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1Introduction
Voting with the rest of the country on who becomes the next president, bidding against other com-
panies on a multi-million dollar highway construction contract from the government or commanding
armies in a war - the common factor in all these situations is that the outcome does not solely depend
on the actions taken by one participant alone but also on the actions taken by the others. Every
day we are faced with such strategic situations the outcome of which depends on our interaction
with other people, albeit the outcome is typically of far less import. Think for example of everyday
situations like voting with colleagues on where to go for lunch, bidding on a rare Ramones record on
Ebay or playing a round of Risk with friends.
Game theory attempts to model people’s behavior in such strategic situations mathematically.
According to Aumann (1987), we could therefore also call it “interactive decision theory”. As he puts
it, “game theory is a sort of umbrella or ‘uniﬁed ﬁeld’ theory for the rational side of social science,
where ‘social’ is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers,
animals, plants).” By drawing on game theoretic analysis and methods we are able to enhance our
understanding of vast areas of human and non-human interaction. This makes game theory broadly
appealing to various ﬁelds of research including economics, political science, computer science and
biology. The signiﬁcance of game theory as a ﬁeld of study was underlined in 2005 when Robert
Aumann and Thomas Schelling received the Nobel Prize in Economics “for having enhanced our
understanding of conﬂict and cooperation through game-theory analysis” (Royal Swedish Academy
of Sciences, 2005).
1.1 Mechanism Design
The topic of this thesis falls into a sub-ﬁeld of game theory called mechanism design. In 2007 the
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences recognized the importance of this research area by awarding the
Nobel Prize in Economics to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson “for having laid
the foundations of mechanism design theory” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2007).
1
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
But what is mechanism design, and why is it such an important ﬁeld of research? In order to
address these questions let us brieﬂy consider a simple but illustrative cake division problem. A
mother baked a cake for her two children. Upon receiving the cake both children start ﬁghting over
its division, each one trying to score the biggest piece possible. The mother wants to fairly divide
the cake in order to end the argument. However, no matter how she cuts the cake, one child will
always complain because it feels that it received a smaller piece than the other one. A mechanism
that resolves this problem is to let one child divide up the cake and to let the other one choose a
piece.
This is a mechanism design problem. In this little example there exists a mechanism designer, the
mother, who wants to achieve a certain goal, in this case fair allocation of the cake. But she does not
know which allocation would be considered fair. The children are participants with diﬀerent goals.
They do not care about the mother’s fairness objective, each child is just interested in getting the
biggest piece of cake. Employing the above described mechanism aligns the goals of the designer with
those of the participants. For this the children do not have to take the mother’s fairness objective into
account. Just by following their own myopic interests and adhering to the rules of the mechanism
the mother’s goal gets satisﬁed.
Mechanism design theory is concerned with such situations in which some desirable design goals
have to be aligned with diverging participants’ goals. Typical research questions include: Which
design goals are achievable in certain situations and which are not? If a goal is achievable, which
mechanism can be used?
Clearly this makes the application of mechanism design theory interesting for many areas of our
society, may it be the private or the public sector. Think for example of a company that went
bankrupt and gets liquidated. The goal of the trustee in bankruptcy is to gather as much money
as possible for the creditors. The potential buyers on the other hand want to maximize their own
proﬁts. Which method should the trustee use to sell oﬀ the remaining company assets? Or consider a
ﬁrm that wants to procure production materials. The goal of the ﬁrm is to minimize its procurement
costs whereas the potential suppliers again aim at maximizing their own proﬁts. Which procurement
method should the ﬁrm employ? A public sector example is the government trying to allocate public
resources such as mining rights or spectrum licenses. The government is concerned with maximizing
society’s overall social welfare while the competing companies are concerned with the maximization
of their own proﬁts. What is a good method of resource allocation? Another public goal is the stop
of global warming. How can the government set incentives for the industry to reduce its emission of
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
1.1. Mechanism Design 3
greenhouse gases?
Before we establish how this thesis ﬁts into the ﬁeld of mechanism design theory, it will be helpful
to describe some concepts in more detail.
1.1.1 Some Basic Concepts
As established above, when we discuss games, we mean situations in which the interaction of several
agents leads to some outcome. Mechanism design is the branch of game theory that concerns itself
with designing the rules of games. A game can yield several possible outcomes. Each participating
agent has a set of possible actions at his disposal that he can choose from. His choice of action
inﬂuences the outcome of the game. How exactly is speciﬁed by a mechanism which deﬁnes the
rules of the game. Such a mechanism consists of two rules, an allocation rule and a payment rule.
Based on the actions taken by all the agents, the allocation rule determines the outcome of the game.
Similarly, the payment rule determines for each agent a payment to make or to receive.
In order to illustrate the above let us consider the auction for a painting as an example. The
agents in this auction game are the participating bidders. One possible outcome of the auction is for
example that bidder A wins the painting. Another one would be for bidder B to win. The action a
bidder can take to inﬂuence the auction outcome is to make a money bid for the painting. Based on
the bids from all the bidders an allocation rule determines who gets the painting and a payment rule
determines how much everyone has to pay.
Four basic auction formats are the English, the Dutch, the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid and the second-
price sealed-bid auction. The English auction format is the one closest to the Latin root of the word
auction, augere - to increase. The price of the painting is successively increased, via the auctioneer or
via bids from the bidders, until all but one bidder decided to drop out of the auction. The painting
is then allocated to the remaining bidder, and he has to pay the last standing price. As well as in
the other three auction formats, the losers pay nothing. The Dutch auction is the converse of the
English auction. The name stems from the ﬂower auctions in the Netherlands where this auction
format plays a predominant role. In this auction format the auctioneer sets an initial price for the
painting which is successively lowered until one bidder accepts the standing price. The painting is
then allocated to him at this price. In the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction bidders are asked to submit
sealed bids, for example sealed envelopes containing their bids. The painting is allocated to the bidder
who submitted the highest bid at a price equal to his bid. The second-price sealed-bid auction works
essentially in the same way. The bidders are asked to submit sealed bids, and whoever submitted
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the highest bid wins the painting. However, the price that the winner has to pay is not equal to his
own bid but equal to the second highest bid. This auction format was proposed by William Vickrey
(1961), therefore it is also commonly referred to as Vickrey auction.
The agents have preferences over the diﬀerent possible outcomes of the game. An agent’s outcome
preferences are expressed by his valuation function. Additionally, agents’ outcome valuations are also
dependent on their types. An agent’s type represents information available to him that is inﬂuential
to his valuation of the diﬀerent possible outcomes. Throughout this thesis we work in a framework
of private information. That is, an agent’s type is known to himself but it is not known to any of
the other agents. Typically, it is assumed that agents have independent valuations where an agent’s
valuation depends only on his own type. So an agent’s valuation of some outcome would not change if
he would get to know any other agent’s type. The auction setting presented in Chapter 4 is an example
for this. However, the settings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 allow for interdependent valuations.
This means that in these settings an agent’s valuation for an outcome is not only inﬂuenced by his
own type but also by the types of the other agents. An agent’s outcome valuation together with his
payment make up his utility. Throughout the whole thesis we work in a framework of quasi-linear
utilities. That is, an agent’s utility is his outcome valuation minus his payment. Agents are assumed
to be rational, meaning that each agent aims at maximizing his own utility.
Coming back to the painting auction example, an agent’s type can for example be a representation
of how much he likes the painting. In an independent valuations scenario an agent’s valuation for
owning the painting would then only depend on how much he likes the painting himself. In an
interdependent valuations scenario his valuation for owning the painting would also depend on how
much the others like it. Possible reasons are that this inﬂuences the painting’s potential resale value
and the owner’s prestige with regard to his standing within the art collector community.
An agent’s strategy assigns an action to each of his possible types. In this thesis we focus on
direct revelation mechanisms, a special class of mechanisms. In a direct revelation mechanism the
only action an agent can take is to announce a type. An agent’s strategy is called dominant if
it maximizes his utility for every possible combination of actions taken by the other agents. One
goal of the mechanism designer could be to design a direct revelation mechanism which is dominant
strategy incentive compatible. This means creating a mechanism such that truthfully announcing his
own type is a dominant strategy for every agent. In this thesis we are concerned with Bayes-Nash
settings. In these settings agents do not know which types the others have but the distribution of
potential types for each agent is publicly known. More speciﬁcally, we are investigating Bayes-Nash
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incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms. This means that truthfully reporting his own
type maximizes each agent’s expected utility, given that all the other agents also report truthfully.
Besides truthfulness a mechanism designer might strive for other goals, for example eﬃciency. An
eﬃcient mechanism picks an outcome that maximizes social welfare. That is, the outcome maximizes
the sum total of all agents’ valuations. Another potential goal is optimality. In our painting auction
example this would mean picking an auction format that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue. In
case the agents do not have to participate in the mechanism but can opt out of the whole process
the designer might want to consider individual rationality as a design goal in order to assure himself
of the agents’ participation. Individual rationality ensures that truthfully acting agents receive non-
negative utility when participating in the mechanism.
1.2 Thesis Outline
As established before, a mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. In a recent
stream of literature researchers are concerned with the characterization of dominant strategy incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanisms in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation alone.
That is, they want to characterize precisely those allocation rules for which they can guarantee
the existence of a payment rule that makes the resulting mechanism dominant strategy incentive
compatible.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we adapt this idea to Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms. In
Chapter 2 we consider direct revelation mechanisms in settings where agents have independently
distributed, one-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility functions.1 Agents are allowed to have
interdependent valuations. We show that monotonicity, a condition on the allocation rule, is a
necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. This condition expresses that an agent’s
expected gain in valuation for truthfully reporting a type t instead of misreporting a type s should
be at least as big as his expected gain in valuation for misreporting t instead of truthfully reporting
s.
In order to establish the suﬃciency of monotonicity for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility we
take a network approach similar to the one taken by Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu
(2005) in their work with regard to dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Recognizing
that the constraints inherent in the deﬁnition of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility have a natural
network interpretation we build complete directed graphs for agents’ type spaces. To do so we
1This chapter is based on Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2005).
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6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
associate a node with each type and put a directed edge between each ordered pair of nodes. The
length of the edge going from the node associated with type s to the node associated with the type
t is deﬁned as the cost of manipulation. That is, the expected diﬀerence in an agent’s valuation for
truthfully reporting s instead of misreporting t. Monotonicity corresponds to the absence of 2-cycles
with negative length in these graphs.
We show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if the graphs de-
scribed above contain no negative length cycles. This result is the Bayes-Nash equivalent to a ﬁnding
by Rochet (1987) who shows that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in
terms of the absence of negative length cycles in similar graphs.
We demonstrate that in order for monotonicity to be a suﬃcient condition for Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatibility we have to put further restrictions on our setting. Such conditions are decomposi-
tion monotonicity of the costs of manipulation or agents’ valuation functions satisfying non-decreasing
expected diﬀerences. For these restrictions we can establish the suﬃciency of monotonicity. Char-
acterization results of Myerson (1981), Malakhov and Vohra (2004) and Feng (2008) for Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible mechanisms follow as special cases from our characterization results. Their set-
tings can be folded into our framework which allows for a broader class of type spaces and alternative
forms interdependencies between agents’ valuations.
Furthermore, we show how to construct corresponding payment rules for Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible allocation rules by using shortest path length in the agent’s graphs. An allocation rule
satisﬁes revenue equivalence if all payment rules that make it Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield
the same expected payments up to an additive constant.We establish that revenue equivalence holds
if agents’ type spaces are convex and their expected valuations are convex in their own types. Thus,
we establish revenue equivalence under the same conditions as Krishna and Maenner (2001).
In Chapter 3 we extend the analysis of the foregoing chapter to settings with multi-dimensional
type spaces.2 Considering the painting auction from the beginning, one component of agent A’s type
might reﬂect how much he likes the painting. Another component could reﬂect how happy he would
be in case agent B wins the painting because they are friends. Yet another component of his type
could reﬂect how sad he would be in case agent C wins because they are long-standing rivals.
We follow the same network approach as before and keep the structure of the chapter as close
as possible to the foregoing one. This yields some overlap between both chapters but in this way
Chapter 3 can be read as an independent entity. In this chapter we have to restrict agents’ type
2This chapter is based on Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b).
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spaces to be convex and their expected valuation functions to be convex in their own types. We
show that if the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone or agents’ valuation functions
satisfying non-decreasing expected diﬀerences then monotonicity in conjunction with an integrability
condition is both necessary and suﬃcient for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Although mono-
tonicity alone is not suﬃcient anymore, we still achieve a characterization that is purely based on
the valuations and the allocation rule. Characterization results of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b) follow as special cases from
our characterization results. Again we can establish revenue equivalence under the same conditions
as Krishna and Maenner (2001).
In Chapter 4 we consider scoring auctions.3 In the painting auction example described before,
competition among the bidders works only via the price. Essentially every bidder announces a price
he this willing to pay and whoever makes the highest oﬀer gets the painting. However, sometimes
the price of an item is not the only concern and other non-monetary attributes play a role as well.
Consider for example several construction companies competing for a government contract to build
a highway. One important feature is of course the price. Another one is the completion time. So
one company might oﬀer to build the highway for 20 million dollars within 6 months and another
company might oﬀer to build it for 15 million dollars but only within 9 months.
One common method employed to deal with the analysis of scoring auction settings is to skillfully
transform the setting into that of a standard, price-only auction. Then known results about these
price-only auctions can be applied. We do this for a scoring auction setting in which several items with
multiple attributes need to be allocated. We show how to transform this setting into a combinatorial
auction setting that looks like the linear valuations setting discussed in Section 3.4.1 of the foregoing
chapter. In doing this we extend the work of Asker and Cantillon (2008) to a framework with
multiple items. Asker and Cantillon (2008) consider a scoring auction setting in which a single
item with multiple attributes has to be allocated. They transform this into a single item, price-only
auction setting.
3This chapter is based on Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007a).
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2Monotonicity and One-Dimensional Types
An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that
truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism
consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This chapter provides characterizations of
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social choice settings where agents have one-
dimensional and independently distributed types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent
valuations. The characterizations are derived by constructing complete directed graphs on agents’
type spaces with cost of manipulation as lengths of edges. Thus, the work presented in this chapter
serves as the Bayes-Nash extension of a recent stream of literature that employs a network based
approach to characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules.
Monotonicity of the allocation rule corresponds to the condition that all 2-cycles in the above
mentioned graphs have non-negative length. In case agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing
expected diﬀerences, it is shown that monotonicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility. The characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility in models
with one-dimensional types is a well-explored ﬁeld. Next to a condition on the allocation rule such
characterizations commonly employ also conditions on agents’ utility functions. Here we provide a
characterization in terms of a simple property on the allocation alone. Our approach also allows us
to work in a very general setup that allows for broad forms of interdependent valuations and ﬁnite as
well as inﬁnite type spaces.
It is shown how corresponding payment rules are constructed for Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
allocation rules by utilizing shortest path lengths in agents’ graphs. In the case that agents have convex
type spaces and expected valuations which are convex in their types, it is established that revenue
equivalence holds for all incentive compatible allocation rules. This result was already established by
Krishna and Maenner (2001). However, our network approach yields an alternate proof of this result.
9
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we concern ourselves with social choice settings where agents have independently
distributed, one-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility functions. That is, an agent’s utility is
his valuation of an outcome minus a payment. We allow for interdependent valuations across agents.
Thus, an agent’s valuation of an outcome can depend on the types of other agents as well. We
consider direct revelation mechanisms. Direct mechanisms consist of two rules: an allocation rule
and a payment rule. Given a proﬁle of type reports from all agents, the allocation rule determines
the outcome, for example who wins the object in a single item auction. The payment rule determines
the payment each agent has to make. An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
if there exists a payment rule such that truthful reporting of agents’ types constitutes a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the corresponding direct revelation mechanism consisting of the two rules.
One major issue addressed in this chapter is the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compat-
ible allocation rules in the social choice settings under consideration. That is, we want to characterize
precisely those allocation rules for which we can guarantee the existence of a payment rule making
them Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Additionally, we aim for a framework that enables us to
construct such a payment rule for a particular allocation rule, if one exists. Take for example an
allocation rule deciding in a single item auction for each set of bids which agent wins the object. We
want to be able to decide whether there exists a pricing scheme for winning bids that makes truthful
bidding a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In case the answer is yes, we want to have the means to construct
such a pricing scheme.
The construction of payment rules is the second major issue addressed in this chapter. We
show how to build a payment rule that makes an allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
Furthermore, we investigate how much freedom exists in the construction process. Do all payment
rules that make a particular allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield the same expected
payments for the agents? Or is there room for the existence of payment rules that yield diﬀering
expected payments for the agents?
2.1.1 Related Work
A recent stream of literature has focused on the characterization of dominant strategy incentive
compatible allocation rules in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. An allocation
rule is dominant strategy incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule such that for any report
of the other agents an agent maximizes his own utility by reporting truthfully his type. Examples
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are Bikhchandani, Chatterji, Lavi, Mu’alem, Nisan and Sen (2006), Monderer (2008), Gui, Mu¨ller
and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005).
The later two establish their results by making a link to network theory. Take for example Saks
and Yu (2005). They consider a setting in which the allocation rule maps agents’ types into a ﬁnite
set of possible outcomes. It is shown that dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules
in this setting can be characterized in terms of weak monotonicity. In order to derive this result
they construct complete directed graphs in the following way: Take some agent and ﬁx a proﬁle of
type reports for the others. Now, a directed graph is constructed by associating a node with each
outcome and putting a directed edge between each ordered pair of nodes. Take two outcomes a and
b. Consider the diﬀerence of the valuation of a and the valuation of b with respect to every type
for which truthfully reporting this type yields outcome a. The length of the network edge from a to
b is deﬁned as the inﬁmum of all these diﬀerences. In this fashion a graph is constructed for every
agent and every possible report proﬁle of the other agents. Weak monotonicity states that for any
two diﬀerent outcomes a and b, the sum of the two edge lengths from a to b and from b to a is
non-negative.
Earlier, Rochet (1987) characterized dominant strategy implementation in cases where the set
of outcomes is not necessarily ﬁnite, an assumption that is made in all of the above mentioned
references. For the case where agents have one-dimensional, convex type spaces and their valuation
functions satisfy the increasing diﬀerences property, Rochet(1987) shows that dominant strategy
incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation
rule alone.
Monotonicity in conjunction with a condition on agents’ utility functions is also used to character-
ize Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in settings featuring one-dimensional types, see
for example Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 23, or Jehle and Reny (2001), Chap-
ter 9. Myerson (1981) gives such a characterization for a single item auction setting where agents
have one-dimensional, convex type spaces and interdependent valuations. A similar characterization
result is provided by Feng (2008). In her setting multiple, commonly ranked items are auctioned oﬀ
to agents having one-dimensional, convex type spaces and independent valuations.
Malakhov and Vohra (2004) consider an auction setting where multiple units of an homogeneous
good are auctioned oﬀ to several agents with constant marginal valuations. The one-dimensional
type of an agent represents his marginal valuation for an extra unit of the good. Each agent has a
ﬁnite set of possible types. Agents’ valuations are independent. Malakhov and Vohra (2004) show
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that Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility holds if and only if the allocation rule is monotone. So their
characterization is in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule alone. In order to
establish this result they also make a link to network theory.
Archer and Kleinberg (2008) consider a single agent setting featuring linear valuation functions.
For convex type spaces they characterize incentive compatibility in terms of a monotonicity and a
local integrability condition of the allocation rule. They also deliver some insight for non-convex type
spaces.
In addition to the characterization result mentioned above, Myerson (1981) also shows that in
the setting considered by him revenue equivalence holds for all Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
allocation rules. Krishna and Maenner (2001) provide such a result for a setting where each agent
has a convex type space and a valuation function that is convex in the agent’s type. Heydenreich,
Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra (2009) derive a characterization of revenue equivalence under more general
conditions. Similar to Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005) they use networks
to establish their results. For countable outcome spaces the aforementioned result of Krishna and
Maenner (2001) follows as a consequence of their work.
2.1.2 Our Contribution
In Section 2.2 we state some basic assumptions and deﬁnitions. Throughout the chapter we as-
sume that agents have quasi-linear utility functions and independently distributed, privately known,
one-dimensional types. Furthermore, we allow for interdependent valuations. We do not put any
restrictions on the number of possible outcomes.
If an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, then there exists a payment rule such
that an agent’s expected utility for truthfully reporting his type t is at least as high as his expected
utility for misreporting some type s. Similarly, an agent’s expected utility for truthfully reporting
type s is at least as high as his expected utility for misreporting type t. By combining these two
conditions we get a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. This condition is the expected
utility equivalent to the weak monotonicity condition utilized by Saks and Yu (2005) in the context
of dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules. Monotonicity is a necessary condition for
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. It expresses that the expected gain in valuation for truthfully
reporting t instead of misreporting s should be at least as big as the expected gain in valuation for
misreporting t instead of truthfully reporting s.
Similar to the network approach of Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005) we
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
2.1. Introduction 13
construct graphs in Section 2.3. Recognizing that the constraints inherent in the deﬁnition of Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility have a natural network interpretation we build complete directed graphs
for agents’ type spaces. To do so we associate a node with each type and put a directed edge between
each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge going from the node associated with type s to
the node associated with the type t is deﬁned as the cost of manipulation. That is, the expected
diﬀerence in an agent’s valuation for truthfully reporting s instead of misreporting t.
Diﬀerent from the networks constructed by Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005)
(see description earlier in this section) we construct only one graph for each agent. This is because
we work in terms of expectations and do not consider each possible type proﬁle of the other agents
separately. Furthermore, each of these graphs contains (except for the case of ﬁnite type spaces) an
inﬁnite number of nodes as we associate a node with each possible type of an agent. One could also
construct outcome based graphs, as done by Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005),
by associating a node with each possible probability distribution over outcomes. However, these
graphs possibly also contain an inﬁnite number of nodes since we allow that the diﬀerent possible
type reports of an agent induce an inﬁnite number of probability distributions over outcomes. For
example, in the single item auction framework presented in Section 2.6.1 it is quite natural to allow
that every diﬀerent type report of an agent yields a diﬀerent expected conditional probability for
him to win the object.
We show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if the networks
described above contain no negative length cycles. Rochet (1987) shows that dominant strategy
incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of the absence of negative length cycles in
similar graphs. Our result is the Bayes-Nash equivalent for his ﬁnding. Furthermore, we show as
a lemma that the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone if the allocation rule satisﬁes
monotonicity and agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences (deﬁnitions
can be found in Section 2.2).
Agents’ types are restricted to be one-dimensional. No further restrictions on agents’ type spaces
are made. That is, we allow for inﬁnite type spaces as considered by Myerson (1981) and Feng
(2008) as well as for ﬁnite type spaces as considered by Malakhov and Vohra (2004). Without any
additional restrictions our setting is too general in order for monotonicity to be a suﬃcient condition
for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. This is illustrated by an example in Section 2.4. However,
for the case that the costs of manipulation are assumed to be decomposition monotone we are able to
show that monotonicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
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Using the lemma from Section 2.3 it follows that monotonicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility for the case that agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-
decreasing expected diﬀerences. The aforementioned auction settings of Malakhov and Vohra (2004),
Myerson (1981) and Feng (2008) are special cases of this framework. Compared to their settings,
our framework allows not only for a broader class of type spaces but also for alternative forms of
interdependencies between agents’ valuations. How their settings can be folded into our framework
is illustrated at the end of this chapter in Section 2.6.
Thus, the main contribution of Section 2.4 is to derive a complete characterization of Bayes-Nash
incentive compatibility in terms of monotonicity. Thereby we achieve a characterization that depends
purely on the valuations and the allocation rule. This is done in a very broad framework that allows
for ﬁnite and inﬁnite type spaces as well as interdependent valuations. Our characterization resembles
the one derived by Rochet (1987) for dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, our results
do not follow from Rochet immediately. Rochet (1987) requires agents to have convex type spaces
and twice diﬀerentiable valuation functions, whereas our setting allows for broader classes of type
spaces and valuation functions.
If we know that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, we would also like to know
how to construct a corresponding payment rule. In Section 2.5 we show that such payment rules can
be built by making use of shortest path lengths in the agents’ networks. We also investigate how much
room there exists for having diﬀerent payment rules that make a particular allocation rule Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible. Speciﬁcally, we establish that Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation
rules satisfy revenue equivalence if agents have convex type spaces and expected valuations that are
convex in their own types. Thus, using our network approach, we can establish revenue equivalence
under the same conditions as Krishna and Maenner (2001). Using examples featuring discrete type
spaces and concave valuation functions we illustrate that these conditions cannot easily be relaxed.
2.2 Model & Deﬁnitions
We consider a setting in which there is a set of possible outcomes Γ, as well as a set of agents
N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent has some private information which is modeled by a one-dimensional
type. Speciﬁcally, each agent i has a type ti ∈ T i with T i ⊆ R. The set of all complete type
proﬁles t =
(
t1, . . . , tn
)
is denoted T , whereas the set of all type proﬁles excluding agent i, t−i =(
t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn
)
, is denoted T−i. We assume that agents’ types are independently dis-
tributed. Assuming that agent i’s types are distributed according to some density πi on T i, the joint
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density π−i on T−i is then given by
π−i
(
t−i
)
=
∏
j∈N
j =i
πj
(
tj
)
.
We consider direct revelation mechanisms, consisting of a payment rule and an allocation rule.
Based on a proﬁle of reported types from all the agents, a payment rule
P : T → Rn
assigns each agent with a payment. So, given a report proﬁle r−i of the others, reporting type ri
results in a payment Pi
(
ri, r−i
)
for agent i. Similarly, an allocation rule
f : T → Γ
maps each proﬁle of reported types into an outcome.
Suppose agent i has true type ti and reports ri while the others have true types t−i and report
r−i. The value that agent i assigns to the resulting outcome of the allocation rule is denoted by
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
. Thus, we allow for interdependent valuations across agents. That is, an
agent’s valuation for an outcome is not only inﬂuenced by his own type but also by the types of the
other agents. Take for example an auction for a painting, see Klemperer (1999), where agents’ types
reﬂect how much they like the painting. An agent’s valuation for owning the painting depends on the
types of the others as they aﬀect the possible resale value of the painting and the owner’s prestige.
Utilities are quasi-linear. That is, an agent’s utility is his valuation of an allocation minus his
payment. Let us consider agent i and assume that all other agents report truthfully. If agent i has
true type ti, then his expected utility for making a report ri is given by
U i(ri | ti) =
∫
T−i
(
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (2.1)
If agent i’s types have a discrete distribution this simpliﬁes to
U i(ri | ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
(
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (2.2)
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We assume E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
to be ﬁnite ∀ri, ti ∈ T i. This holds for example if ∀ri, ti the
valuation function vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
, viewed as a function of t−i, is bounded. This also holds in
the discrete case.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility) An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash in-
centive compatible if there exists a payment rule P such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
. (2.3)
If an allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, we have also
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (2.4)
By adding (2.3) and (2.4) we get
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
+ vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
+ vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
.
(2.5)
Notice that agent i’s expected payments for reporting types ri and r˜i appear on both sides of the above
inequality and can be canceled. This however is only possible because we work under the assumption
of independently distributed types. Dropping this assumption would result in the following: Because
of stemming from (2.3), the expected payment for reporting ri on the left-hand side of (2.5) would be
conditional on agent i having true type ri. On the other hand, the expected payment for reporting
ri on the right-hand side of (2.5) would be conditional on agent i having true type r˜i since it stems
from (2.4). Thus, the two expected payments could not be canceled anymore.
Canceling the expected payments and rearranging the terms in (2.5) yields the following mono-
tonicity condition:
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Monotonicity) An allocation rule f satisﬁes monotonicity if ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈
T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)]
.
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The above condition is the expected utility equivalent to the 2-cycle inequality of Gui, Mu¨ller and
Vohra (2004), the weak monotonicity (W-Mon) condition of Bikhchandani, Chatterji, Lavi, Mu’alem,
Nisan and Sen (2006) and the weak monotonicity condition of Saks and Yu (2005). It is the same
as the condition termed weak monotonicity in Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b). The rationale for
naming this condition monotonicity becomes evident once we consider valuation functions that are
linear with respect to agents’ types, see for example the applications presented in Section 2.6 of this
chapter. Obviously, monotonicity is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. In
Section 2.4 we discuss the suﬃciency of monotonicity.
Furthermore, let us introduce at this point the following condition for agents’ valuation functions:
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Non-decreasing Expected Diﬀerences) Consider ri, r˜i, ti, t˜i ∈ T i such that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)]
.
The valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected diﬀerences if ∀t¯i ∈ T i s.t.
t¯i = (1− α)t˜i + αti, α > 1 we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
.
The above condition deals with the marginal change in expected valuation with respect to the reported
type. It is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Consider the change in expected valuation for making a report
ri instead of r˜i. Assume that there exist types ti and t˜i such that this change is larger or at least as
large if the agent has true type ti instead of t˜i. Now consider the agent having a true type which is
even further away from t˜i than ti (in the direction of ti). The condition then requires that the change
in expected valuation is at least as large as in the case where the agent has true type ti. That is, the
point corresponding to this change in expected valuation in Figure 2.1 has to lie in the shaded area.
This requirement is slightly weaker than the condition known as increasing (or isotone) diﬀerences
(see for example Milgrom (2004)) which asserts that the marginal change in valuation with respect
to the allocation is strictly increasing in the type. Speciﬁcally, the increasing diﬀerences condition
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t˜i ti agent i’s type
Figure 2.1: Illustration non-decreasing expected diﬀerences: The change in expected valuation for
making a report ri instead of r˜i, E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
, is depicted along
the y-axis.
requires that for all ri > rˆi and all ti > tˆi in T i,
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rˆi, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
> E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| tˆi, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rˆi, t−i
)
| tˆi, t−i
)]
.
Note that an agent’s valuation function which is linear in his true type satisﬁes the non-decreasing
expected diﬀerences condition, see for example the application settings discussed in Section 2.6.
2.3 A Network Interpretation
We begin this section by brieﬂy reviewing a well-known result from the ﬁeld of network ﬂow theory.1
Let X = {x1, . . . , xk} be a ﬁnite set of variables. Consider the following system of constraints:
xi − xj ≤ wij ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (2.6)
where wij is some constant speciﬁc to the ordered pair (i, j). The system can be associated with
a network by constructing a directed, weighted graph whose nodes correspond to the variables. A
directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge from the node
1For a comprehensive introduction to network ﬂows we refer the reader to Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993).
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corresponding to xi to the node corresponding to xj is given by wij .
It is a well-known result (see for example Shostak (1981)) that there is no negative length cycle in
the associated network if and only if the system of linear inequalities in (2.6) is feasible. The system
being feasible means that there exists an assignment of real values to the variables such that the
constraints in (2.6) are satisﬁed. Furthermore, if the system is feasible then one feasible solution is
to assign to each xi the length of a shortest path from the node associated with xi to some arbitrary
source node.2
In order to see that the constraints in (2.3) have a natural network interpretation it is useful to
rewrite (2.3) as follows:
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (2.7)
Considering a speciﬁc allocation rule, the right-hand side of (2.7) is a constant. Thus, we have
a system of diﬀerence constraints as described in (2.6) (except that we are now dealing with a
potentially inﬁnite number of variables and constraints).
Given this observation, we associate the system of inequalities (2.7) with a network in the same
way as is described above. For each agent we build a complete directed graph T if . A node is associated
with each type and a directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. For agent i the length
of an edge directed from ri to r˜i is denoted li(ri, r˜i) and is deﬁned as the cost of manipulation:
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (2.8)
Given our previous assumptions, the edge length is ﬁnite. For technical reasons we allow for loops.
However, note that an edge directed from ri to ri has length li(ri, ri) = 0.
Using this deﬁnition of the edge lengths, the monotonicity condition can be written as
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
+ li
(
r˜i, ri
)
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i.
So monotonicity corresponds to the absence of negative length 2-cycles in the agents’ graphs described
above.
Rochet (1987) observed that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in
2In order to be consistent with the existing literature we deﬁned the system of constraints as in (2.6). However,
in network theory the constraints are commonly deﬁned as xj − xi ≤ wij . In this case, if the system is feasible then
one feasible solution is to assign to each xi the length of a shortest path from some arbitrary source node to the node
associated with xi.
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terms of the absence of negative length cycles in similar graphs. Using the same proof technique, we
can derive such a characterization for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility as well.
Theorem 2.1 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if there is no
negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N .
Proof (Adapted from Rochet (1987).)
Take some agent i and let C =
(
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
)
denote a cycle in T if . Let us assume that f is
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Using (2.7) and the edge length deﬁnition (2.8), this implies that
for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
Adding up these inequalities yields
0 ≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
so cycle C has non-negative length.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists no negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N . For each agent
i we pick an arbitrary source node ri0 ∈ T
i and deﬁne ∀ri ∈ T i
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if , that is, all paths that
start at ri and end at ri0. Absence of negative length cycles implies that p
i
(
ri0
)
= 0. Furthermore,
∀ri ∈ T i we have
pi
(
ri0
)
≤ pi
(
ri
)
+ li
(
ri0, r
i
)
which implies that pi
(
ri
)
is ﬁnite. For every pair ri, r˜i ∈ T i we also have
pi
(
ri
)
≤ pi
(
r˜i
)
+ li
(
ri, r˜i
)
.
Thus, by setting
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
∀t−i ∈ T−i
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and using (2.8) we get
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Hence, the constraints in (2.7) are satisﬁed and f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Note that it
is actually suﬃcient to pick a payment rule such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ ci. This allows for
a variety of payment rules yielding the same expected payments up to an additive constant.

Let us conclude this section with a condition for the costs of manipulation that is used in the
derivation of the characterization theorems presented in the following section.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Decomposition Monotonicity) The costs of manipulation are decomposition
monotone if ∀ri, r¯i ∈ T i and ∀ri ∈ T i s.t. ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i, α ∈ (0, 1) we have
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
.
So considering a pair of nodes, if decomposition monotonicity holds then the direct edge between
those nodes is at least as long as any path connecting the same two nodes via nodes lying on the line
segment between them. An illustrative example is given in Figure 2.2. Decomposition monotonicity
implies that the edge from ri to r¯i is at least as long as the path A =
(
ri, ri∗∗, r¯
i
)
and that A is at
least as long as the path A˜ =
(
ri, ri∗, r
i
∗∗, r
i
∗∗∗, r¯
i
)
.
ri r¯iri∗ r
i
∗∗ r
i
∗∗∗
Figure 2.2: Example decomposition monotonicity.
Monotonicity and non-decreasing expected diﬀerences together imply that the costs of manipu-
lation are decomposition monotone:
Lemma 2.1 If f satisﬁes monotonicity and the valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected
diﬀerences then the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.
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Proof
Take some agent i and let ri, r¯i ∈ T i. Let ri ∈ T i such that ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Monotonicity implies that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
.
Since the valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected diﬀerences we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Adding E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
on both sides of the later inequality
yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Notice that the ﬁrst and the last term on the left-hand side of the inequality cancel. Hence
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Using (2.8) this can be written as
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
,
so the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.

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2.4 Suﬃciency of Monotonicity
As mentioned in Section 2.2, monotonicity is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patibility. In this section we show that this condition is also suﬃcient if decomposition monotonicity
(see Deﬁnition 2.4) is satisﬁed. As demonstrated earlier, monotonicity corresponds to the absence
of negative length 2-cycles in T if , ∀i ∈ N (see Section 2.3). In order to establish suﬃciency, we
show that this implies that there do not exist any cycles with negative length. Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility then follows from Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that the allocation rule f and agents’ valuation functions are such that the
costs of manipulation satisfy decomposition monotonicity. Then, f is Bayes-Nash incentive compat-
ible if and only if f satisﬁes monotonicity.
Proof
The necessity of monotonicity follows trivially (see Section 2.2). For the other direction suppose that
decomposition monotonicity is satisﬁed and f satisﬁes monotonicity.
Take some agent i and let C =
(
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
)
denote a cycle in T if . Whenever an edge of
C connects two non-neighboring nodes, we substitute this edge with a path connecting the same two
nodes via edges that have the same direction and only connect neighboring nodes. By doing this we
generate a new cycle C˜ that has the same nodes as C but consists only of edges between neighboring
nodes. An example of this procedure is given in Figure 2.3.
Decomposition monotonicity implies that the length of C is larger than or equal to the length of
C˜. Since C˜ is a cycle, we know that at each node the number of edges entering equals the number of
edges leaving. This implies that the length of C˜ can be written as the sum of 2-cycle lengths. Since f
satisﬁes monotonicity there are no 2-cycles with negative length. It follows that C has non-negative
length as well.
Finally, absence of cycles with negative length in T if , ∀i ∈ N implies that f is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible (see Theorem 2.1).

If agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences we can state directly the
following:
Theorem 2.3 Suppose that agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences.
Then, the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if f satisﬁes monotonicity.
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C
C˜
Figure 2.3: The original cycle C and the newly generated cycle C˜.
Proof
Again, the necessity of monotonicity follows trivially (see Section 2.2). In order to establish suﬃ-
ciency, note that monotonicity together with non-decreasing expected diﬀerences implies that the
costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone, see Lemma 2.1. Finally, we apply Theorem 2.2.

Note that monotonicity of the allocation rule f is not a suﬃcient condition for Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatibility if the cost of manipulation are not decomposition monotone. This is illustrated in
the following example where we present a very simple setting and two allocation rules. In both cases
decomposition monotonicity is violated and monotonicity is satisﬁed. However, one allocation rule
is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible while the other one is not.
Example 2.1 For simplicity we assume that there exists only a single agent. His type space T =
{x, y, z} consists of three types x, y, z ∈ R, for which we assume x < y < z. There are three possible
outcomes, speciﬁcally Γ = {a, b, c}. The agent’s valuations for the diﬀerent outcomes, depending on
his type, are stated in Table 2.1.
Let us ﬁrst consider the allocation rule f which is deﬁned as follows: f(x) = b, f(y) = c, f(z) = a.
So, if the agent reports truthfully his type, the allocation rule assigns to him his most preferred
outcome. The corresponding network Tf is depicted in Figure 2.4 (for the deﬁnition of the edge
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Outcome Agent’s type
γ x y z
a 2 0 3
b 3 2 0
c 0 3 2
Table 2.1: The agent’s valuations in Example 2.1.
length see (2.8)). Obviously decomposition monotonicity is not satisﬁed as l(x, z) < l(x, y) + l(y, z).
As easily can be checked, all 2-cycles have length 4, so monotonicity is satisﬁed. Actually, all cycles
have positive length. Hence, by Theorem 2.1 we have that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
x y z
3
3 3
1
1 1
Figure 2.4: The network Tf in Example 2.1.
Now let us consider another allocation rule fˆ which is deﬁned as follows: fˆ(x) = a, fˆ(y) = b,
fˆ(z) = c. That is, if the agent reports truthfully his type, the allocation rule assigns to him his
second most preferred outcome. The corresponding network T
fˆ
is depicted in Figure 2.5. Again
decomposition monotonicity is not satisﬁed as l(z, x) < l(z, y) + l(y, x). As easily can be checked, all
2-cycles have length 1, so monotonicity is satisﬁed. However, the 3-cycle C = (x, y, z, x) has length
l(x, y) + l(y, z) + l(z, x) = −3. The existence of such a negative length cycle implies that f is not
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (see Theorem 2.1).
2.5 Payment Rules
In the foregoing section we characterized Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in terms of
a monotonicity condition. In this section we start out by showing how to construct a corresponding
payment rule for an incentive compatible allocation rule. Afterwards we discuss the issue of revenue
equivalence.
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x y z
-1
-1 -1
2
2 2
Figure 2.5: The network T
fˆ
in Example 2.1.
According to Deﬁnition 2.1 an allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there exists a
payment rule P such that all the incentive compatibility constraints (2.3) are satisﬁed. With Theorem
2.1 (see Section 2.3) we establish that the existence of such a payment rule can be guaranteed if for
all agents the corresponding networks T if do not contain any negative length cycles. In the proof of
the theorem we construct a payment rule by making use of shortest path lengths. Speciﬁcally, for
every agent i we pick an arbitrary source node ri0 and deﬁne for all nodes r
i
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if , that is, all paths that
start at node ri and end at the source node ri0. The payment rule P is then constructed by setting
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Thus, the payment agent i has to make for reporting ri corresponds to the length of the shortest
path in T if from the node r
i to the source node.
As noted at the end of the proof for Theorem 2.1, it is actually suﬃcient to choose a payment
rule such that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ ci.
That is, the expected payment agent i has to make for reporting ri corresponds to the length of the
shortest path from the node ri to the source node plus possibly some constant. Thus, we can observe
that there is room for a variety of payment rules that make the allocation rule f Bayes-Nash incentive
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compatible. First of all, even for a ﬁxed source node there can exist several payment rules yielding
the same expected payments up to an additive constant. Secondly, changing the source node might
lead to payment rules yielding diﬀerent expected payments. Thirdly, there might exist payment rules
that do not evolve from shortest path lengths. The setting described in Section 2.5.2 serves as an
illustrative example for the later two sources of variety.
In the remainder of this section we establish conditions under which we can guarantee that
actually all payment rules that make an allocation rule f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield
the same expected payments for the agents up to an additive constant. Such an allocation rule is
said to be satisfying revenue equivalence. Krishna and Maenner (2001) show that if agents’ type
spaces are convex and their valuation functions are convex in their own types then every Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible allocation rule satisﬁes revenue equivalence. Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz
and Vohra (2009) are concerned with dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules and
the characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic argument. In an application
section they establish that their approach has a natural extension to other notions of incentive
compatibility as well. Speciﬁcally, they show that a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rule
satisﬁes revenue equivalence if and only if for every agent i and all types si, ti ∈ T i the length of
the shortest path from si to ti and the length of the shortest path from ti to si add up to zero.
Furthermore, Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra (2009) establish that the above mentioned result
of Krishna and Maenner (2001) follows as an immediate consequence of their results when the outcome
space is countable.
In the following we show under the same conditions as Krishna and Maenner (2001) that all
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules satisfy revenue equivalence. Although we do not
extend their result, we give an alternate proof using our network based approach. We also present
illustrative example settings in which we relax these conditions. In these settings there exist several
payment rules which make f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, yet do not yield the same expected
payments up to an additive constant.
We begin with the deﬁnition of revenue equivalence:
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Revenue Equivalence) Suppose the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible. We say that f satisﬁes revenue equivalence if for any two payment rules P ,P˜ such that
all the incentive compatibility constraints (2.3) are satisﬁed there exists a constant ci such that we
have
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
P˜i
(
ti, t−i
)]
+ ci ∀ti ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N.
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So, an allocation rule f satisﬁes revenue equivalence if all payment rules that make f Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible yield the same expected payments up to an additive constant. Our notion
of revenue equivalence is equivalent to what is termed payoﬀ equivalence in Krishna and Maenner
(2001).
Suppose that the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Furthermore, suppose
that P is a payment rule such that all the incentive constraints in (2.3) are satisﬁed. Now let us
consider agent i and some types si, ti ∈ T i. Based on (2.3) and (2.8) we have that
E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
si, ti
)
as well as that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
si, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
ti, si
)
.
Together the above inequalities yield
−li
(
ti, si
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
si, ti
)
. (2.9)
That is, for agent i the diﬀerence in expected payments for reporting si or ti is bounded by the length
of the edge from si to ti and the negative length of the backward edge.
Now consider a sequence of nodes between si and ti, A =
(
ri1 = s
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = t
i
)
. Parallel
to the above we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in A that
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
and that
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
.
Similar to (2.9) together this yields
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (2.10)
By summing up the inequalities (2.10) for all elements in A we get
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (2.11)
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Observe that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
Pi
(
ri1, t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rim+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
(2.12)
since all the terms of the summation cancel except for the ﬁrst one and the last one and since we
have that ri1 = s
i and rim+1 = t
i. Now, using (2.12) we can write (2.11) as
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (2.13)
So for any sequence of nodes between si and ti, the diﬀerence in agent i’s expected payments for
reporting si or ti is bounded by the length of the path from si to ti along these nodes and the negative
length of the reverse path along the same nodes. Under certain conditions, stated in Theorem 2.4, we
can guarantee that there exists a sequence of nodes such that the left-hand side and the right-hand
side of (2.13) are equal and hence, the allocation rule f satisﬁes revenue equivalence.
Before we state the main result of this section, let us introduce the following helpful result. Sup-
pose that agent i’s expected valuation functions E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
are convex in his true
type. Let ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
denote the set of all subgradients ofE−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
at ti. Note that ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
is a non-empty set for all ti ∈ T i due to the convexity
of E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
, see for example Rockafellar (1970), p.218. For every ri ∈ T i we pick
an element of ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
which we denote by xi
(
ri
)
. That is,
xi
(
ri
)
∈ ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
∀ri ∈ T i. (2.14)
Lemma 2.2 Suppose that agent i’s expected valuation functions E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
are con-
vex in his true type. If the allocation rule f satisﬁes monotonicity then xi (.) is monotonically in-
creasing.
Proof
Let us assume that agent i has expected valuation functions which are convex in his true type.
Furthermore, let us assume that the allocation rule f is monotone.
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Consider any two types si, ti ∈ T i. Since the allocation rule f is monotone we have that
li
(
si, ti
)
+ li
(
ti, si
)
≥ 0.
Using the edge length deﬁnition (2.8) this can be written as
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)]
≥ 0. (2.15)
Note that by deﬁnition of the subgradient
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)]
≥
(
ti − si
)
xi
(
si
)
and
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
≥
(
si − ti
)
xi
(
ti
)
.
Multiplying both sides by −1 yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
≤
(
si − ti
)
xi
(
si
)
and
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)]
≤
(
ti − si
)
xi
(
ti
)
.
Together with (2.15) the two inequalities above imply that
(
si − ti
) (
xi
(
si
)
− xi
(
ti
))
≥ 0.
Thus, xi (.) is monotonically increasing.

Using Lemma 2.2, we can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.4 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space T i and expected valuation functions
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
which are convex in his true type. If the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible then it also satisﬁes revenue equivalence.
Proof
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Let us assume that each agent has a convex type space and expected valuation functions which are
convex in his true type. Furthermore, let us assume that the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible. Let P be a payment rule such that all the incentive compatibility constraints in (2.3)
are satisﬁed.
Take agent i and pick two types si, ti ∈ T i. Consider a sequence of nodes between si and ti,
A =
(
ri1 = s
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = t
i
)
. Recall from (2.13) that
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
Note that
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri2, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=2
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
.
(2.16)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the edge length given in (2.8). The second equality
stems from rearranging the terms of the summation. The third equality is derived by adding and
subtracting E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)]
. To establish the last equality we use that ri1 = s
i and
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In a similarly fashion we get that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim, t
−i
)]
+
m−1∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
.
(2.17)
Again, the ﬁrst equality follows from (2.8). The second equality stems from rearranging the terms of
the summation. The third equality is derived by adding and subtracting
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
. In order to establish the last equality we again use that ri1 = s
i
and rim+1 = t
i. Using (2.16) and (2.17) we can now write (2.13) as follows
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
. (2.18)
By deﬁnition of the subgradient we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in A that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
,
(for deﬁnition of xi (.) see (2.14)). This implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≥
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
. (2.19)
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Similarly we have that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij − r
i
j+1
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
Multiplying both sides by −1 yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
which implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
. (2.20)
Applying (2.19) and (2.20) to (2.18) yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
(2.21)
By Lemma 2.2 xi (.) is monotonically increasing. Hence, xi (.) is Riemann integrable, see for
example Khuri (2003), Theorem 6.3.2. From this it follows that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si
xi
(
ri
)
dri
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si
xi
(
ri
)
dri.
So, we get that for all si, ti ∈ T i
E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si
xi
(
ri
)
dri.
That is, up to an additive constant, the expected payments of an agent are completely deﬁned by
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his valuation function and the allocation rule f . Thus, f satisﬁes revenue equivalence.

Two conditions needed for Theorem 2.4 are the convexity of agents’ type spaces and that agents’
expected valuation functions are convex in their types. These conditions cannot easily be relaxed as
we demonstrate with two examples. In each setting we relax one of the conditions and show that
there exist several payment rules making the allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible which
do not yield the same expected payments up to an additive constant. Hence, the allocation rule does
not satisfy revenue equivalence.
2.5.1 Example Setting: Concave Valuation Functions
This example is based on Holmstro¨m (1979), Appendix B. Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra
(2009) also give an interpretation by embedding it into a framework of demand rationing problems
as discussed in Cachon and Lariviere (1999).
Let us consider a setting in which a perfectly divisible item is distributed. For simplicity we
assume that there exists only a single agent with type space T = [0, 1]. His type reﬂects his demand
for a certain fraction of the item. The allocation rule f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] determines what fraction of
the item is allocated to the agent. Speciﬁcally, we have f(r) = r. That is, the allocation rule meets
whatever demand is reported by the agent. The agent’s valuation for reporting r while having true
demand t is as follows (for illustration see Figure 2.6):
v (f(r) | t) =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 if f(r) ≤ tt− f(r) if f(r) > t .
Take any s < t in T . The corresponding edge lengths in the network Tf are
l(s, t) = t− s > 0
and
l(t, s) = 0.
Since all edges in Tf have non-negative lengths there do not exist any negative length cycles. Thus,
by Theorem 2.1 we have that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Furthermore, notice that for
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agent’s type
v
0
f(r) 1
−f(r)
Figure 2.6: The agent’s valuations v(f(r) | t) for outcome f(r).
any r between s and t, that is s < r < t, we have
l(s, t) = l(s, r) + l(r, t) = t− s
and
l(t, s) = l(t, r) + l(r, s) = 0.
This implies that every path from s to t has the same length as the direct edge from s to t. Also,
every reverse path from t to s has the same length as the direct edge from t to s.
Now let us construct a payment rule P that makes the allocation rule f Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible. Following the approach based on shortest path lengths as described in the proof of
Theorem 2.1 and the beginning of this section, we pick a source node r0 in Tf and set
P (r) = inf
m∑
j=1
l (rj , rj+1) ,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A = (r1 = r, . . . , rm+1 = r0) in Tf , that is, all paths starting
at node r and ending at the source node. If we pick r0 = 0 as the source node this yields the payment
rule P (r) = 0. However, if we set r0 = 1 we get a diﬀerent payment rule, namely P˜ (r) = 1 − r.
Clearly, P and P˜ do not yield the same payments up to an additive constant. Hence, the allocation
rule f does not satisfy revenue equivalence.
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2.5.2 Example Setting: Discrete Type Spaces
Let us consider a setting in which a buyer wants to purchase an item via a procurement auction.
There is a set of three potential suppliers for this item, N = {1, 2, 3}. Each supplier i has a discrete
type space T i = {1, 2, 3}. A supplier’s type reﬂects his production cost for the item. Suppliers’ types
are independently and equally distributed with πi
(
ti
)
= 13 for all t
i ∈ T i and i ∈ N .
Based on the suppliers’ type reports the winner of the auction is selected as follows: The supplier
reporting the lowest type wins. If the lowest type is submitted by several suppliers then the tie
is broken by means of an equal chance lottery. In case two suppliers report 3 while the other one
reports 1 the low bid is deleted and thus the winner is drawn from the remaining two suppliers.3
More formally, given reports from all suppliers, the allocation rule f : T → [0, 1]3 assigns to each
supplier a probability for winning the contract to deliver the item. So the outcome set Γ is the set of
all possible winning probability proﬁles. Supplier i’s probability to win, given a report proﬁle t ∈ T ,
is denoted f i(t). His winning probabilities for all possible report proﬁles are stated in Table 2.2.
Report ti Report proﬁle t−i of the other suppliers
of supplier i {1, 1} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 1} {2, 2} {2, 3} {3, 1} {3, 2} {3, 3}
1 13
1
2
1
2
1
2 1 1
1
2 1 0
2 0 0 0 0 13
1
2 0
1
2 1
3 0 0 12 0 0 0
1
2 0
1
3
Table 2.2: Supplier i’s winning probabilities f i(.) for the diﬀerent possible report proﬁles.
Suppliers’ valuation functions are linear in their own types. Take supplier i having true type ti
and reporting ri while the other suppliers have true types t−i and make reports r−i. Supplier i’s
valuation for the resulting outcome is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= −f i
(
ri, r−i
)
ti.
Suppose supplier i reports ri and all other suppliers report their types truthfully. Supplier i’s expected
conditional probability for winning the auction is
qi
(
ri
)
=
∑
t−i∈T−i
f i
(
ri, t−i
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
.
3Why having the allocation rule delete the low bid in this case? In this bid constellation the buyer might interpret
the low bid as an indication of inferior product quality which would aﬀect him adversely. Or he could see it as an
indication of price dumping behavior which he does not want to tolerate, for example because the buyer is a public
institution.
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This yields qi (1) = 1627 , q
i (2) = 727 and q
i (3) = 427 . The supplier’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= −qi
(
ri
)
ti. (2.22)
Take two types ri, r˜i ∈ T i. Based on (2.8) and (2.22), the length of the edge from ri to r˜i in the
corresponding network T if is
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
=
(
−qi
(
ri
)
+ qi
(
r˜i
))
ri.
The complete network is depicted in Figure 2.7. Clearly, there do not exist any negative length cycles
1 2 3
4
3
−13 −
2
9
−49
2
3
1
3
Figure 2.7: The network T if .
in T if . Thus, by Theorem 2.1 we have that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. As a side note we
observe that f is not dominant strategy incentive compatible. This would require ∀si, ti ∈ T i and
∀t−i ∈ T−i that
−f i
(
si, t−i
)
si − Pi
(
si, t−i
)
≥ −f i
(
ti, t−i
)
si − Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
.
This implies that also
−f i
(
ti, t−i
)
ti − Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
≥ −f i
(
si, t−i
)
ti − Pi
(
si, t−i
)
.
Adding the above two inequalities yields
(
f i
(
ti, t−i
)
− f i
(
si, t−i
)) (
ti − si
)
≤ 0.
Thus, it is a necessary condition for dominant strategy incentive compatibility that an agent’s winning
probability is decreasing in his type for every type proﬁle of the others. Looking at Table 2.2 this
condition is obviously violated.
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Next we construct a payment rule P that makes the allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patible. Based on the approach utilizing shortest path lengths which is presented in the proof of
Theorem 2.1 and the beginning of this section, we pick a source node ri0 in T
i
f and set
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if from r
i to ri0. Any
payment rule P such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. This
can be achieved for example by setting Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i. If we pick ri0 = 1 as the
source node this yields
E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)]
= 0,
E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
=
2
3
,
E−i
[
Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
= 1
as expected payments for agent i.
Looking at the network T if (see Figure 2.7) it is obvious that the shortest forward and backward
paths between any two nodes do not add up to zero. From Theorem 9 in Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz
and Vohra (2009) it follows that the allocation rule f does not satisfy revenue equivalence. That is,
there exist payment rules that yield expected payments for the agents which diﬀer not only by an
additive constant.
For example, if we set ri0 = 3 we get a diﬀerent payment rule P˜ with the following expected
payments for agent i:
E−i
[
P˜i
(
1, t−i
)]
= −
5
9
,
E−i
[
P˜i
(
2, t−i
)]
= −
2
9
,
E−i
[
P˜i
(
3, t−i
)]
= 0.
Clearly, P and P˜ do not yield the same expected payments up to an additive constant.
Since agents’ type spaces consist of only three types, we can easily observe how much room there
actually is for the existence of diﬀerent payment rules that make the allocation rule Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible. The incentive compatibility constraints (2.3) which have to be fulﬁlled for
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agent i are
−qi (1) 1− E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (2) 1− E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
, (2.23)
−qi (1) 1− E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (3) 1− E−i
[
Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
, (2.24)
−qi (2) 2− E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (1) 2− E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)]
, (2.25)
−qi (2) 2− E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (3) 2− E−i
[
Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
, (2.26)
−qi (3) 3− E−i
[
Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (1) 3− E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)]
, (2.27)
−qi (3) 3− E−i
[
Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
≥ −qi (2) 3− E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
. (2.28)
By plugging in the expected conditional winning probabilities that we have computed above and
combining (2.23) and (2.25), (2.24) and (2.27) as well as (2.26) and (2.28) we get
−
2
3
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)
− Pi
(
2, t−i
)]
≤ −
1
3
,
−
4
3
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
1, t−i
)
− Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
≤ −
4
9
,
−
1
3
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
2, t−i
)
− Pi
(
3, t−i
)]
≤ −
2
9
.
Any payment rule that satisﬁes the above constraints makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Of
course this leaves also room for payment rules that are not based on shortest paths to some ﬁxed
source node. Take for example a payment rule Pˆ that yields the following expected payments:
E−i
[
Pˆi
(
1, t−i
)]
= −
17
18
,
E−i
[
Pˆi
(
2, t−i
)]
= −
5
18
,
E−i
[
Pˆi
(
3, t−i
)]
= 0.
2.6 Applications
Malakhov and Vohra (2004) consider a multiple item auction setting where agents have ﬁnite type
spaces and independent valuations. They show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patible if and only if it satisﬁes monotonicity.
Myerson (1981) deals with a single item auction setting where agents have convex type spaces and
interdependent valuations. Feng (2008) considers a multiple item auction setting where agents have
convex type spaces and independent valuations. Both Myerson (1981) and Feng (2008) give a similar
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characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility in their respective settings. They show that
a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if monotonicity is satisﬁed and
a condition on agents’ utility functions holds. This condition is that for all agents i and all types
si, ti ∈ T i
U i
(
si | si
)
= U i
(
ti | ti
)
+
∫ si
ti
qi(r)dr,
where U i
(
si | si
)
denotes agent i’s expected utility for truthfully reporting si (see (2.1) for deﬁnition
of expected utilities) and qi(r) represents some expected winning probability which depends on the
allocation rule. Note that the above can be written as
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
si, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)]
+
∫ si
ti
qi(r)dr.
Thus, the second condition used for characterizing Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility, next to mono-
tonicity, is revenue equivalence.
In the following we show how the aforementioned settings and results can be folded into our
framework. Especially, we demonstrate, with regard to Myerson (1981) and Feng (2008), that for
the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules one only needs to evoke
monotonicity.
2.6.1 Single, Indivisible Item
In this application we consider a common single item auctions setting. Speciﬁcally, we look at a
setting presented by Myerson (1981). In this setting a single, indivisible item is auctioned oﬀ to one
of several potential buyers. A buyer’s type reﬂects his initial value estimate for the item. Each buyer
has a convex type space. Speciﬁcally, we assume that T i =
[
ai, bi
]
with −∞ < ai < bi < ∞. Given
reports from all buyers, the allocation rule f : T → [0, 1]n assigns to each buyer a probability for
winning the item. So the outcome set Γ is the set of all possible winning probability proﬁles. Buyer
i’s probability to win, given a report proﬁle t ∈ T , is denoted f i(t). The allocation rule must satisfy
the probability condition
∑n
i=1 f
i(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T .
Buyers’ valuations are interdependent. If a buyer would get to know the value estimate of some
other buyer, he would want to revise his own initial value estimate for the item. For instance, suppose
the item is a painting and a buyer is uncertain about whether he is dealing with an original or a
forgery. Learning that another buyer has a low value estimate, suggesting a tendency towards forgery,
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would incline him to revise his own value estimate downwards. We assume that the buyers make
these revisions additively according to n revision eﬀect functions ej : T j → R, j ∈ N . If buyer i learns
that buyer j has type tj , he revises his initial value estimate by adding ej
(
tj
)
to it. Additionally, in
order to justify that a buyer’s type reﬂects his initial value estimate for the item, it is assumed that
∫
T j
ej
(
tj
)
πj
(
tj
)
dtj = 0.
That is, revision eﬀects have an expected value of zero. The stated results do not depend on this
assumption. However, without it, the interpretation of buyers’ types would change. Also, note that
modelling the valuation interdependencies as done above implies that actually all buyers i 
= j revise
their initial estimates by the same amount ej
(
tj
)
. Without aﬀecting any of the results, one could
also allow for buyer speciﬁc adjustments by assuming that each buyer i has n − 1 revision eﬀect
functions eji : T
j → R, j ∈ N , j 
= i.
Take buyer i having true type ti and reporting ri while the other buyers have true types t−i and
make reports r−i. The value that the buyer assigns to the resulting allocation is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= f i
(
ri, r−i
)(
ti +
∑
j∈N
j =i
ej
(
tj
))
.
Consider buyer i reporting ri and assume that the other buyers report truthfully. Buyer i’s expected
conditional probability for winning the item is
qi
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
f i
(
ri, t−i
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
The buyer’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= qi
(
ri
)
ti +
∫
T−i
f i
(
ri, t−i
)(∑
j∈N
j =i
ej
(
tj
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i. (2.29)
Applying (2.29), the monotonicity condition (see Deﬁnition 2.2) becomes
(
qi
(
ri
)
− qi
(
r˜i
)) (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N. (2.30)
That is, satisfying monotonicity means that a buyer’s expected winning probability is increasing in
his type report.
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Myerson (1981) shows that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if
(2.30) is satisﬁed and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds ∀ri ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N,
where U i
(
ri | ri
)
denotes buyer i’s expected utility for truthfully reporting ri (see (2.1) for deﬁnition
of expected utilities).
As easily can be veriﬁed, buyers’ valuation functions in this single item auction setting satisfy
non-decreasing expected diﬀerences (see Deﬁnition 2.3). Thus, we can directly apply the results
derived earlier in Section 2.4 of this chapter. From Theorem 2.3 it follows that f is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible if and only if the monotonicity condition in (2.30) is satisﬁed.
Now, suppose that the allocation rule satisﬁes monotonicity. Let us construct a payment rule
that makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We use the approach utilizing shortest path lengths
(see proof of Theorem 2.1 and the beginning of Section 2.5). For each buyer i we pick ai, that is his
lowest possible type, as the source node in T if . We set
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = a
i
)
in T if . Any payment rule P
such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. This can be achieved
for example by setting Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Considering the length of such a path A, we ﬁnd by applying (2.29) to (2.17) that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
qi
(
rij+1
) (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
.
Monotonicity (2.30) implies that qi (.) is Riemann integrable, see for example Khuri (2003), Theorem
6.3.2. Furthermore, decomposition monotonicity is satisﬁed since buyers’ valuation functions satisfy
non-decreasing expected diﬀerences, see Lemma 2.1. So considering any path A from ri to ai, we
can construct paths that are shorter (or as long) by letting them visit the same nodes as A and also
additional nodes in between (see also example in Figure 2.2). In the limit, as m →∞, the distance
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between neighboring nodes goes to zero and
m∑
j=1
qi
(
rij+1
) (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
→
∫ ai
ri
qi(s)ds.
So, based on the above, we ﬁnd for our payment rule that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds. (2.31)
Note that by construction E−i
[
Pi
(
ai, t−i
)]
= 0. Thus, we can subtract E−i
[
Pi
(
ai, t−i
)]
on the
left-hand side of (2.31), yielding
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ai, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds. (2.32)
Since buyers’ type spaces are convex and buyers’ expected valuation functions are linear in their
true types it follows from Theorem 2.4 that the allocation rule satisﬁes revenue equivalence. That is,
all payment rules making f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield the same expected payments up
to an additive constant. So (2.32) holds for all of them. Thus, by rearranging the terms in (2.32),
we get
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds.
as a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
2.6.2 Multiple Units of a Homogenous Good
In this application we consider a setting presented by Malakhov and Vohra (2004). In this setting
there are k units of an homogenous good being auctioned oﬀ to several potential buyers. These
buyers exhibit constant marginal valuations for getting additional units of the good. That is, a buyer
values the ﬁrst unit that he gets as much as the second unit, the third unit and so on. This marginal
valuation for an additional unit of the good is reﬂected by a buyer’s type. Each buyer has a discrete
type space consisting of hi diﬀerent types. Thus, T
i =
{
ti1, . . . , t
i
hi
}
where without loss of generality
tij < t
i
j+1. Given reports from all buyers, the allocation rule f : T → R
n
+ determines how many units
of the good each buyer is winning. The quantity allocated to buyer i, given a report proﬁle t ∈ T ,
is denoted f i(t). If f is probabilistic, that is, it maps each reported type proﬁle t into a distribution
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over allocations, then f i(t) denotes the expected quantity buyer i is winning.
Buyers’ valuations are independent. Take buyer i having true type ti and reporting ri while the
other buyers have true types t−i and make reports r−i. The buyer assigns the following value to the
resulting allocation
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= f i
(
ri, r−i
)
ti.
Let us assume that buyer i reports ri and the other buyers report truthfully their types. Then buyer
i expects to win
qi
(
ri
)
=
∑
t−i∈T−i
f i
(
ri, t−i
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
units of the good. Hence, the buyer’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= qi
(
ri
)
ti. (2.33)
Using (2.33), the monotonicity condition (see Deﬁnition 2.2) becomes
(
qi
(
ri
)
− qi
(
r˜i
)) (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N. (2.34)
That is, satisfying monotonicity means that a buyer’s expected winning quantity is increasing in his
type report.
As easily can be veriﬁed, buyers’ valuation functions in this setting are satisfying non-decreasing
expected diﬀerences, see Deﬁnition 2.3. Thus, we can apply the characterization results derived in
Section 2.4. From Theorem 2.3 it follows that the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
if and only if the monotonicity condition in (2.34) is satisﬁed. This ﬁnding is also established in
Malakhov and Vohra (2004).
If the allocation rule satisﬁes monotonicity we can construct a payment rule that makes f Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible by using the shortest path length approach described in the beginning of
the foregoing section and in the proof of Theorem 2.1. First, we pick ti1 as buyer i’s source node in
T if . Next, we set
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = t
i
1
)
in T if . Any payment rule P
such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. One way to achieve
this is to set Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
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Note that in this setting decomposition monotonicity is satisﬁed since buyers’ valuation functions
satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences, see Lemma 2.1. So if we consider any path A from ri to
ti1, we can construct paths that are shorter (or as long) by letting them visit the same nodes as A
and also additional nodes in between (see also example in Figure 2.2). Thus, the shortest path from
ri to ti1 is the one going through all the nodes in between, see also Figure 2.8. So, based on this
ti1 t
i
2 r
iti3
Figure 2.8: Shortest path from ri to the source node ti1.
observation, we ﬁnd that for our payment rule
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
=
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the sum is taken over all edges of the path A˜ =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim = t
i
2, r
i
m+1 = t
i
1
)
visiting every
node in between ri and ti1. By applying (2.33) to (2.17) the above can be written as
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= qi
(
ri
)
ri − qi
(
ti1
)
ti1 +
m∑
j=1
qi
(
rij+1
) (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
.
Finally, we observe that Theorem 2.4 is not applicable in this setting since buyers’ type spaces are
discrete. So, we cannot generally guarantee that a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rule
also satisﬁes revenue equivalence. In fact, the discrete type space example in Section 2.5.2 can be seen
as a special case of the setting under concern here. In this example there exist several payment rules
that make the allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible but do not yield the same expected
payments up to an additive constant.
2.6.3 Commonly Ranked Items
In this section we consider the setting presented by Feng (2008). The analysis of this setting is going
to parallel the one of Myerson’s (1981) single item setting presented in Section 2.6.1. In Feng’s (2008)
setting there is a set of items L = {1, . . . , l}. These items are auctioned oﬀ to n potential buyers. It
is assumed that l ≤ n, so there are no more items then there are buyers. These items are commonly
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ranked by the buyers. Speciﬁcally, every buyer values having the ﬁrst item more than having the
second item, which in turn is better than having the third item and so on down to the lth item. As
an example for such a scenario one can think of an auction for online advertisement positions on an
internet search site like Google or Yahoo. Next to the list of search results the site also presents a
list of online ads relating to the search topic. Although diﬀerent companies might attach diﬀerent
values to the various positions on this list, generally each company values a higher position more
than a lower one.
A buyer’s type aﬀects his valuation for the diﬀerent items. Each buyer has a convex type space.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that T i =
[
ti, t¯i
]
with ti ≥ 0. Given reports from all buyers, the allocation
rule f : T → [0, 1]ln assigns the items to the diﬀerent buyers. Buyer i’s probability to win item k,
given a report proﬁle t ∈ T , is denoted f ik(t). The allocation rule must satisfy a couple of probability
conditions. First of all, we have f ik(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ L, ∀t ∈ T . Furthermore, it is assumed that∑n
i=1 f
i
k(t) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ L, ∀t ∈ T , so an item is not allocated to more than one buyer. Lastly, we have∑l
k=1 f
i
k(t) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T . That is, a buyer cannot win more than one item.
With regard to buyers’ valuation functions, Feng (2008) considers four cases, all of which can be
folded into the following. Take buyer i having true type ti. The value that i attaches to the kth item
is
vi
(
k | ti
)
= α(k) + β(k)ti. (2.35)
So, buyers’ valuations are independent. In addition, a buyer’s valuation for a speciﬁc item is linear
in his type. Note that without aﬀecting any of the results in this section, one could also allow for
buyer speciﬁc functions α(.) and β(.).
Concerning the four valuation function cases actually considered by Feng (2008), there is ﬁrst of
all the parallel case in which α(k) = −ak, a > 0, and β(k) = 1. So, in this case we have
vi
(
k | ti
)
= −ak + ti.
Thus, if the buyer moves his consideration from a higher ranked item to a lower ranked item, his
valuation drops at rate a. This drop rate is independent of the buyer’s type. Furthermore, Feng
(2008) considers three non-parallel cases in which α(k) = a and β(k) = b − k with a + bti > 0,
∀ti ∈ T i. So, in these cases we have
vi
(
k | ti
)
= a+ (b− k)ti.
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In the convergent case we have b ≥ l, in the divergent case b ≤ 1 and in the convergent-then-divergent
case 1 < b < l. Figure 2.9 illustrates buyer i’s preferences with respect to the ranked items in the
four cases described above. Note that (2.35) allows for more general valuation functions than the
four kinds analyzed by Feng (2008). Using the framework in (2.35) also helps in showing the links
to Myerson’s (1981) setting and our results.
Parallel Case Convergent Case
Divergent Case Convergent-then-divergent Case
k1 2 l
vi
bk1 2 l
vi
k2 l
vi
k1 2 b l
vi
31b
Figure 2.9: Buyer i’s valuation functions vi
(
. | ti
)
for diﬀerent types ti in the four cases described
by Feng (2008).
Take buyer i having true type ti and reporting ri while the other buyers have true types t−i and
make reports r−i. The value that the buyer assigns to the resulting allocation is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
=
l∑
k=1
f ik
(
ri, r−i
) (
α(k) + β(k)ti
)
.
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Suppose buyer i reports ri and the other buyers report truthfully. As done by Feng (2008), we deﬁne
qi
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
(
l∑
k=1
f ik
(
ri, t−i
)
β(k)
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
as buyer i’s adjusted probability of winning, which is weighted by β(k) for diﬀerent positions k. Then,
the buyer’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
=
∫
T−i
(
l∑
k=1
f ik
(
ri, t−i
) (
α(k) + β(k)ti
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= qi
(
ri
)
ti +
∫
T−i
(
l∑
k=1
f ik
(
ri, t−i
)
α(k)
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
(2.36)
(2.36) is comparable to the buyer’s expected valuation in Myerson’s (1981) setting, see (2.29). Both
consist of the buyer’s true type multiplied by an expected winning probability as well as some additive
term that depends on the buyer’s report but not on his true type.
As done by Myerson (1981), Feng (2008) shows that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible if and only if for every buyer qi(.) is increasing in the buyer’s type report and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ti | ti
)
+
∫ ri
ti
qi(s)ds ∀ri ∈ T i
where U i
(
ri | ri
)
denotes the buyer’s expected utility for truthfully reporting ri.
As the analysis of this setting parallels the one of Myerson’s (1981) setting, the reader is referred
to Section 2.6.1 for details. In the following we just brieﬂy summarize the results. Again, buyers’
valuation functions in this setting satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences (see Deﬁnition 2.3).
Thus, from Theorem 2.3 it follows that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if it satisﬁes
monotonicity. Using shortest path lengths to construct payments and picking ti as the source node
in T if for every buyer i yields
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ti
qi(s)ds. (2.37)
for our payment rule. Since buyers’s type spaces are convex and their expected valuation functions
are linear in their true types, we can apply Theorem 2.4. Hence, all Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
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allocation rules in this setting satisfy revenue equivalence. Based on (2.37) we again get
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ti | ti
)
+
∫ ri
ti
qi(s)ds.
as a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
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3Monotonicity and Multi-Dimensional Types
An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that
truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism
consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This chapter provides characterizations of
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social choice settings where agents’ types are
multi-dimensional and independently distributed. The agents have convex type spaces and quasi-linear
utility functions. Their expected valuation functions are restricted to be convex in their own types.
We allow for interdependent valuations. The characterizations are derived by constructing complete
directed graphs on agents’ type spaces with cost of manipulation as lengths of edges. Thus, the work
presented in this chapter serves as the Bayes-Nash extension of a recent stream of literature that
employs a network based approach to characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation
rules. It also extends the work of the foregoing chapter from one-dimensional to multi-dimensional
types. We follow the same network approach as before and keep the structure of the chapter as close
as possible to the foregoing one. This yields some overlap between both chapters but in this way
Chapter 3 can be read as an independent entity.
Monotonicity of the allocation rule corresponds to the condition that all 2-cycles in the above
mentioned graphs have non-negative length. In case agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing
expected diﬀerences, it is shown that monotonicity in conjunction with an integrability condition
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Thus, compared to
other characterization results that employ also conditions on agents’ utility functions, we provide
a characterization that only involves agents’ valuations and the allocation rule. Our approach also
allows us to work in a more general setup that allows for a broader class of valuation functions.
We show how corresponding payment rules are constructed for Bayes-Nash incentive compati-
ble allocation rules by utilizing shortest path lengths in agents’ graphs. We establish that revenue
equivalence holds for all incentive compatible allocation rules in our setting. This result was already
established by Krishna and Maenner (2001). However, our network approach yields an alternate
51
proof of this result.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation
rules in social choice settings where agents have independently distributed, multi-dimensional types
and quasi-linear utility functions. That is, utility is the valuation of an allocation minus a payment.
We allow for interdependent valuations across agents. Thus, an agent’s valuation can, next to his
own type, depend on the types of the other agents. We consider direct revelation mechanisms. A
direct mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. Based on a proﬁle of type
reports from all the agents, the allocation rule determines the outcome. In case of a combinatorial
auction for example, the allocation rule determines which set of items each agent gets. Similarly, the
payment rule determines what payment each agent has to make. We call the allocation rule Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible if there exists a payment rule such that truthful reporting of agents’ types
constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the corresponding direct revelation mechanism consisting of
the two rules.
The central task of this chapter is to extend the results of the foregoing chapter as far as possi-
ble to settings featuring multi-dimensional types. Thus, one major topic is the characterization of
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules. That means, for the social choice settings under
consideration, we want to characterize the allocation rules for which we can guarantee the existence
of a payment rule making them Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. In doing this we again aim for a
framework that enables us to construct such payment rules. For example, consider once more the
allocation rule which decides in a combinatorial auction for each set of bids which set of items each
agent is winning. We want to be able to decide whether there exists a pricing scheme for winning
bids that makes truthful bidding a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. If the answer is yes, we want to have
the means to construct such a pricing scheme.
Hence, the other big topic addressed in this chapter is the construction of payment rules. We
show how to build a payment rule that makes an allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
In addition we show that, for the settings under consideration here, all payment rules making a
particular allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield the same expected payments for the
agents.
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3.1.1 Related Work
An allocation rule is dominant strategy incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule such that
for any report of the other agents an agent maximizes his own utility by reporting truthfully his type.
Roberts (1979) implicitly uses a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule in order to derive his
characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms in terms of aﬃne maximizers
for unrestricted preference domains. For a selection of restricted preference domains, Bikhchandani,
Chatterji, Lavi, Mu’alem, Nisan and Sen (2006) characterize dominant strategy incentive compatibil-
ity directly in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004)
extend these results to larger classes of preference domains by making a link to network theory. Saks
and Yu (2005) go even further, showing that previous results extend to any convex multi-dimensional
type space. One of the most recent representatives of this stream of literature is Monderer (2008).
The environment considered by Saks and Yu (2005) features quasi-linear utilities and multi-
dimensional types. The allocation rule maps agents’ type reports into a ﬁnite set of m possible
outcomes. An agent’s type is a vector in Rm reﬂecting his valuation of the diﬀerent possible outcomes.
That is, the agent’s valuation of some outcome a is given by the ath element of his type vector. Agents’
type spaces are assumed to be convex. Saks and Yu (2005) show that dominant strategy incentive
compatible allocation rules in this setting can be characterized in terms of weak monotonicity. In
order to derive this result they construct complete directed graphs in the following way: Take some
agent and ﬁx a proﬁle of type reports for the others. Now, a directed graph is constructed by
associating a node with each outcome and putting a directed edge between each ordered pair of
nodes. Take two outcomes a and b. Consider the diﬀerence of the valuation of a and the valuation
of b with respect to every type for which truthfully reporting this type yields outcome a. The length
of the network edge from a to b is deﬁned as the inﬁmum of all these diﬀerences. In this fashion
a graph is constructed for every agent and every possible report proﬁle of the other agents. Weak
monotonicity states that for any two diﬀerent outcomes a and b, the sum of the two edge lengths
from a to b and from b to a is non-negative.
Earlier, Rochet (1987) characterized dominant strategy implementation in cases where the set
of outcomes is not necessarily ﬁnite. This assumption is crucial to the work of Saks and Yu (2005)
and the others. He considers a setting where agents have multi-dimensional, convex type spaces and
valuation functions which are linear with respect to their own true types. Making some additional
diﬀerentiability assumptions, Rochet (1987) shows that in this case dominant strategy incentive
compatibility can be characterized in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule plus
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an integrability condition.
Monotonicity has also been used to characterize Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) develop characterizations
for social choice settings where agents have multi-dimensional, convex type spaces and valuation
functions which are linear with respect to their true types. In the ﬁrst one agents’ valuations are
independent, whereas the second one allows for interdependent valuations. Both characterizations of
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility include a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule as well
as an integrability condition comparable to the one presented by Rochet (1987) and a condition on
agents’ utility functions. The frameworks considered by Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999)
and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) can be folded into the environment considered by us in Mu¨ller,
Perea and Wolf (2007b). There we also deal with social choice settings in which agents have multi-
dimensional, convex type spaces and valuation functions which are linear in their true types. However,
we allow for a broader class of possible interdependencies between agents’ valuations. In order to
establish our results in Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b) we make a link to network theory. Archer
and Kleinberg (2008) consider a single agent setting also featuring multi-dimensional types and linear
valuation functions. For convex type spaces they characterize incentive compatibility in terms of a
monotonicity and a local integrability condition of the allocation rule. They also deliver some insight
for non-convex type spaces.
Krishna and Maenner (2001) consider a setting in which each agent has a convex type space
and a valuation function that is convex in the agent’s type. They show that in this setting revenue
equivalence holds for all Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules. Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz
and Vohra (2009) derive a characterization of revenue equivalence under more general conditions.
Similar to Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005) they use networks to establish their
results. For countable outcome spaces the aforementioned result of Krishna and Maenner (2001)
follows as a consequence of their work.
3.1.2 Our Contribution
In Section 3.2 we state some basic assumptions and deﬁnitions. Throughout the chapter we assume
that agents have quasi-linear utility functions and independently distributed, privately known, multi-
dimensional types. Furthermore, we do not put any restrictions on the number of possible outcomes.
We allow for interdependent valuations. However, we require that agents’ expected valuation func-
tions are convex in their own types. This framework is less restrictive than the one employed in
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Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b) where linearity instead of convexity is required. On the other hand,
it is more restrictive than the framework considered in the foregoing chapter for one-dimensional
types. There the convexity of agents’ types spaces and the convexity condition on agents’ valua-
tion functions are not needed for the characterization results. Nevertheless, many of the arguments
that we employed in the analysis of the one-dimensional environment also go through in the multi-
dimensional setting. Therefore we decided to keep the structure of this chapter as close as possible
to the structure of Chapter 2, even though that yields some overlaps, especially in Section 3.3.
If an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, then there exists a payment rule such
that an agent’s expected utility for truthfully reporting his type t is at least as high as his expected
utility for misreporting some type s. Similarly, an agent’s expected utility for truthfully reporting
type s is at least as high as his expected utility for misreporting type t. By combining these two
conditions we get a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. This condition is the expected
utility equivalent to the weak monotonicity condition utilized by Saks and Yu (2005) in the context
of dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules. Monotonicity is a necessary condition for
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. It expresses that the expected gain in valuation for truthfully
reporting t instead of misreporting s should be at least as big as the expected gain in valuation for
misreporting t instead of truthfully reporting s.
Similar to the network approach of Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005) we
construct graphs in Section 3.3. Recognizing that the constraints inherent in the deﬁnition of Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility have a natural network interpretation we build complete directed graphs
for agents’ type spaces. To do so we associate a node with each type and put a directed edge between
each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge going from the node associated with type s to
the node associated with the type t is deﬁned as the cost of manipulation. That is, the expected
diﬀerence in an agent’s valuation for truthfully reporting s instead of misreporting t.
Diﬀerent from the networks constructed by Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005)
we construct only one graph for each agent. This is because we work in terms of expectations and do
not consider each possible type proﬁle of the other agents separately. Each of these graphs contains
an inﬁnite number of nodes as we associate a node with each possible type of an agent. One could also
construct outcome based graphs, as done by Gui, Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004) and Saks and Yu (2005),
by associating a node with each possible probability distribution over outcomes. However, these
graphs possibly also contain an inﬁnite number of nodes since we allow that the diﬀerent possible
type reports of an agent induce an inﬁnite number of probability distributions over outcomes. For
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example, in the single item auction framework presented in Section 3.6.2 it is quite natural to allow
that every diﬀerent type report of an agent yields a diﬀerent vector of expected conditional winning
probabilities.
We show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if the networks
described above contain no negative length cycles. Rochet (1987) shows that dominant strategy
incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of the absence of negative length cycles in
similar graphs. Our result is the Bayes-Nash equivalent for his ﬁnding. Furthermore, we show as
a lemma that the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone if the allocation rule satisﬁes
monotonicity and agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences (deﬁnitions
can be found in Section 3.2). The network construction and the derivation of these results are
completely analogical to what we have done in the corresponding section of the foregoing chapter.
In chapter 2, dealing with one-dimensional types, we show for the case where the costs of manipu-
lation are decomposition monotone that monotonicity is not only a necessary but also a suﬃcient con-
dition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Unfortunately, once we turn to our multi-dimensional
type setting, monotonicity alone is not suﬃcient anymore. Even with the additional convexity re-
strictions on agents’ type spaces and valuation functions. This is illustrated by an example in Section
3.4. However, we are able to show that monotonicity in conjunction with an integrability condition is
both necessary and suﬃcient. Using the lemma from the foregoing section it follows that monotonic-
ity and the integrability condition are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility in case that agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences.
Using examples it is illustrated that weak monotonicity and the integrability condition do not imply
one another.
The main contribution of Section 3.4 is thus to derive for the setting described above a complete
characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility in terms of monotonicity and an additional
integrability condition. Thereby we achieve a characterization that depends purely on the valua-
tions and the allocation rule. This characterization resembles the one derived by Rochet (1987) for
dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, our setting covers a broader class of valuation
functions as Rochet (1987) requires them to be linear in the agents’ own true types. The settings
considered in Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Mu¨ller,
Perea and Wolf (2007b) also all restrict agents’ valuation functions to be linear in their own true
types. These settings constitute special cases of the framework discussed in this chapter. How these
settings can be folded into our framework is illustrated in Section 3.4.1 for Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf
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(2007b) and in Section 3.6 for the other two.
If we know that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, we also want to know how
to construct a corresponding payment rule. In Section 3.5 we show that such payment rules can be
built by making use of shortest path lengths in the agents’ networks. We also establish that in the
environment considered by us, all Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules satisfy revenue
equivalence. Thus, using our network approach, we can establish revenue equivalence under the same
conditions as Krishna and Maenner (2001).
3.2 Model & Deﬁnitions
In this chapter we consider a setting in which there is a set of possible outcomes Γ, as well as a set
of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent has some private information which is modeled by a multi-
dimensional type. Speciﬁcally, each agent i has a type ti ∈ T i with T i ⊆ Rk, k > 1. We assume
that T i is convex for each agent i. The set of all complete type proﬁles t =
(
t1, . . . , tn
)
is denoted
T , whereas the set of all type proﬁles excluding agent i, t−i =
(
t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn
)
, is denoted
T−i. We assume that agents’ types are independently distributed. Assuming that agent i’s types are
distributed according to some density πi on T i, the joint density π−i on T−i is then given by
π−i
(
t−i
)
=
∏
j∈N
j =i
πj
(
tj
)
.
We consider direct revelation mechanisms, consisting of a payment rule and an allocation rule.
Based on a proﬁle of reported types from all the agents, a payment rule
P : T → Rn
assigns each agent with a payment. So, given a report proﬁle r−i of the others, reporting type ri
results in a payment Pi
(
ri, r−i
)
for agent i. Similarly, an allocation rule
f : T → Γ
is mapping each proﬁle of reported types into an outcome.
Suppose agent i has true type ti and reports ri while the others have true types t−i and report
r−i. The value that agent i assigns to the resulting outcome of the allocation rule is denoted by
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vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
. This setup allows for interdependent valuations across agents. That is, an
agent’s valuation for an outcome is not only inﬂuenced by his own type but also by the types of
the other agents. Take for example an auction where several telephone companies compete for 3G
spectrum licenses, see Kirchkamp and Moldovanu (2004). In this example a company’s type reﬂects
its cost structure as well as its expectation for future market demand based on a survey it took. This
survey outcome is also of interest to the other telephone companies for their value assessments of the
spectrum licenses. Thus, the companies’ valuation functions are interdependent.
Agents’ utility functions are quasi-linear. That is, an agent’s utility is his valuation of an allocation
minus his payment. Consider agent i and assume that the other agents make their reports truthfully.
If agent i has true type ti, then his expected utility for making a report ri is given by
U i(ri | ti) =
∫
T−i
(
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (3.1)
We assume E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
to be ﬁnite ∀ri, ti ∈ T i. This holds for example if ∀ri, ti the
valuation function vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
, viewed as a function of t−i, is bounded. In addition, we
assume that agent i’s expected valuation functions E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
are convex in his true
type. This is guaranteed if for example vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)
is convex for all t−i since the integral
of a family of convex functions is convex.
Furthermore, we let ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
denote the set of all subgradients of
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
at ti. Note that ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
is a non-empty set for all
ti ∈ T i due to the convexity of E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
, see for example Rockafellar (1970), p.218.
By xi we denote a selection from these subgradient sets. Speciﬁcally, for every ri ∈ T i we pick an
element of ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
which we denote by xi
(
ri
)
. That is,
xi
(
ri
)
∈ ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
∀ri ∈ T i. (3.2)
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility) An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash in-
centive compatible if there exists a payment rule P such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
. (3.3)
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If an allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, we have also
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (3.4)
By adding (3.3) and (3.4) we get
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
+ vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
+ vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
.
(3.5)
Note that agent i’s expected payments for reporting types ri and r˜i appear on both sides of the above
inequality and can be canceled. This however is only possible because we work under the assumption
of independently distributed types. Dropping this assumption would result in the following: Because
of stemming from (3.3), the expected payment for reporting ri on the left-hand side of (3.5) would be
conditional on agent i having true type ri. On the other hand, the expected payment for reporting
ri on the right-hand side of (3.5) would be conditional on agent i having true type r˜i since it stems
from (3.4). Thus, the two expected payments could not be canceled anymore.
Canceling the expected payments and rearranging the terms in (3.5) yields the following mono-
tonicity condition:
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Monotonicity) An allocation rule f satisﬁes monotonicity if ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈
T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)]
.
The monotonicity condition above is the expected utility equivalent to the 2-cycle inequality of Gui,
Mu¨ller and Vohra (2004), the weak monotonicity (W-Mon) condition of Bikhchandani, Chatterji,
Lavi, Mu’alem, Nisan and Sen (2006) and the weak monotonicity condition of Saks and Yu (2005).
It is the same as the condition termed weak monotonicity in Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b). The
rationale for naming this condition monotonicity becomes evident once one considers valuation func-
tions that are linear with respect to agents’ types, see for example Section 3.4.1 or Section 3.6 of
this chapter. Based on the above derivation it is clear that monotonicity is a necessary condition
for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. In Section 3.4 we discuss to what extend monotonicity also
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serves as a suﬃcient condition.
Furthermore, let us introduce at this point the following condition for agents’ valuation functions:
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Non-decreasing Expected Diﬀerences) Consider ri, r˜i, ti, t˜i ∈ T i such that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)]
.
The valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected diﬀerences if ∀t¯i ∈ T i s.t.
t¯i = (1− α)t˜i + αti, α > 1 we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
.
The above condition deals with the marginal change in expected valuation with respect to the reported
type. Consider the change in expected valuation for making a report ri instead of r˜i. Assume that
there exist types ti and t˜i such that this change is larger or at least as large if the agent has true type
ti instead of t˜i. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1 which depicts the diﬀerences in expected valuation
along the line through types t˜i and ti. Now consider the agent having a true type which is even
further away from t˜i than ti (in the direction of ti). The condition then requires that the change
in expected valuation is at least as large as in the case where the agent has true type ti. That is,
the point corresponding to this change in expected valuation in Figure 3.1 has to lie in the shaded
area. Non-decreasing expected diﬀerences is a slightly weaker condition than increasing diﬀerences.
The later requires that the marginal change in valuation with respect to the allocation is strictly
increasing in the type. Speciﬁcally, it requires that that for all ri ≥ rˆi, ri 
= rˆi and all ti ≥ tˆi, ti 
= tˆi
in T i,
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rˆi, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
> E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| tˆi, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rˆi, t−i
)
| tˆi, t−i
)]
.
Note that we assume agent i’s expected valuation functions E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
to be
convex in his true type. As illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, this convexity does not imply non-
decreasing expected diﬀerences and vice versa. Both ﬁgures depict expected valuation functions for
reporting ri and r˜i along a line in agent i’s type space. In Figure 3.2, E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
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t˜i ti agent i’s type
Figure 3.1: Illustration non-decreasing expected diﬀerences: The change in expected valuation for
making a report ri instead of r˜i, E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
, is depicted along
the y-axis.
and E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
are convex but the non-decreasing expected diﬀerences condition is
clearly violated. In Figure 3.3 on the other hand, non-decreasing expected diﬀerences is satisﬁed
agent i’s type
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
Figure 3.2: Convexity does not imply non-decreasing expected diﬀerences.
but E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
and E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
are not convex. Finally, note that
an agent’s valuation function which is linear in his true type satisﬁes the non-decreasing expected
diﬀerences condition. Such linear settings are discussed in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.6.
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agent i’s type
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
Figure 3.3: Non-decreasing expected diﬀerences does not imply convexity.
3.3 A Network Interpretation
Note that the content of this section corresponds to Section 2.3 in the foregoing chapter. It is
repeated in order to enhance the readability of this chapter as a single, stand alone entity. Readers
who already familiarized themselves with the content of Section 2.3 are invited to skip ahead to the
next section.
Let us begin by brieﬂy reviewing a well-known result from the ﬁeld of network ﬂow theory.1 Let
X = {x1, . . . , xk} be a ﬁnite set of variables. Consider the following system of constraints:
xi − xj ≤ wij ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (3.6)
where wij is some constant speciﬁc to the ordered pair (i, j). The system can be associated with
a network by constructing a directed, weighted graph whose nodes correspond to the variables. A
directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge from the node
corresponding to xi to the node corresponding to xj is given by wij .
It is a well-known result (see for example Shostak (1981)) that there is no negative length cycle in
the associated network if and only if the system of linear inequalities in (3.6) is feasible. The system
being feasible means that there exists an assignment of real values to the variables such that the
constraints in (3.6) are satisﬁed. Furthermore, if the system is feasible then one feasible solution is
to assign to each xi the length of a shortest path from the node associated with xi to some arbitrary
1A comprehensive introduction to network ﬂows is given in Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993).
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source node.2
In order to see that the constraints in (3.3) have a natural network interpretation it is useful to
rewrite (3.3) as follows:
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (3.7)
Considering a speciﬁc allocation rule, the right-hand side of (3.7) is a constant. Thus, we have a
system of diﬀerence constraints as described in (3.6) (except that we are now dealing with an inﬁnite
number of variables and constraints).
Given this observation, we associate the system of inequalities (3.7) with a network in the same
way as is described above. For each agent we build a complete directed graph T if . A node is associated
with each type and a directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. For agent i the length
of an edge directed from ri to r˜i is denoted li(ri, r˜i) and is deﬁned as the cost of manipulation:
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (3.8)
Given our previous assumptions, the edge length is ﬁnite. For technical reasons we allow for loops.
However, note that an edge directed from ri to ri has length li(ri, ri) = 0.
Using the above deﬁnition of the edge lengths, the monotonicity condition can be written as
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
+ li
(
r˜i, ri
)
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i.
So monotonicity corresponds to the absence of negative length 2-cycles in the agents’ graphs described
above.
Rochet (1987) observed that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in
terms of the absence of negative length cycles in similar graphs. Using the same proof technique, we
can derive such a characterization for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility as well.
Theorem 3.1 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if there is no
negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N .
2In order to be consistent with the existing literature we deﬁned the system of constraints as in (3.6). However,
in network theory the constraints are commonly deﬁned as xj − xi ≤ wij . In this case, if the system is feasible then
one feasible solution is to assign to each xi the length of a shortest path from some arbitrary source node to the node
associated with xi.
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Take some agent i and let C =
(
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
)
denote a cycle in T if . Let us assume that f is
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Using (3.7) and the edge length deﬁnition (3.8), this implies that
for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
Adding up these inequalities yields
0 ≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
so cycle C has non-negative length.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists no negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N . For each agent
i we pick an arbitrary source node ri0 ∈ T
i and deﬁne ∀ri ∈ T i
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if , that is, all paths that
start at ri and end at ri0. Absence of negative length cycles implies that p
i
(
ri0
)
= 0. Furthermore,
∀ri ∈ T i we have
pi
(
ri0
)
≤ pi
(
ri
)
+ li
(
ri0, r
i
)
which implies that pi
(
ri
)
is ﬁnite. For every pair ri, r˜i ∈ T i we also have
pi
(
ri
)
≤ pi
(
r˜i
)
+ li
(
ri, r˜i
)
.
Thus, by setting
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
∀t−i ∈ T−i
and using (3.8) we get
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Hence, the constraints in (3.7) are satisﬁed and f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Note that it
is actually suﬃcient to pick a payment rule such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ ci. This allows for
a variety of payment rules yielding the same expected payments up to an additive constant.

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We conclude this section with a condition for the costs of manipulation that is used in the
derivation of the characterization theorems presented in the following section.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Decomposition Monotonicity) The costs of manipulation are decomposition
monotone if ∀ri, r¯i ∈ T i and ∀ri ∈ T i s.t. ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i, α ∈ (0, 1) we have
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
.
So considering a pair of nodes, if decomposition monotonicity holds then the direct edge between
those nodes is at least as long as any path connecting the same two nodes via nodes lying on the line
segment between them. An illustrative example is given in Figure 3.4. Decomposition monotonicity
implies that the edge from ri to r¯i is at least as long as the path A =
(
ri, ri∗∗, r¯
i
)
and that A is at
least as long as the path A˜ =
(
ri, ri∗, r
i
∗∗, r
i
∗∗∗, r¯
i
)
.
ri r¯iri∗ r
i
∗∗ r
i
∗∗∗
Figure 3.4: Example decomposition monotonicity.
Monotonicity and non-decreasing expected diﬀerences together imply that the costs of manipu-
lation are decomposition monotone:
Lemma 3.1 If f satisﬁes monotonicity and the valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected
diﬀerences then the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.
Proof
Take some agent i and let ri, r¯i ∈ T i. Let ri ∈ T i such that ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Monotonicity implies that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
.
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Since the valuation function satisﬁes non-decreasing expected diﬀerences we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Adding E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
on both sides of the later inequality
yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Notice that the ﬁrst and the last term on the left-hand side of the inequality cancel. Hence
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Using (3.8) this can be written as
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
,
so the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.

3.4 Suﬃciency of Monotonicity & Path Independence
As mentioned in Section 3.2, monotonicity is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compati-
bility. In Chapter 2 we have shown that if agents’ type spaces are one-dimensional then monotonicity
serves as a suﬃcient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Unfortunately, if type spaces
are multi-dimensional then monotonicity alone no longer suﬃces. This is illustrated below in Example
3.1.
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This example is constructed based on the following insight. Suppose that agent i’s expected
valuations have a very simple linear form. Speciﬁcally, let us assume that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= riBit
i′,
where Bi is some agent speciﬁc k × k matrix and
′ denotes the transpose.
Monotonicity requires that
(
ri − r˜i
)
Bi
(
ri − r˜i
)′
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i.
Note that
Bi =
1
2
(
Bi +B
′
i
)
+
1
2
(
Bi −B
′
i
)
.
That is, Bi can be decomposed into a symmetric part
1
2 (Bi +B
′
i) and an anti-symmetric part
1
2 (Bi −B
′
i). Monotonicity is already satisﬁed if the symmetric part of Bi is positive semi-deﬁnite.
However, there are no negative length cycles in T if (and thus f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible)
if and only if Bi is symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite. Both results follow from Rockafellar (1970),
p.240.
Example 3.1 For simplicity we assume that there exists only a single agent. The agent’s type is
one of three extreme types, denoted x, y and z, or any convex combination of these. His type space
can be parameterized by a simplex with vertices x = (1, 0, 0), y = (0, 1, 0) and z = (0, 0, 1). Thus, the
agent’s type space T = conv{x, y, z} consists of the convex hull of the three unit vectors in R3.
There are three elementary outcomes, denoted a, b and c. If the agent is of type x, his valuations
for these outcomes are given by the ﬁrst column of the following matrix
V =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 3
3 2 0
0 3 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The ﬁrst element in this column is his valuation for a, the second one for b and the third one for c.
Similarly, if the agent is of type y or z, his valuations for the elementary outcomes are given by the
second and the third column of V .
The allocation rule f is a linear mapping associating each type report with a probability distribu-
tion over the three elementary outcomes. The outcome space Γ is the set of all possible probability
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distributions on {a, b, c}. Generic element γ = (γa, γb, γc) indicates that a is achieved with probability
γa, b with probability γb and c with probability γc. The allocation rule works as follows: if the agent
reports x as his type then f awards him with the second-best outcome according to this type, that is
f(x) = (1, 0, 0). Similarly, f(y) = (0, 1, 0) and f(z) = (0, 0, 1). In general we have f(r) = rI, where
I denotes the 3× 3 identity matrix.
The agent’s valuation function is v(f(r) | t) = f(r)V t′ = rV t′. As easily can be checked (by
verifying that the symmetric part 12(V +V
′) of V is positive deﬁnite), monotonicity is satisﬁed. That
is,
(r − r˜)V (r − r˜)′ ≥ 0 ∀r, r˜ ∈ T.
Nevertheless, the 3-cycle C = (x, y, z, x) has length l(x, y)+l(y, z)+l(z, x) = −3 (see also Figure 3.5).
The existence of such a negative length cycle implies that f is not Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
(see Theorem 3.1).
y
z
x
T
-1
-1
-1
Figure 3.5: The negative cycle C in Example 3.1.
From the above example it is evident that monotonicity alone is not enough to ensure Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility. However, in the following we are going to show that monotonicity
together with an integrability condition is suﬃcient if decomposition monotonicity (see Deﬁnition
3.4) is satisﬁed.
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dent if for any two ri, r¯i ∈ T i the path integral of ψ from ri to r¯i
∫ r¯i
ri,S
ψ
is independent of the path of integration S.
Recall that in Section 3.2, see (3.2), we deﬁned
xi
(
ri
)
∈ ∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
∀ri ∈ T i.
So xi is a vector ﬁeld T i → Rk.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space and expected valuation functions
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
which are convex in his true type. Also, suppose that the allocation rule f
and agents’ valuation functions are such that the costs of manipulation satisfy decomposition mono-
tonicity. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1) f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
2) f satisﬁes monotonicity and for every agent i, xi is path independent.
Proof
(1)⇒(2): Let us assume that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
the necessity of monotonicity follows trivially. Furthermore, from Theorem 3.1 it follows that for
every agent i the graph T if has no negative length cycles. Let C =
(
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
)
denote a
cycle in T if . Absence of negative length cycles implies that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥ 0.
Note that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (3.8) and the second equality stems from rearranging the terms
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of the summation. By deﬁnition of the subgradient we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in C that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij − r
i
j+1
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
Multiplying both sides by −1 yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
which implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
Together with the absence of negative length cycles this yields
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
≥ 0.
Thus, xi is cyclically monotone.3 From Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 24.8, it follows that there
exists a convex function ϕ: T i → R such that xi is a selection from its subdiﬀerential mapping. That
is,
xi
(
ri
)
∈ ∂ϕ
(
ri
)
∀ri ∈ T i.
This implies (see Krishna and Maenner (2001), Theorem 1) that for any smooth path S in T i joining
ri and r¯i the following holds: ∫ r¯i
ri,S
xi = ϕ
(
r¯i
)
− ϕ
(
ri
)
.
So xi is path independent.
(2)⇒(1): Let us assume that decomposition monotonicity is satisﬁed, f satisﬁes monotonicity
and for every agent i, xi is path independent. Take any edge from T if and denote its starting
node ri and its ending node r¯i. Let L denote the line segment between ri and r¯i. That is, L ={
ri ∈ T i | ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i, α ∈ [0, 1]
}
. Now we pick any ri ∈ L and substitute the original edge
with the path A =
(
ri, ri, r¯i
)
which has length li
(
ri, ri
)
+li
(
ri, r¯i
)
. Since decomposition monotonicity
is satisﬁed we have that
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
. (3.9)
3The notion of cyclical monotonicity was introduced by Rockafellar (1966).
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That is, the original edge is at least as long as the path A. By repeated substitution we can generate
a new path A˜ =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = r¯
i
)
where rij ∈ L, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m + 1}. Then (3.9) implies
that the original edge is at least as long as A˜. That is,
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
(see also the example given in Figure 3.4). Since f satisﬁes monotonicity we have that
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥ −li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
.
Together the above imply that
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
.
Note that
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri2, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=2
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
.
(3.10)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the edge length given in (3.8). The second equality
follows from rearranging the terms of the summation. The third equality is derived by adding
and subtracting E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)]
. To derive the last equality we use that ri1 = r
i and
rim+1 = r¯
i. By deﬁnition of the subgradient we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in A˜ that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
.
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Thus, together with the above we get
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
.
By repeated substitution we can generate paths with more and more edges. In the limit the
distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero and
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
→
∫ r¯i
ri,L
xi.
Thus, as m→∞,
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
goes to
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
∫ r¯i
ri,L
xi. (3.11)
Now, let C =
(
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
)
denote a cycle in T if . Furthermore, let Lj denote the line
segment between rij and r
i
j+1. The result in (3.11) and the path independence of x
i imply for the
length of C that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
xi
= 0.
That is, C has non-negative length. In order to see the equality relation, note the following: The
terms of the ﬁrst summation cancel each other out. Furthermore, the second summation describes
an integral over a closed path in T i which, due to path independence, equals zero.
Finally, absence of cycles with negative length in T if , ∀i ∈ N , implies that f is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible (see Theorem 3.1).

If agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences we can state directly the
following:
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Theorem 3.3 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space and a valuation function satisfying
non-decreasing expected diﬀerences and yielding expected valuation functions E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
which are convex in his true type. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1) f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
2) f satisﬁes monotonicity and for every agent i, xi is path independent.
Proof
(1)⇒(2): In order to show the necessity of monotonicity and path independence of xi, one can
use the corresponding part of the proof for Theorem 3.2 without changes as it does not depend on
decomposition monotonicity or non-decreasing expected diﬀerences being satisﬁed.
(2)⇒(1): In order to establish the suﬃciency of monotonicity and path independence of xi,
note that monotonicity together with non-decreasing expected diﬀerences implies that the costs of
manipulation are decomposition monotone, see Lemma 3.1. Finally, we apply Theorem 3.2.

Monotonicity of f and path independence of xi do not imply one another. That monotonicity
of f does not imply path independence of xi follows directly from Example 3.1 and Theorem 3.3.
It can also be derived directly from Example 3.1. Note that, due to the linearity of the valuation
function and there being only one agent in this example, we have xi(r) = f(r). Now, if we consider
for example path A consisting of the line segment between the types x and y and path A˜ consisting
of the line segment between the types x and z as well as the line segment between the types z and
y, we ﬁnd that
∫ y
x,A
f = −
3
2
and
∫ y
x,A˜
f = 3.
So the path integral of f from x to y is not independent of the path of integration. The fact that
monotonicity of f does not imply path independence of xi depends crucially upon the assumption
of multi-dimensional type spaces in our setting. If we would consider one-dimensional type spaces
instead, then monotonicity of f would imply that also xi is monotone, see Lemma 2.2 in the foregoing
chapter. This in turn would imply path independence of xi.
That path independence does not imply monotonicity is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.2 Let us consider the allocation of a single, indivisible item. For simplicity we assume
that there exists only a single agent to possibly allocate to. He has a type t ∈ T = [0, 1] which reﬂects
the value of the object for him. Given a report r of the agent, the allocation rule f : T → [0, 1]
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assigns to him a probability for getting the object. The agent’s valuation for the resulting allocation
is v(f(r) | t) = f(r)t. Thus, in this example we have that xi(r) = f(r). Speciﬁcally, we set
f(r) = −(2r − 1)2 + 1 (see Figure 3.6). Clearly, f is path independent but not monotone.
r
1
0 1
f(r)
Figure 3.6: The allocation function f in Example 3.2.
3.4.1 Linear Valuation Functions
In Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b) we consider a special case of the setting presented in this chapter.
In this special case agents also have multi-dimensional types, convex type spaces and interdependent
valuations. However, each agent’s valuation function is restricted to be linear in his own true type.
Speciﬁcally, we have
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= αi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| t−i
)
+ βi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| t−i
)
ti.
Note that αi : Γ× T−i → R and βi : Γ× T−i → Rk. That is, αi assigns to every
(
γ, t−i
)
∈ Γ× T−i
a value in R, whereas βi assigns to every
(
γ, t−i
)
∈ Γ× T−i a vector in Rk. Thus, agent i’s expected
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valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
αi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
+ E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
ti. (3.12)
Note that in this linear setting
xi
(
ri
)
= E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
. (3.13)
Hence, E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
., t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is a vector ﬁeld T i → Rk. Applying (3.12), the monotonicity condi-
tion (see Deﬁnition 3.2) becomes
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)
− βi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t−i
)] (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N.
Since our linear valuation functions satisfy the non-decreasing expected diﬀerences condition, we
readily get the following characterization result for this linear setting.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space and a valuation function which is
linear in his true type. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1) f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
2) f satisﬁes weak monotonicity and for every agent i, E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
., t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is path independent.
The above result follows directly from Theorem 3.3. The proof presented in Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf
(2007b) works along the same lines as the proof for Theorem 3.2. However, thanks to (3.13) it is
somewhat shorter. Due to (3.13) one can work directly with path lengths rather than bound the
path lengths using xi.
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) consider special cases of
this linear setting, see Section 3.6 for details. The setting of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999)
does not feature interdependent valuations. In Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) the interdependencies
with other agents’ types enter an agent’s valuation function only additively via the α-term. The same
goes for the one-dimensional setting presented by Myerson (1981), see Section 2.6.1 in the foregoing
chapter. There the interdependencies also only come in additively via the α-term. However, note
that the class of valuation functions considered in Mu¨ller, Perea and Wolf (2007b) also allows for
interesting settings where the interdependencies with other agents’ types enter multiplicatively via
the β-term. Consider for example the following simple, one-dimensional communication network
setting:
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Example 3.3 There are three agents, N = {1, 2, 3}, each owning a link in the communication
network presented in Figure 3.7. That is, agent i owns the link li. Furthermore, there exists a social
origin destination
ρ
(1− ρ)
l1 l2
l3
Figure 3.7: The communication network considered in Example 3.3.
planner who wants to send data from the point of origin to the destination point. In order to do so, he
can rent diﬀerent combinations of links. The outcome set Γ contains the possible link combinations
he can choose from. That is, Γ = {∅, {l3}, {l1, l2}, {l1, l2, l3}}. The planner assigns a value v
0 to the
successful data transfer. Data can only be sent once. If the planner chooses the link combination
{l1, l2, l3}, we assume that the following simple rooting policy is employed: with probability ρ the upper
connection {l1, l2} is used, and with probability 1− ρ the lower connection l3 is used.
Each agent has a type ti ∈ [0, 1] reﬂecting the probability that his link actually works if the
planner tries to send data through it (for example the link might be busy putting through other data).
Furthermore, agent i incurs ﬁxed, publicly known costs ci for putting data through his link. His
valuation for γ ∈ Γ is vi
(
γ | ti
)
= −cibi(γ)ti, where bi(γ) denotes the probability that the data reaches
the link li if outcome γ is chosen. The allocation rule of the planner is to pick a γ ∈ Γ such that[
v0H(γ)− C(γ)
]
is maximized. H(γ) denotes the expected throughput, that is, the probability that
the data reaches the destination given the link combination γ. C(γ) denotes the expected throughput
costs, that is,
∑
i c
ibi(γ)ti. The valuations of the agents for the diﬀerent outcomes are summarized in
Table 3.1. Note that agent 1’s type enters agent 2’s valuation of the outcomes {l1, l2} and {l1, l2, l3}
Outcome Agents’ valuations
γ v1
(
γ | t1
)
v2
(
γ | t2
)
v3
(
γ | t3
)
∅ 0 0 0
{l3} 0 0 −c
3t3
{l1, l2} −c
1t1 −c2t1t2 0
{l1, l2, l3} −c
1ρt1 −c2ρt1t2 −c3(1− ρ)t3
Table 3.1: Agents’ valuations in Example 3.3.
in the aforementioned multiplicative fashion. Employing diﬀerent routing policies and data sending
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strategies, one can construct also examples where each agent exhibits such interdependent valuations.
3.5 Payment Rules
In the foregoing section we characterized Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in terms of
a monotonicity condition and an integrability condition. In this section we start out by showing how
to construct a corresponding payment rule for an incentive compatible allocation rule. Afterwards
we discuss the issue of revenue equivalence. The outline of this section follows closely the one of the
corresponding section in the chapter concerned with one-dimensional type settings. Although the
general ideas are the same, some minor adjustments have to be made to accommodate for the now
multi-dimensional type setting.
According to Deﬁnition 3.1 an allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there exists a
payment rule P such that all the incentive compatibility constraints (3.3) are satisﬁed. With Theorem
3.1 (see Section 3.3) we establish that the existence of such a payment rule can be guaranteed if for
all agents the corresponding networks T if do not contain any negative length cycles. In the proof of
the theorem we construct a payment rule by making use of shortest path lengths. Speciﬁcally, for
every agent i we pick an arbitrary source node ri0 and deﬁne for all nodes r
i
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if , that is, all paths that
start at node ri and end at the source node ri0. The payment rule P is then constructed by setting
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Thus, the payment agent i has to make for reporting ri corresponds to the length of the shortest
path in T if from the node r
i to the source node.
As noted at the end of the proof for Theorem 3.1, it is actually suﬃcient to choose a payment
rule such that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ ci.
That is, the expected payment agent i has to make for reporting ri corresponds to the length of
the shortest path from the node ri to the source node plus possibly some constant. Thus, we can
observe that there is potentially room for a variety of payment rules that make the allocation rule
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f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. First of all, even for a ﬁxed source node there can exist several
payment rules yielding the same expected payments up to an additive constant. Secondly, changing
the source node might lead to payment rules yielding diﬀerent expected payments. Thirdly, there
might exist payment rules that do not evolve from shortest path lengths.
However, in the remainder of this section we establish that for the setting discussed in this chapter
(where agents have convex type spaces and expected valuation functions which are convex in their
own types) actually all payment rules that make an allocation rule f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
yield the same expected payments for the agents up to an additive constant. Such an allocation rule
is said to be satisfying revenue equivalence. Krishna and Maenner (2001) show that if agents’ type
spaces are convex and their valuation functions are convex in their own types then every Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible allocation rule satisﬁes revenue equivalence. Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz
and Vohra (2009) are concerned with dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules and
the characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic argument. In an application
section they establish that their approach has a natural extension to other notions of incentive
compatibility as well. Speciﬁcally, they show that a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rule
satisﬁes revenue equivalence if and only if for every agent i and all types si, ti ∈ T i the length of
the shortest path from si to ti and the length of the shortest path from ti to si add up to zero.
Furthermore, Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz and Vohra (2009) establish that the above mentioned result
of Krishna and Maenner (2001) follows as an immediate consequence of their results in case the
outcome space is countable.
The multi-dimensional type setting discussed in the chapter (see also Section 3.2) imposes the
same conditions as imposed by Krishna and Maenner (2001). We show that in this setting all Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible allocation rules satisfy revenue equivalence. Although by doing this we
do not extend the result of Krishna and Maenner (2001), we provide an alternate proof using our
network based approach.
We begin by formally introducing the deﬁnition of revenue equivalence:
Deﬁnition 3.6 (Revenue Equivalence) Suppose the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible. We say that f satisﬁes revenue equivalence if for any two payment rules P ,P˜ such that
all the incentive compatibility constraints (3.3) are satisﬁed there exists a constant ci such that we
have
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
P˜i
(
ti, t−i
)]
+ ci ∀ti ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N.
So, an allocation rule f satisﬁes revenue equivalence if all payment rules that make f Bayes-Nash
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incentive compatible yield the same expected payments up to an additive constant. Our notion
of revenue equivalence is equivalent to what is termed payoﬀ equivalence in Krishna and Maenner
(2001).
Suppose that the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Furthermore, suppose
that P is a payment rule such that all the incentive constraints in (3.3) are satisﬁed. Now let us
consider agent i and some types si, ti ∈ T i. Based on (3.3) and (3.8) we have that
E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
si, ti
)
as well as that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
si, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
ti, si
)
.
Together the above inequalities yield
−li
(
ti, si
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ li
(
si, ti
)
. (3.14)
That is, for agent i the diﬀerence in expected payments for reporting si or ti is bounded by the length
of the edge from si to ti and the negative length of the backward edge.
Now consider a sequence of nodes A =
(
ri1 = s
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = t
i
)
which starts at si and ends at
ti. Parallel to the above we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in A that
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
and that
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
.
Similar to (3.14) together this yields
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (3.15)
By summing up the inequalities (3.15) for all elements in A we get
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (3.16)
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Observe that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
Pi
(
ri1, t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rim+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
(3.17)
since all the terms of the summation cancel except for the ﬁrst one and the last one and since we
have that ri1 = s
i and rim+1 = t
i. Now, using (3.17) we can write (3.16) as
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
. (3.18)
So for any sequence of nodes starting at si and ending at ti, the diﬀerence in agent i’s expected
payments for reporting si or ti is bounded by the length of the path from si to ti along these nodes
and the negative length of the reverse path along the same nodes. For the setting considered in
this chapter (see Section 3.2) we can guarantee that there exists a sequence of nodes such that the
left-hand side and the right-hand side of (3.18) are equal and hence, the allocation rule f satisﬁes
revenue equivalence.
Theorem 3.5 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space T i and expected valuation functions
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ., t−i
)]
which are convex in his true type. If the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible then it also satisﬁes revenue equivalence.
Proof
Let us assume that each agent has a convex type space and expected valuation functions which are
convex in his true type. Furthermore, let us assume that the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible. Let P be a payment rule such that all the incentive compatibility constraints in (3.3)
are satisﬁed.
Take agent i and pick two types si, ti ∈ T i. Let L denote the line segment between si and ti.
Now, consider a sequence of nodes between si and ti along the line segment L,
A =
(
ri1 = s
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = t
i
)
. Recall from (3.18) that
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
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Note that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim, t
−i
)]
+
m−1∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
.
(3.19)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the edge length given in (3.8). The second equality
stems from rearranging the terms of the summation. The third equality is derived by adding and
subtracting E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
. To establish the last equality we use that ri1 = s
i and
rim+1 = t
i. In a similarly fashion we get that
m∑
j=1
−li
(
rij+1, r
i
j
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
.
(3.20)
For a detailed description of the transformation steps involved see (3.10) in the foregoing section.
Using (3.20) and (3.19) we can now write (3.18) as follows
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
. (3.21)
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By deﬁnition of the subgradient we have for any rij , r
i
j+1 in A that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
,
(for deﬁnition of xi (.) see (3.2)). This implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≥
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
. (3.22)
Similarly we have that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
≥
(
rij − r
i
j+1
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
Multiplying both sides by −1 yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
which implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
≤
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
. (3.23)
Applying (3.22) and (3.23) to (3.21) yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij
)
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
(
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
xi
(
rij+1
)
.
(3.24)
Observe that xi is path independent. (This is a necessary condition for f being Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible. For details the reader is referred to the ﬁrst part of the proof for Theorem 3.2
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in the foregoing section.) Considering all the nodes along the line segment L, it follows that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si,L
xi
≤ E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si,L
xi,
and we get that for all si, ti ∈ T i
E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
+
∫ ti
si,L
xi.
Since xi is path independent, the diﬀerence in expected payments E−i
[
Pi
(
si, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ti, t−i
)]
is
the same if we pick some path from si to ti other than the direct line segment L. So, up to an additive
constant, the expected payments of an agent are completely deﬁned by his valuation function and
the allocation rule f . Thus, f satisﬁes revenue equivalence.

3.6 Applications
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) consider a social choice setting in which agents have convex types
spaces and interdependent valuations. Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) deal with a single
item auction setting where agents have convex types spaces and independent valuations. The later
can be folded into the setting of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). In both cases agents’ valuation
functions are linear in their types.
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) show that a mechanism
(f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if monotonicity and path independence are
satisﬁed, and a condition on agents’ utility functions holds. This condition requires that for all
agents i and all types si, ti ∈ T i
U i
(
si | si
)
= U i
(
ti | ti
)
+
∫ si
ti,S
qi,
where U i
(
si | si
)
denotes agent i’s expected utility for truthfully reporting si (see (3.1) for deﬁnition).
The vector ﬁeld qi represents expected winning probabilities and depends on the allocation rule. S
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is some path of integration between ti and si. The above can be written as
E−i
[
Pi
(
ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
si, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
si, t−i
)
| si, t−i
)]
+
∫ si
ti,S
qi.
Thus, the last condition used for characterizing Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility is revenue equiv-
alence.
In the following we show how the two aforementioned settings can be folded into our frame-
work. Especially, into the linear valuations setting presented in Section 3.4.1. Also, we are going
to demonstrate that for the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules one
only needs to evoke monotonicity and path independence.
3.6.1 Interdependent Valuations
In this application we consider the social choice setting introduced by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001),
a setting which allows for allocative externalities as well as interdependent valuations. In this setting
there exists a set of social alternatives H = {1, . . . , h}. Given reports from all agents, the allocation
rule f : T → [0, 1]h assigns to each social alternative a probability to be chosen. So the outcome
set Γ is the set of all possible probability proﬁles. Given a report proﬁle r ∈ T , alternative k’s
probability to be chosen is denoted fk(r). The allocation rule must satisfy the probability conditions∑h
k=1 fk(t) = 1 and 0 ≤ fk(t) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ H, ∀t ∈ T .
For every agent i, the type space T i ⊂ Rh×n is assumed to be convex and bounded. Element tikj
of agent i’s type ti ∈ T i aﬀects agent j’s valuation for social alternative k ∈ H. Given a type proﬁle
t ∈ T , agent i’s valuation for some alternative k ∈ H is vi(k | t) =
∑n
j=1 a
j
kit
j
ki. The scalars a
j
ki are
common knowledge and aiki ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ H.
Now, take agent i having true type ti and reporting ri while the other agents have true types t−i
and reports r−i. The value that the agent assigns to the resulting outcome is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
=
h∑
k=1
(
fk
(
ri, r−i
) n∑
j=1
a
j
kit
j
ki
)
.
Consider agent i reporting ri and assume that the other agents report their types truthfully. Then,
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the agent’s expected conditional probability for social alternative k ∈ H to be chosen is
qik
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
fk
(
ri, t−i
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
Based on the above, we deﬁne the vector ﬁeld Qi : T i → Rh×n as follows. Considering Qi
(
ri
)
we
have that, for each k ∈ H, the kith element is given by aikiq
i
k
(
ri
)
and the kjth element is zero for
all j 
= i. Thus, the agent’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
=
∫
T−i
( h∑
k=1
(
fk
(
ri, t−i
) n∑
j=1
a
j
kit
j
ki
))
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= Qi
(
ri
)
ti +
h∑
k=1
∫
T−i
(
fk
(
ri, t−i
)∑
j∈N
j =i
a
j
kit
j
ki
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
(3.25)
In (3.25) the Qi
(
ri
)
ti represents the value that agent i attaches to a certain expected allocation.
Also entering his expected valuation are the interdependencies with the other agents’ types which are
captured by the second term in (3.25). Applying (3.25), the monotonicity condition (see Deﬁnition
3.2) becomes (
Qi
(
ri
)
−Qi
(
r˜i
)) (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N. (3.26)
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
if and only if (3.26) holds, Qi is path independent ∀i ∈ N and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
r˜i | r˜i
)
+
∫ ri
r˜i,S
Qi ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N, (3.27)
where S denotes a path in T i connecting r˜i and ri. Due to path independence, it does not matter
which path of integration is chosen. Remember that U i
(
ri | ri
)
denotes agent i’s expected utility for
truthfully reporting ri (see (3.1) for deﬁnition of expected utilities).
Note that the social choice model under consideration here constitutes a special case of the
linear valuations setting presented in Section 3.4.1. More speciﬁcally, we are dealing with a special
case where the interdependencies with other agents’ types enter an agent’s valuation function only
additively via the α-term in (3.12). Thus, we can directly apply the results derived earlier in this
chapter. From Theorem 3.4 it follows that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if the
monotonicity condition in (3.26) holds and Qi is path independent ∀i ∈ N . Compared to Jehiel and
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Moldovanu(2001), this characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility is not using condition
(3.27). In the following we show how (3.27) follows from the other conditions.
Now, suppose that monotonicity of f and path independence of Qi are satisﬁed. Before we
start constructing a payment rule that makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, we observe the
following with regard to path lengths. Take ri, r¯i ∈ T if and let L denote the line segment between
them. Consider a path A =
{
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r¯
i
}
from ri to r¯i that moves along the line between
the two. That is, every rij is on L. By applying (3.25) to (3.19) we ﬁnd for the length of A that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
Qi
(
rij+1
) (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
. (3.28)
Since agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected diﬀerences, decomposition mono-
tonicity is satisﬁed (see Lemma 3.1). So we can construct paths that are shorter than A (or as long)
by letting them visit the same nodes as A and also additional nodes along L (see also example in
Figure 3.4). In the limit, as m→∞, the distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero and
m∑
j=1
Qi
(
rij+1
) (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
→
∫ r¯i
ri,L
Qi.
Thus, (3.28) goes to
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
∫ r¯i
ri,L
Qi.
Let us now construct a payment rule that makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We use the
approach utilizing shortest path lengths (see proof of Theorem 3.1 and the beginning of Section 3.5).
For each agent i we pick ri0 as the source node in T
i
f . We set
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the inﬁmum is taken over all paths A =
(
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0
)
in T if . Let Lj denote the line
segment between rij and r
i
j+1, whereas L denotes the line segment between the source and r
i. Any
payment rule P such that E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
makes f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. This
can be achieved for example by setting Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
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Based on what we have established before, if we take some path A, we can construct paths that
are shorter (or as long) by letting them visit the same nodes as A and also additional nodes along
the line segments in between. In the limit, as the number of nodes goes to inﬁnity, the length of the
paths goes to
m∑
j=1
(
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
+
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
Qi
)
.
Since Qi is path independent we have that4
m∑
j=1
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
Qi =
∫ ri
0
ri,L
Qi.
So, based on the above, we ﬁnd for our payment rule that
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri0, t
−i
)
| ri0, t
−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ri
0
,L
Qi. (3.29)
Note that by construction E−i
[
Pi
(
ri0, t
−i
)]
= 0. Thus, we can subtract E−i
[
Pi
(
ri0, t
−i
)]
on the
left-hand side of (3.29), yielding
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri0, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri0, t
−i
)
| ri0, t
−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ri
0
,L
Qi. (3.30)
Since agents have convex type spaces and expected valuation functions which are linear in their
true types, it follows from Theorem 3.5 that the allocation rule satisﬁes revenue equivalence. That
is, all payment rules making f Bayes-Nash incentive compatible yield the same expected payments
up to an additive constant. So (3.30) holds for all of them. Thus, by rearranging the terms in (3.30),
we get
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ri0 | r
i
0
)
+
∫ ri
ri
0
,L
Qi.
as a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. (3.27) follows readily.
4For convenience we picked the line segment L as the path of integration. Due to the path independence of Qi, it
can be replaced with any other path connecting the source and ri.
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3.6.2 Single Item Auction With Externalities
In this section we consider the single item auction presented by Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1999). In this setting a single, indivisible item is auctioned oﬀ to one of n potential buyers. Each
buyer has a convex type space T i ⊂ Rn. A buyer’s type reﬂects his value for the diﬀerent possible
outcomes. Suppose buyer i has type ti. The ith type element tii ∈ [a, b] represents his value for the
item. Similarly, the jth type element tij ∈
[
a˜, b˜
]
represents the value of the externalities he incurs if
buyer j 
= i wins the item. Commonly, we have that tii ≥ 0 and t
i
j ≤ 0. That is, buyer i attaches
positive value to winning the item and negative value to someone else getting it. Given reports from
all buyers, the allocation rule f : T → [0, 1]n assigns to each buyer a probability for winning the item.
So the outcome set Γ is the set of all possible winning probability proﬁles. Buyer i’s probability to
win, given a report proﬁle t ∈ T , is denoted f i(t). The allocation rule must satisfy the probability
condition
∑n
i=1 f
i(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T .
Buyers’ valuations are independent. Let buyer i have true type ti and report ri while the others
have true types t−i and make reports r−i. The value that the buyer assigns to the resulting allocation
is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= f
(
ri, r−i
)
ti.
Now, let buyer i report ri and assume that the other buyers report truthfully. His expected condi-
tional probability for buyer j to win the item is
qij
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
f j
(
ri, t−i
)
π−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
We deﬁne qi
(
ri
)
=
(
qi1
(
ri
)
, . . . , qin
(
ri
))
. The buyer’s expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= qi
(
ri
)
ti. (3.31)
Applying (3.31), the monotonicity condition (see Deﬁnition 3.2) becomes
(
qi
(
ri
)
− qi
(
r˜i
)) (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N. (3.32)
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) show that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive
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compatible if and only if (3.32) holds, qi is path independent ∀i ∈ N and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
r˜i | r˜i
)
+
∫ ri
r˜i,S
qi ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,∀i ∈ N, (3.33)
where S denotes a path in T i connecting r˜i and ri. Due to path independence, it does not matter
which path of integration is chosen.
Observe that the single item auction setting presented in this section, can be folded into the
social choice model of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). Thus, the reader is referred to Section 3.6.1
for its analysis. Here we just brieﬂy summarize the results. From Theorem 3.4 it follows that f is
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if f satisﬁes monotonicity and qi is path independent
∀i ∈ N . Using shortest path lengths to construct payments and picking ri0 as the source node in T
i
f
yields
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= qi
(
ri
)
ri − qi
(
ri0
)
ri0 −
∫ ri
ri
0
,L
qi. (3.34)
for our payment rule. Due to buyers’ convex type spaces and linear valuation functions we can apply
Theorem 3.5. Hence, all allocation rules which are Bayes-Nash incentive compatible in this setting
satisfy revenue equivalence. Based on (3.34) we get (3.33) as a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash
incentive compatibility.
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4Combinatorial Scoring Auctions
In this chapter we concern ourselves with a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement mechanism
called combinatorial scoring auction. In our setting there are several suppliers which have multi-
dimensional private information. A buyer wants to procure several items at once. Subsets of these
items are characterized by a price as well as by a number of non-monetary attributes called quality
(for example completion time of a project). The suppliers submit oﬀers specifying prices and quality
levels for these subsets. These oﬀers are evaluated according to a quasi-linear scoring rule. Based on
the resulting scores, suppliers win contracts for the delivery of certain items. Such a contract only
speciﬁes the set of items a supplier has to deliver and a score that he has to meet. The decision
about the speciﬁc price-quality combination is at the discretion of the supplier. He only has to make
sure that his chosen combination is yielding the contracted score. In deciding about the delivered
price-quality combination, the supplier aims at optimizing his own proﬁt.
We analyze the equilibria in such auctions. Also, we establish a link between combinatorial scoring
auctions and combinatorial price-only auctions. It is demonstrated how this link can be exploited to
employ preexisting knowledge about the equilibrium behavior in regular, price-only auctions in order
to facilitate the strategic analysis of combinatorial scoring auctions. This entails for example results
about equilibria existence and revenue equivalence, as presented in the foregoing chapters. Our work
is the multi-item extension to the results of Asker and Cantillon (2008) about single item scoring
auctions with one-dimensional pseudo-types. Their setting is a special case of our setting which deals
with multi-item scoring auctions and multi-dimensional pseudo-types.
4.1 Introduction
The design and analysis of combinatorial auctions is a ﬂourishing ﬁeld in auction theory. It is drawing
the interest of researchers from the area of game theory as well as from the area of computer science.
(Or as Roger B. Myerson puts it on the back cover of Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg (2006):
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Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
92 CHAPTER 4. COMBINATORIAL SCORING AUCTIONS
“Combinatorial auctions are the great frontier of auction theory today, . . . ”.) While single item
auctions only allocate one item at a time, combinatorial auctions are used to allocate multiple items
all at once. By doing this, complementary or substitutable preferences of the bidders for diﬀerent
item sets can be taken into account. The majority of research conducted on combinatorial auctions
(but this also holds for single item auctions) considers the price as the unique strategic dimension for
bidders. That is, bidders oﬀer prices for diﬀerent sets of items. Based on these price bids the items
are allocated.
However, there are situations in which auction participants are not only concerned with the
price of items but also with other non-monetary attributes of the items (called quality). Take for
example the construction of a building. The construction process can be subdivided into several tasks.
Contractors can make bids on these tasks. The building owner does not only care about the prices
at which these tasks are executed by the contractors. He also cares about non-monetary attributes
of these tasks, like the completion time, the quality of the used materials, the construction quality or
the probability that the contractor goes bankrupt during the job and leaves the task unﬁnished. On
the other side, due to diﬀerent levels of specialization, contractors might be able to take over several
tasks or only some special tasks. Also, the contractor having the lowest cost for executing a speciﬁc
task might diﬀer depending on the quality level. That is, the low cost contractor for a task at a low
quality level might not be the same as the low cost contractor for the same task at a higher quality
level. Thus, it can be important to consider other strategic dimensions than just price.
One way to deal with combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement problems, like the one described
above, is using combinatorial scoring auctions. In this chapter we analyze the equilibria in such
combinatorial scoring auctions. Speciﬁcally, we aim at extending the results of Asker and Cantillon
(2008). They consider a setting for single item scoring auctions where item quality and bidders’ types
are multi-dimensional. For each bidder they construct a one-dimensional pseudo-type which is the
maximum level of apparent social surplus that this bidder can generate. “Apparent” social surplus
because for its construction the scoring rule is used, which can diﬀer from the buyer’s true valuation
function. Asker and Cantillon (2008) show that knowledge of bidders’ pseudo-type distributions
is suﬃcient for describing equilibrium outcomes and the buyer’s expected equilibrium utility. This
ﬁnding allows them to establish a link between single item scoring auctions and standard single
item independent private value (IPV) price-only auctions. Speciﬁcally, for each single item scoring
auction in their setting they identify a corresponding single item IPV price-only auction in which
a bidder’s type is his pseudo-type. They then show that the strategic analysis of a scoring auction
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reduces to the strategic analysis of the corresponding price-only auction. In this chapter we establish
the multi-item extension of this result. That is, we also construct pseudo-types. In our case these
pseudo-types are consisting of the maximum levels of apparent social surplus that a bidder can
generate for the diﬀerent item sets. We also show a link between combinatorial scoring auctions and
combinatorial price-only auctions. This link is again established by identifying for each combinatorial
scoring auction a corresponding price-only auction.
4.1.1 Related Work
Che (1993) analyzes single item scoring auctions where the supplier bidding the highest score is
selected to deliver the item. He considers a setting where the item quality is one-dimensional and
suppliers’ private information is also one-dimensional. Suppliers’ production costs depend on the
quality level as well as on their own private information. Furthermore, he considers scoring rules
that are linear in price. In order to construct equilibria in these auctions, he makes use of the
maximum level of social welfare that a supplier can produce, also called a supplier’s pseudo-type.
These pseudo-types are well deﬁned once the scoring rule is given. By employing a relatively simple
change in variables, Che (1993) is able to transform the problem of ﬁnding equilibria in these scoring
auctions into the problem of ﬁnding equilibria in standard single item IPV price-only auctions. The
later problem is a well-studied area in the auction literature. He also designs an optimal scoring rule,
maximizing the buyer’s utility.
Branco (1997) extends Che’s (1993) analysis of the independent cost setting to the case where
suppliers’ production costs are correlated. He characterizes an optimal direct revelation mechanism,
the implementation of which requires a two-stage auction. David, Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus
(2002a), (2002b), (2003) and (2006) propose and analyze simultaneous and sequential English auc-
tions on suppliers’ scores (with and without deadline). Their settings either allow for two-dimensional
quality and two-dimensional private information or for general multi-dimensional quality and one-
dimensional private information. However, in the settings under their consideration, the functional
form of the suppliers’ utility functions and the scoring rules is more restrictive than in the foregoing
papers. They also identify optimal scoring rules for the considered settings, that is, scoring rules
which maximize the buyer’s expected utility.
Asker and Cantillon (2009), (2008) extend Che’s (1993) analysis to a single item scoring auc-
tion setting. This setting allows for multi-dimensional quality as well as multi-dimensional private
information for the suppliers. Asker and Cantillon (2009) show that, contrary to Che’s (1993) one-
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dimensional setting, the optimal buying mechanism cannot be implemented by a scoring auction with
a scoring rule which is linear in price if suppliers’ information is multi-dimensional. Furthermore,
they analyze the performance of scoring auctions in comparison to the optimal mechanism. Asker
and Cantillon (2008) prove that in order to describe equilibrium outcomes in single item scoring auc-
tions, it is suﬃcient to make use of suppliers’ one-dimensional pseudo-types. However, if suppliers’
original private information is multi-dimensional, this proof is more involved than using the simple
variable transformation employed by Che (1993). As Che (1993), Asker and Cantillon (2008) show
that the problem of ﬁnding equilibria in single item scoring auctions can be transformed into the
problem of ﬁnding equilibria in standard single item IPV price-only auctions. In this chapter we
deliver the multi-item extension of this result. Furthermore, Asker and Cantillon (2008) ﬁnd that
scoring auctions dominate other procedures for buying diﬀerentiated objects, like menu auctions,
beauty contests and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.
Milgrom (2000) shows that an item can be eﬃciently allocated by a scoring auction which employs
the buyer’s valuation function as the scoring rule and runs a Vickrey auction on suppliers’ submitted
scores. Suyama and Yokoo (2005) investigate a combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction
setting that allows for multi-dimensional quality as well as for multi-dimensional private information
of the suppliers. Their setting is a bit more restrictive than the one considered in this chapter.
Speciﬁcally, in their setting the vector of quality levels for an item set is composed of the quality
vectors of the individual items in the set. They propose a direct revelation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)) that determines the social surplus
maximizing allocation of items and quality levels for the items. In this mechanism it is a dominant
strategy for a supplier to report his private information truthfully. The combinatorial VCG scoring
auction presented in Section 4.5.1 is quite similar in that it is essentially a direct revelation VCG
mechanism based on suppliers’ pseudo-types. In our auction the welfare maximizing allocation is
determined by the auction mechanism. The optimal quality levels are determined by the suppliers
themselves. This combinatorial VCG scoring auction is the multi-item extension of Milgrom’s (2000)
scoring auction.
In addition to the theoretical work presented above, also some experimental work on single
item multi-attribute auctions has been done, see for example: Bichler (2000), Chen-Ritzo, Harrison,
Kwasnica and Thomas (2005), Strecker and Seifert (2004) as well as Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005).
In these papers theoretical equilibrium predictions are veriﬁed and diﬀerent scoring auction formats
are compared. A ﬁnding of these experiments is that multi-attribute auction mechanisms dominate
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price-only auction mechanisms in terms of the buyer’s and suppliers’ utilities.
4.1.2 Chapter Outline & Our Contribution
In Section 4.2 we state some basic assumptions and deﬁnitions. Also, we describe our combinatorial
scoring auction model which is an extension of the single item scoring auction models considered by
Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008).
Contrary to the commonly analyzed single item scoring auctions, in our setting a buyer wants to
procure several items at once. Item sets are characterized by a price as well as by a number of non-
monetary attributes. A supplier’s production costs for the diﬀerent item sets are inﬂuenced by the
chosen quality level and his type which is his private information. We allow for multi-dimensional,
independently distributed private information for the suppliers and multi-dimensional non-monetary
attributes for the sets of items. The suppliers submit oﬀers on the diﬀerent item sets. They specify
prices as well as quality levels for the non-monetary attributes. Each oﬀer is evaluated according to
a scoring rule which assigns to each price-quality oﬀer for an item set a one-dimensional score.1 We
only consider scoring rules that are linear in price.
Based on the resulting scores an allocation rule determines which suppliers are contracted to
deliver certain sets of items. This yields for each supplier an allocation vector. This allocation vector
has an element for each item set (including the empty one) specifying the supplier’s probability to win
the corresponding item set. (For example, consider the case where the allocation rule is deterministic.
Then, one element of a suppliers allocation vector is equal to one, whereas the remaining elements are
equal to zero.) The delivery contract for an item set speciﬁes only a score that the winning supplier has
to meet. The ﬁnal decision about the speciﬁc price-quality combination for the delivered item set is at
the discretion of the winning supplier. The only restriction is that his chosen combination has to yield
the contracted score. We ﬁnd that winning suppliers choose the delivered quality level independent of
the score that they contractually have to meet. That is, the contracted score eﬀectively determines
the price a winning supplier is charging the buyer for his item set. This ﬁnding is analogous to
ﬁndings in single item scoring auction settings, see for example Che (1993) or Asker and Cantillon
(2008).
In Section 4.2.2 we observe the following. Given the scoring rule, the maximum level of apparent
social surplus that a supplier with a certain type can generate by producing and subsequently selling
a set of items is well deﬁned. We use this ﬁnding to construct for each supplier a multi-dimensional
1For an introduction to scoring rules and multi-attribute decision making in general see Yoon and Hwang (1995).
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
96 CHAPTER 4. COMBINATORIAL SCORING AUCTIONS
pseudo-type which has a component for each set of items. Each of these components is deﬁned as
the maximum level of apparent social surplus that the supplier can create for the corresponding item
set. This deﬁnition of pseudo-types is analogous to the deﬁnition of one-dimensional pseudo-types in
single item scoring auction settings (see Asker and Cantillon (2008)).
Based on the possible pseudo-types, we can partition a supplier’s type space into equivalence
classes of types yielding the same pseudo-type. A supplier’s bidding function assigns a bid to each of
his possible types. On a particular equivalence class, a supplier’s bidding function is doing one of the
following two things. On the one hand, the bidding function can assign the same bid to all types, in
which case we say that it is not mixing on this equivalence class. Or the bidding function can assign
diﬀering bids to the types, in which case we say that it is mixing on this equivalence class. This
mixing can happen in two ways. Given the bidding strategies of the others, if diﬀering bids yield also
diﬀering expected allocation vectors for the supplier then we speak of allocation mixing. If diﬀering
bids yield the same expected allocation vector then we speak of allocation equivalent mixing.
In Section 4.3 we assume that in equilibrium suppliers’ bidding functions employ allocation equiv-
alent mixing only for a zero measure of types. Under this assumption we show (Theorem 4.2) that
for the equilibrium analysis of a scoring auction it is suﬃcient to concentrate on bidding functions
which are constant on equivalence classes of types. That is, in equilibrium, except for allocation
equivalent mixing for a zero measure of types, suppliers assign the same bid to all types yielding
the same pseudo-type. Speciﬁcally, we show that for any equilibrium in a scoring auction we can
construct a new equilibrium with bidding strategies that are constant on equivalence classes of types.
A supplier’s new bidding strategy is constructed as follows. We pick a representative type from each
equivalence class in his type space and assign the old equilibrium bids for these representative types
also to all other types in their respective equivalence classes.
In order to ensure that these new bidding strategies indeed constitute an equilibrium, it is suf-
ﬁcient to show that they diﬀer from the suppliers’ original equilibrium bidding strategies only on a
set of types with zero measure (see proof of Theorem 4.2). Unproblematic in this respect are the
equivalence classes of types on which a supplier’s original equilibrium bidding function is not mixing.
This is because for these types his new bidding function is identical to his original one. Potentially
troublesome are the equivalence classes on which the original bidding function is mixing. The reason
is that for those types the new bidding strategy is diﬀerent from the original one. However, by
assumption we have that the set of types for which the original bidding function employs allocation
equivalent mixing has measure zero. In addition we prove (Lemma 4.4) that the set of types for
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which the original bidding function employs allocation mixing has also measure zero.2 This implies
that the set of types for which the original bidding function employs mixing (that is, the union of the
two aforementioned sets) has measure zero. Hence, the new bidding strategy is almost everywhere
the same as the original one.
Similar to Asker and Cantillon (2008) we utilize two facts in order to establish Lemma 4.4 (stating
that the set of types for which suppliers’ equilibrium strategies employ allocation mixing has zero
measure). First, we construct for every equilibrium in the scoring auction an auxiliary equilibrium
(Lemma 4.1) in which suppliers’ bidding strategies are based on their pseudo-types. This auxiliary
equilibrium is constructed in such a way that a supplier’s auxiliary equilibrium bidding strategy
speciﬁes a mixed bid for each of his pseudo-types. For a certain pseudo-type, the support of such a
mixed bid consists of all the pure bids that the original equilibrium bidding function speciﬁes for the
types in the corresponding equivalence class. Second, we prove that for almost all pseudo-types this
support does not contain pure bids which yield diﬀerent expected allocations for the supplier (Lemma
4.3). The ﬁrst ﬁnding, the construction of the auxiliary equilibrium, works out in the same way as in
Asker and Cantillon (2008). However, for the second ﬁnding we use a diﬀerent method than Asker
and Cantillon (2008). Their techniques do not extend well to settings covering multi-dimensional
pseudo-types. As part of our method we encounter again a monotonicity condition. This condition
is comparable to the monotonicity conditions presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
In Section 4.5 we show how the existing literature on combinatorial IPV price-only auctions can be
used for the strategic analysis of scoring auctions. For example, we show how to establish equilibrium
existence and revenue equivalence, both topics that we dealt with in the foregoing two chapters. More
speciﬁcally, for each scoring auction we identify a corresponding combinatorial price-only auction in
which a bidder’s type, on which he bases his bidding strategy, is his pseudo-type. With Corollary
4.1 we extend Asker and Cantillon’s (2008) “Expected Utility Equivalence”-Theorem for the buyer
from single item to combinatorial scoring auctions.
As an illustrative example, we describe in Section 4.5.1 a combinatorial scoring auction that
allocates items eﬃciently. As mentioned earlier in this section, this auction relates to the direct
revelation VCG mechanism described by Suyama and Yokoo (2005). It is the multi-item extension
of a single item scoring auction analyzed by Milgrom (2000). The above mentioned link to price-only
auctions is used to establish an equilibrium in this auction.
We end this chapter with a conclusion in Section 4.6 in which we discuss again some of the
2We have to exclude allocation equivalent mixing for a non-zero measure of types by assumption because we cannot
exclude it analytically like in the case of allocation mixing.
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simplifying assumptions that we take.
4.2 Model & Deﬁnitions
We consider a setting in which a buyer wants to procure a set of distinct items A = {1, . . . , a}.
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of potential suppliers for these items. Each of these suppliers is able
to produce every item.3 The buyer does not need to purchase from only one supplier. He can buy
diﬀerent subsets of items from diﬀerent suppliers. Including the empty set which we associate with
index 0, there are 2a possible subsets of items. Each non-empty subset of items j, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2a − 1},
is characterized by a sales price pj ∈ R+ and a quality level qj ∈ R
mj
+ for its mj ≥ 1 non-monetary
attributes. In order to ease notation later on let us deﬁne d = 2a − 1 and m =
∑d
j=1 mj .
The buyer’s valuation for the purchase of item set j with quality level qj at price pj is vj (qj)−pj .
Each supplier i has some private information in the form of a type θi ∈ Θi with Θi ⊂ Rki , ki ≥
1. Suppliers’ type spaces are assumed to be convex and compact. The set of all complete type
proﬁles θ =
(
θ1, . . . , θn
)
is denoted Θ, whereas the set of all type proﬁles excluding supplier i,
θ−i =
(
θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn
)
, is denoted Θ−i. Suppliers’ types are independently distributed.
Assuming that supplier i’s types are distributed according to some density γi on Θi, the joint density
γ−i on Θ−i is then given by
γ−i
(
θ−i
)
=
∏
h∈N
h=i
γh
(
θh
)
.
Supplier i’s type inﬂuences his production cost. The cost he incurs for producing the set of items j
with quality qj is denoted by c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
)
. We assume that cij is continuous as well as strictly increasing
in the supplier’s type. All cost functions cij are publicly known. Supplier i’s proﬁt g
i
j from producing
the set of items j with quality qj and selling it at price pj is
gij
(
pj , qj , θ
i
)
= pj − c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
)
. (4.1)
4.2.1 The Scoring Auction
The scoring auction works as follows. Based on his type each supplier i makes a price-quality bid(
pi, qi
)
∈ Rd+m+ consisting of a price-quality oﬀer for each of the possible non-empty item sets. That
3In case a supplier is not able to produce certain items, we can model this by letting him bid inﬁnitely high prices
for the item sets which he is unable to produce. In this way he is not chosen as the supplier for item sets that he cannot
deliver.
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is
(
pi, qi
)
=
((
pi1, q
i
1
)
, . . . ,
(
pid, q
i
d
))
with
(
pij , q
i
j
)
∈ R
1+mj
+ .
4 There is a scoring rule
Sj : R
1+mj
+ → R,
for every possible set of items j. Using this scoring rule, each price-quality oﬀer (pj , qj) for the item
set j is associated with a one-dimensional score Sj (pj , qj). The scoring rules for all item sets are
ﬁxed before the bidding starts and known to every supplier. We assume that the scoring rules are
quasi-linear, that is,
Sj (pj , qj) = φj (qj)− pj . (4.2)
In addition it is assumed that φj is continuous and that φj (qj) − c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
)
is strictly concave in qj
for all θi.
By applying the scoring rules each supplier’s original price-quality bid
(
pi, qi
)
∈ Rd+m+ is trans-
formed into a vector of scores si ∈ Rd consisting of a score sij ∈ R for every set of items j. An
allocation rule maps each proﬁle of scores s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
into an allocation of items to suppliers
(or a distribution over such allocations in case the allocation rule is probabilistic). That is, the
allocation rule determines which supplier is allowed to provide which items to the buyer. Every item
is provided by at most one supplier. This allows for the case that some items are not procured at
all. The allocation rule implies for each supplier i and each proﬁle of scores s an allocation vector
xi(s) =
(
xi0(s), x
i
1(s) . . . , x
i
d(s)
)
where xi0(s) denotes the probability that i is awarded the empty set,
that is, he does not sell any items to the buyer. Similarly, for j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, xij(s) denotes supplier
i’s probability for winning the contract giving him the right to provide the buyer with the set of
items j. In order to simplify notation we deﬁne the allocation rule
x : Rnd → [0, 1]n2
a
directly as a mapping that maps each proﬁle of scores s ∈ Rnd into an allocation vector xi(s) ∈ [0, 1]2
a
for every supplier i.
Based on a proﬁle of scores s, the winning score rule
w : Rnd → Rn2
a
4We are aware of the potential complexity of suppliers’ bids. Specifying a price-quality oﬀer for each of the 2a − 1
non-empty subsets of items is highly impractical for larger sets of items. Bid complexity and representation are generally
an issue in combinatorial auctions. However, concerns about the representation of bids and bidding languages go beyond
the scope of this chapter and are not addressed henceforth. A comprehensive introduction to bidding languages for
combinatorial auctions is given by Nisan (2006).
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assigns each supplier i with a vector of winning scores wi(s) =
(
wi0(s), w
i
1(s), . . . , w
i
d(s)
)
where wi0(s)
is the payment that i has to make in case he is awarded the empty set. Thus, we allow for the case
that a supplier has to make a payment to the buyer if he did not win any delivery contract. For
j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, wij(s) is the score that supplier i has to meet in case he wins the contract to provide
the buyer with item set j. That is, he has to provide the set of items with a quality level qj at a
price pj such that Sj (pj , qj) = w
i
j(s). This means that the buyer and the supplier only contract a
score for the item set. The actual sales price and the delivered quality is chosen by the supplier in
such a way that the contracted score is met.
4.2.2 Pseudo-types
Suppose that supplier i of type θi has won the contract to provide the set of items j to the buyer
and has to meet a score ω. He will choose a price-quality pair (pj , qj) that maximizes his proﬁt
gij
(
pj , qj , θ
i
)
while meeting the score, that is, Sj (pj , qj) = ω. Using (4.1) and (4.2), supplier i’s
optimization problem becomes
max
(pj ,qj)
(
pj − c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
(4.3)
s.t. φj (qj)− pj = ω.
Substituting for pj in the objective function yields
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
− ω. (4.4)
As can be seen in (4.4), the supplier is choosing the apparent optimal quality level independent
of the winning score that he has to meet. We assume that for every θi ∈ Θi there exits a q∗j >
0 that maximizes φj (qj) − c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
)
. Together with the strict concavity of φj (qj) − c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
)
in qj for all θ
i (see assumptions made earlier) this implies that q∗j is the only maximum and
hence argmaxqj
(
φj (qj)− c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
is well deﬁned. Furthermore, given the continuity of φj (qj)−
cij
(
qj , θ
i
)
(again, see assumptions made earlier), it follows from Berge’s (1963, p.116) Theorem of the
Maximum that
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
= φj
(
q∗j
(
θi
))
− cij
(
q∗j
(
θi
)
, θi
)
is a continuous mapping from Θi to R. Since Θi is compact and connected, its image under this
mapping is also compact and connected. Hence, the set
{
maxqj
(
φj (qj)− c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
|θi ∈ Θi
}
is a
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closed interval in R.
Based on the above we deﬁne for every θi in supplier i’s type space
ti
(
θi
)
=
(
max
q1
(
φ1 (q1)− c
i
1
(
q1, θ
i
))
, . . . ,max
qd
(
φd (qd)− c
i
d
(
qd, θ
i
)))
. (4.5)
We call ti
(
θi
)
the supplier’s pseudo-type. Note that suppliers’ pseudo-types are dependent on their
types as well as on the chosen scoring rules and the production cost functions. Supplier i’s pseudo-
type is monotonically decreasing in his type: Take θˆi, θi ∈ Θi such that θˆi is componentwise smaller
than θi. Furthermore, let q∗ij (.) denote the optimal quality level that supplier i picks for item set j
in (4.4) based on his type. Then, for each element j of his pseudo-type,
tij
(
θi
)
= φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))
− cij
(
q∗ij
(
θi
)
, θi
)
< φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))
− cij
(
q∗ij
(
θi
)
, θˆi
)
≤ φj
(
q∗ij
(
θˆi
))
− cij
(
q∗ij
(
θˆi
)
, θˆi
)
= tij
(
θˆi
)
.
Above, the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that production costs are increasing in the supplier’s
type. The second inequality follows from the optimality of q∗ij (.).
Let Θi
ti
denote the set of all types θi ∈ Θi yielding the same ti as pseudo-type, that is, Θi
ti
={
θi ∈ Θi | ti
(
θi
)
= ti
}
. A supplier’s pseudo-type space is denoted T i with T i ⊂ Rd. Pseudo-types are
privately observed and independently distributed. The distributions are common knowledge (since
the scoring rules, the production cost functions and suppliers’ type distributions are common knowl-
edge). For technical reasons we make two additional assumptions about the pseudo-type mapping.
First of all, if a set of pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero then the set of types yielding this set
of pseudo-types has also Lebesgue measure zero.5 Second, we assume that the pseudo-type space T i
is rich enough, so that for every ti ∈ T i there exists a tˆi ∈ T i that is either component wise bigger or
smaller than ti. Furthermore, we require that any two ti, tˆi ∈ T i, where ti is componentwise smaller
than tˆi, can be connected via a ﬁnite sequence of pseudo-types that is stepwise increasing. Figure
4.1 illustrates this “zigzagging” from ti to tˆi for a two-dimensional example.
Suppose that suppliers have the type proﬁle θ =
(
θ1, . . . , θn
)
and make reports
(
p1, q1
)
, . . . ,
(pn, qn) implying the proﬁle of scores s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
. The utility that supplier i derives from the
5We believe that this assumption is rather innocuous given that a supplier’s pseudo-type is monotonically decreasing
in his type. It may well be that it follows from the other properties, but this question is still open.
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ti1
ti2
ti
tˆi
Figure 4.1: Moving from ti to tˆi by only increasing one pseudo-type component at the time.
resulting outcome (x(s), w(s)) is
ui
(
s | θi
)
=
d∑
j=1
xij(s)
(
max
qj
(
φj (qj)− c
i
j
(
qj , θ
i
))
− wij(s)
)
− xi0(s)w
i
0(s).
Let us deﬁne x˜i(s) =
(
xi1(s), . . . , x
i
d(s)
)
, that is, x˜i(s) is the allocation vector xi(s) without the
winning probability for the empty set xi0(s). Now, using (4.5) the above can be written as
ui
(
s | θi
)
= x˜i(s)ti
(
θi
)
− xi(s)wi(s).6 (4.6)
Notice that supplier i’s pseudo-type captures his preference over outcomes (x(.), w(.)). (As shown by
Asker and Cantillon (2008), only quasi-linear scoring rules exhibit this property if suppliers’ types
are multi-dimensional.) By deﬁning
yi(s) = xi(s)wi(s) (4.7)
we can simplify (4.6) to
ui
(
s | θi
)
= x˜i(s)ti
(
θi
)
− yi(s). (4.8)
If suppliers have the type proﬁle θ, the corresponding buyer utility for the outcome (x(s), w(s))
6Note that x˜i(s)ti
(
θi
)
and xi(s)wi(s) are dot products. Other instances of dot products in the remainder of the
chapter are not especially pointed out.
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is
u0 (s | θ) =
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xij(s)
(
vj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))
− φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))
+ wij(s)
)
+
n∑
i=1
xi0(s)w
i
0(s)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i(s)
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ xi(s)wi(s)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜i(s)
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ yi(s). (4.9)
The ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that the price supplier i is asking for item set j is determined
by φj
(
q∗ij
(
θi
))
− wij(s) (see also (4.3)). The second equality follows from deﬁning v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
=(
v1
(
q∗i1
(
θi
))
, . . . , vd
(
q∗id
(
θi
)))
and a similar deﬁnition for φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
. The last equality follows
from (4.7).
Supplier i’s bidding strategy βi maps each of his possible types θi ∈ Θi into a price-quality bid(
pi, qi
)
∈ Rd+m+ . Together with the scoring rule, β
i implies a scored bidding strategy bi mapping each
of i’s types into a vector of scores si ∈ Rd. Note that for the determination of outcomes (allocation
vectors and winning scores), and hence the determination of the buyer’s and suppliers’ utilities, only
the reported scores are of importance and not the price-quality bids that generated them. Therefore
we concentrate in the following on scored bidding strategies.7
Consider supplier i and assume that the other suppliers bid according to the proﬁle of scored
bidding strategies b−i =
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
. If supplier i has type θi, then his expected utility
for making a scored bid si is
U i
(
si | θi
)
=
∫
Θ−i
(
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
ti
(
θi
)
− yi
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
)))
γ−i
(
θ−i
)
dθ−i
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
ti
(
θi
)
− yi
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
. (4.10)
If suppliers bid according to the proﬁle of scored bidding strategies b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
, the expected
utility of the buyer is
U0(b) =
∫
θ∈Θn
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ. (4.11)
7The analysis done in the following section goes also through (in slightly adapted form) if one allows for mixed
strategies, that is, bi maps each of supplier i’s types into a distribution over ﬁnitely many score vectors. To simplify
matters we stick to pure strategies.
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a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every supplier i ∈ N and all types θi ∈ Θi:
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))
ti
(
θi
)
− yi
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
≥ E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
ti
(
θi
)
− yi
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
∀si.
Supplier i’s scored bidding strategy might assign diﬀerent bids to types yielding the same pseudo-
type. Given a proﬁle of scored bidding strategies of the other suppliers, those bids either induce the
same expected allocation vector for i or diﬀering expected allocation vectors. We conclude this
section by formalizing this observation and introduce the following properties for suppliers’ scored
bidding strategies:
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Allocation Mixing) Consider the proﬁle of scored bidding strategies b. Supplier
i’s strategy bi employs allocation mixing if there exist types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi with ti
(
θi
)
= ti
(
θˆi
)
for which
bi
(
θi
)

= bi
(
θˆi
)
and
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]

= E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θˆi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
This property deals with the expected allocation vectors induced by bids from types yielding the same
pseudo-type. Suppose that there are some types yielding the same pseudo-type for which supplier i
makes diﬀerent scored bids. Allocation mixing means that, given a strategy proﬁle b−i of the others,
the expected allocation vectors for i induced by those bids are not the same. Furthermore, we deﬁne
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Allocation Equivalent Mixing) Consider the proﬁle of scored bidding strategies
b. Supplier i’s strategy bi employs allocation equivalent mixing if there exist types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi with
ti
(
θi
)
= ti
(
θˆi
)
for which bi
(
θi
)

= bi
(
θˆi
)
but
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θˆi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
Similar to the ﬁrst property, this one also deals with the expected allocation vectors induced by bids
from types yielding the same pseudo-type. Suppose that there are some types yielding the same
pseudo-type for which supplier i makes diﬀerent scored bids. Allocation equivalent mixing means
that, given a strategy proﬁle b−i of the others, the expected allocation vectors for i induced by those
bids are the same.
In the next section we are going to establish a link between equilibria in the scoring auction which
are based on types (that is, suppliers’ bidding strategies can specify diﬀerent bids for diﬀerent types)
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and the ones which are based on pseudo-types (that is, suppliers’ bidding strategies specify the same
bid for all types yielding the same pseudo-type). For this we ﬁnally deﬁne
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Almost Everywhere (A.E.) Coinciding Strategies) We say that the proﬁle
of scored bidding strategies b based on types coincides with the strategy proﬁle bˆ based on pseudo-types
a.e. if b and bˆ diﬀer only on a set of types with Lebesque measure zero.
4.3 Pseudo-types Are Suﬃcient Statistics
In this section we show the following: Suppose that every supplier’s bidding strategy employs allo-
cation equivalent mixing (see Deﬁnition 4.3) only for a set of types with Lebesgue measure zero. In
order to analyze the set of possible equilibria in a scoring auction and the corresponding expected
utilities of the buyer, it is then suﬃcient to consider a restricted setting in which suppliers’ bids
are based on their pseudo-types. That is, suppliers make the same scored bid for all types yielding
the same pseudo-type. Thus, we show that pseudo-types are suﬃcient statistics, rendering suppliers
original types redundant for the analysis of the scoring auction equilibria.
In a ﬁrst step we show that every equilibrium in the scoring auction is outcome equivalent to an
auxiliary, mixed strategy equilibrium. In this auxiliary equilibrium each supplier i associates all types
yielding the same pseudo-type with the same mixed bid. Two equilibria are outcome equivalent if
they both induce the same distribution over outcomes (that is allocation vectors and winning scores).
Lemma 4.1 For every equilibrium b in the scoring auction there exists an outcome equivalent mixed
strategy equilibrium b˜ such that b˜i
(
θi
)
= b˜i
(
θˆi
)
whenever ti
(
θi
)
= ti
(
θˆi
)
.
Proof
Let b =
(
b1 . . . , bn
)
be an equilibrium in the scoring auction. For each supplier i and each pseudo-
type ti ∈ T i consider the mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
mapping ti into a distribution over vectors of scores.
The support of ri
(
ti
)
consists of the diﬀerent scored bids generated by bi for all the types yielding
pseudo-type ti. That is, the support set is
{
bi
(
θi
)
| θi ∈ Θi
ti
}
. Each scored bid in the support of
ri
(
ti
)
is played with the relative frequency with which it is played by all the types in Θi
ti
. More
precisely, some scored bid si in the support of ri
(
ti
)
is played with probability
∫
θi∈Θi
ti
δbi(θi)γ
i
(
θi | Θiti
)
,
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
106 CHAPTER 4. COMBINATORIAL SCORING AUCTIONS
where γi
(
. | Θi
ti
)
denotes the conditional type distribution on Θi
ti
and δbi(θi) is deﬁned as follows
δbi(θi) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1 if bi
(
θi
)
= si
0 otherwise
.
Now we can construct a new equilibrium in which each supplier i has the same bidding strategy
for all types yielding the same pseudo-type. This is done by assigning the same mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
to
all θi ∈ Θi
ti
. That is, for all θi ∈ Θi we deﬁne b˜i
(
θi
)
= ri
(
ti
(
θi
))
.
That b˜ =
(
b˜1, . . . , b˜n
)
is indeed an equilibrium can be seen as follows: First, note that by
construction the distribution of bids coming from each supplier i remains unchanged when he switches
from bi to b˜i. Second, consider supplier i’s expected utility. Since b is an equilibrium, we have by
Deﬁnition 4.1 that for all θi ∈ Θi,
bi
(
θi
)
∈ argmax
si
E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))
ti
(
θi
)
− yi
(
si, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
Since supplier i’s private information enters his expected utility only via his pseudo-type, he is
indiﬀerent about the bids adapted by all the types yielding the same pseudo-type. That is, the bid
bi
(
θi
)
is also a best reply for all other θˆi ∈ Θi
ti(θi)
. Hence, every bid in the support of b˜i
(
θi
)
is a best
reply for all θˆi ∈ Θi
ti(θi)
. It follows that b˜i is a best response for supplier i against b−i. As mentioned
before, the distribution of bids coming from the other suppliers is not changing when switching from
b−i to b˜−i. Thus, b˜i is also a best response against b˜−i, and b˜ is indeed an equilibrium. Furthermore,
b and b˜ are outcome equivalent as both equilibria induce the same distribution over scored bids and
therefore also the same distribution over outcomes.

Above we have seen that the suppliers are indiﬀerent between an equilibrium b and its outcome
equivalent, mixed strategy counterpart b˜ (constructed as in the proof of Lemma 4.1). Their expected
utilities are the same in both. The buyer is also indiﬀerent between these two equilibria. However,
this cannot as easily be observed as in the suppliers’ case. In order to show this, we have to make
use of one of the following lemmas, more speciﬁcally Lemma 4.3. The details are given in Section
4.4. Asker and Cantillon (2008) illustrate this diﬃculty for a special case of our model in which only
one item is to be allocated among the suppliers.
Now, let us inspect the auxiliary equilibrium b˜ constructed in Lemma 4.1 a bit further. Remember
that in b˜i all types yielding the same pseudo-type ti have the same mixed bid ri(ti). By hi we denote
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a selection from the support of these mixed bids. That is,
hi
(
ti
)
∈ supp ri
(
ti
)
∀ti ∈ T i. (4.12)
Considering two pseudo-types ti, tˆi ∈ T i, we can observe that8
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti − yi
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≥ E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
ti − yi
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
. (4.13)
The above follows from b˜ being an equilibrium and every element in the support of ri
(
ti
)
being a
best response against b˜−i for all types θi ∈ Θi
ti
(see also explanation in the proof of Lemma 4.1).
Similarly, we also have that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
tˆi − yi
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≥ E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))
tˆi − yi
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
. (4.14)
By adding (4.13) and (4.14) we get the following monotonicity condition,
(
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
− E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]) (
ti − tˆi
)
≥ 0. (4.15)
Note that in order to derive the above, we employed the very same steps as in the derivation of the
monotonicity conditions in the foregoing chapters. (Check the passages leading up to Deﬁnitions 2.2
and 3.2 for details.)
Using (4.15) we can establish our next result. Speciﬁcally, we show that for any selection hi,
supplier i’s expected allocation vector E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi (.) , b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
is componentwise nondecreasing.
In the following ≤˙ denotes “componentwise smaller or equal”.
Lemma 4.2 Consider the equilibrium b˜ constructed in Lemma 4.1 where every type yielding pseudo-
type ti has the same mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
. Let hi be some selection from ri(.) (see also (4.12)). For every
supplier i and all ti, tˆi ∈ T i:
8Generally, E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
is the expected allocation vector for supplier i if he makes a scored bid si and the
other suppliers bid according to b˜−i. Given that b˜−i is a proﬁle of mixed bidding strategies, note that in this case E−i[.]
denotes the expectation taken over all type proﬁles θ−i as well as the corresponding mixed strategies b˜−i
(
θ−i
)
. The
same goes for E−i
[
yi
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
. Also, note that (4.13) is not generally valid for equilibrium bidding strategies
that involve continuous mixed bids. In our case it is valid because of the special way we constructed b˜.
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If ti≤˙tˆi then E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
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Proof
Suppose that b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
is an equilibrium in the scoring auction and that b˜ =
(
b˜1, . . . , b˜n
)
is the
corresponding auxiliary, mixed strategy equilibrium constructed in Lemma 4.1. Take some supplier
i and some pseudo-types ti, tˆi ∈ T i with ti≤˙tˆi. Note that in b˜i all of supplier i’s types yielding the
same pseudo-type ti are associated with the same mixed bid ri(ti). Now we pick some selection hi
from the support of ri(.), see also (4.12).
Via a sequence of pseudo-types
{
t˜i,0 = ti, t˜i,1, . . . , t˜i,k, t˜i,k+1 = tˆi
}
we now move from ti to tˆi. The
elements of this sequence are picked such that moving from one element to the next one requires only
a one-dimensional increase.9 Figure 4.2 illustrates this for a simple two-dimensional example.
So, with t˜i,0 as the starting point, we move on to t˜i,1 by only changing the j∗’s element. Thus,
by construction we have that t˜i,0j∗ 
= t˜
i,1
j∗ , whereas t˜
i,0
j = t˜
i,1
j for all the remaining j 
= j
∗. From (4.15)
it follows that
(
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
t˜i,1
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
− E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
t˜i,0
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]) (
t˜i,1 − t˜i,0
)
≥ 0.
Since only t˜i,1j∗ diﬀers from t˜
i,0
j∗ , whereas all the other elements of the two pseudo-types are the same,
the above inequality becomes
(
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
t˜i,1
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
j∗
− E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
t˜i,0
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
j∗
)(
t˜
i,1
j∗ − t˜
i,0
j∗
)
≥ 0,
where E−i
[
x˜i
(
., b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
j∗
signiﬁes the j∗’s element of supplier i’s expected allocation vector.
Thus, if the pseudo-type increases in the j∗’s dimension then the expected allocation vector also
weakly increases in this dimension.
Now, we repeat the above steps while moving from t˜i,1 to tˆi along the remaining elements of the
pseudo-type sequence. Using this procedure we ﬁnd that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi
(
tˆi
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
.

9One of the assumptions made in Section 4.2.2 is that the pseudo-type space is rich enough to ensure the existence
of such a sequence.
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ti1
ti2
t˜i,0 = ti
t˜i,4 = tˆi
t˜i,1
t˜i,2
t˜i,3
Figure 4.2: Moving from ti to tˆi by only increasing one dimension of the pseudo-type at the time.
Next, we show that for each supplier i, ri(.) is not mixing over scored bids which induce diﬀerent
expected allocations for i, except possibly on a set of measure zero. In order to do so we employ the
following theorem of Lavricˇ (1993).
Theorem 4.1 (Lavricˇ (1993)) Let A be a nonempty subset of Rn and let f : A → Rm be a
componentwise nondecreasing or nonincreasing function. Then the set of all points of discontinuity
of f is of Lebesgue measure zero.
Using the above result we can now state the following:
Lemma 4.3 Consider the equilibrium b˜ constructed in Lemma 4.1 where every type yielding pseudo-
type ti has the same mixed bid ri
(
ti
)
. For each supplier i, the set of pseudo-types ti ∈ T i for which
there exist elements si, sˆi in the support of ri
(
ti
)
such that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]

= E−i
[
x˜i
(
sˆi, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof
Suppose that b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
is an equilibrium in the scoring auction and that b˜ =
(
b˜1, . . . , b˜n
)
is the
corresponding auxiliary, mixed strategy equilibrium constructed in Lemma 4.1. Take some supplier
i and pick two selections hi1, hi2 from the support of ri(.) (see (4.12)). Take ti ∈ T i and consider
a sequence of pseudo-types
(
tik
)
k∈N
in T i with limk→∞
(
tik
)
= ti. More speciﬁcally, we choose the
sequence such that every element is componentwise smaller than ti. That is, tik≤˙ti for all k. (If ti
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already constitutes the lowest possible pseudo-type, one can do the following analysis by choosing a
sequence in which every element is componentwise bigger than ti.)
First of all, Lemma 4.2 implies that10
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
tik
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
∀tik.
Furthermore, from Lemma 4.2 in conjunction with Lavricˇ’s (1993) Theorem 4.1it follows that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1(.), b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
is continuous almost everywhere. Thus,
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
tik
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
→ E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
a.e.,
as tik → ti. From the above it follows that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
a.e. (4.16)
Similarly, Lemma 4.2 also implies that11
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
tik
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
∀tik.
Once more, from Lemma 4.2 in conjunction with Lavricˇ’s (1993) Theorem 4.1 it follows that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2(.), b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
is continuous almost everywhere. Thus,
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
tik
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
→ E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
a.e.,
as tik → ti. From the above it follows that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
≤˙E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
a.e. (4.17)
10In order to clarify this step, consider the following selection hi in Lemma 4.2:
h
i
(
t
∗i
)
=
{
hi1
(
t∗i
)
if t∗i = ti
hi2
(
t∗i
)
if t∗i = ti
.
11Again, in order to clarify this step, consider the following selection hi in Lemma 4.2:
h
i
(
t
∗i
)
=
{
hi1
(
t∗i
)
if t∗i = ti
hi2
(
t∗i
)
if t∗i = ti
.
Thesis_Wolf_v3.pdf
4.3. Pseudo-types Are Suﬃcient Statistics 111
Finally, (4.16) and (4.17) together imply that
E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi1
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
hi2
(
ti
)
, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
a.e.
Thus, the set of pseudo-types ti for which there exist elements si, sˆi in the support of ri
(
ti
)
such
that E−i
[
x˜i
(
si, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]

= E−i
[
x˜i
(
sˆi, b˜−i
(
θ−i
))]
has Lebesgue measure zero.

As we have already seen before, the suppliers are indiﬀerent between an equilibrium b and its
outcome equivalent, mixed counterpart b˜. Their expected utilities are the same in both equilibria.
Utilizing the above Lemma 4.3, we can now claim the same for the buyer. The details for this can
be found in Section 4.4.
Considering the auxiliary equilibrium bidding strategy b˜i, recall that the support of the mixed
bid ri
(
ti
)
consists of the diﬀerent scored bids generated by the original equilibrium strategy bi for
all the types in Θi
ti
. Suppose that for some pseudo-type ti there exist scored bids in the support of
ri
(
ti
)
which yield diﬀerent expected allocation vectors for i. This means that bi employs allocation
mixing (see Deﬁnition 4.2 in the foregoing section) for the types in Θi
ti
. Based on this observation
we ﬁnd the following result:
Lemma 4.4 In every equilibrium b in the scoring auction, supplier i’s bidding strategy bi employs
allocation mixing only for a set of types θi ∈ Θi that has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof
Suppose that b is an equilibrium in the scoring auction. Take some pseudo-type ti ∈ T i and consider
all the types yielding this pseudo-type. If there exist θi, θˆi ∈ Θi
ti
such that E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]

=
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θˆi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
then bi employs allocation mixing for Θi
ti
. From Lemma 4.3 it follows that
the set of pseudo-types for which this happens has Lebesgue measure zero. This implies that also
the corresponding set of types yielding these pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero. (Remember
from the foregoing section that one property of the pseudo-type mapping is as follows: If a set of
pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero then the set of types yielding this set of pseudo-types also
has Lebesgue measure zero.)

Let us restrict our attention to the class of equilibria in the scoring auction where suppliers employ
allocation equivalent mixing only for a zero measure of types. Using Lemma 4.4 we can now state
the following main result of this section:
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Theorem 4.2 Suppose that the set of types for which suppliers employ allocation equivalent mixing
in their bidding strategies has Lebesgue measure zero. Then, for every equilibrium in the scoring
auction based on types there exists a pseudo-type based equilibrium that coincides with it a.e. (see
Deﬁnition 4.4). Vice versa, every equilibrium in the restricted setting, where strategies are based on
pseudo-types, is also an equilibrium in the unrestricted setting.
Proof
Trivially, all equilibria in the scoring auction where suppliers are constrained to make the same bid
for all types yielding the same pseudo-type are also equilibria in the unconstrained scoring auction.
Now let us consider the opposite direction. Suppose that suppliers employ allocation equivalent
mixing in their biding strategies only for a zero measure of types. Furthermore, suppose that b is an
equilibrium in the unconstrained scoring auction. Based on b we can construct an equilibrium bˆ in
which suppliers make the same bid for types yielding the same pseudo-type and which diﬀers from b
at most on a set of measure zero. This is done as follows: For every supplier i and every ti ∈ T i we
pick some θ¯i ∈ Θi
ti
and set bˆi
(
θi
)
= bi
(
θ¯i
)
for all θi ∈ Θi
ti
. As already pointed out before, supplier i’s
private information enters his expected utility only via his pseudo-type. So, bˆi is also best response
against b−i (see argument in the proof of Lemma 4.1). From Lemma 4.4 it follows that for every
supplier i, bˆi diﬀers from bi only on a set of types with Lebesgue measure zero. Hence, bˆi is also a
best response against bˆ−i.

Considering the above proof, note that supplier i switching from his original, unconstrained scored
bidding strategy bi to the constrained one, bˆi, is inconsequential to his own expected utility. This is
because his private information enters his expected utility only via the pseudo-type (again, see the
argument in the proof of Lemma 4.1). However, if bˆi diﬀers from bi on a non-zero measure of types
then we cannot guarantee that the strategy proﬁle b−i (and hence also bˆ−i) is still a best reply for
the other suppliers.12 We can ensure that bˆi diﬀers from bi only on a zero measure of types, if bi
12In order to illustrate this point consider the following simple game. There are only two players and each player
has two possible actions. Player 1 has action set {U,D}, and player 2’s action set is {L,R}. The resulting utilities for
both players are as follows:
L R
U 0,2 0,1
D 0,0 0,1
Notice that, no matter what player 2 does, player 1’s utility is always 0. One can easily see that for example player
1 playing U with probability 1
3
and D with probability 2
3
and player 2 playing R is an equilibrium. Suppose player 1
switches to playing U with probability 1. This move is inconsequential to his own expected utility. However, player 2
could now increase his expected utility by switching from playing R to playing L.
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employs allocation mixing and allocation equivalent mixing only for a zero measure of types. With
respect to allocation mixing we can verify this analytically (see Lemma 4.4). However, for allocation
equivalent mixing we cannot do this and have to exclude it by assumption.
Thus, considering the analysis of the set of possible equilibria in a scoring auction, we can conﬁne
ourselves to a restricted setting where suppliers bid solely based on their pseudo-types. Note that the
expected utilities of the buyer and the suppliers are the same in a type based equilibrium and in the
corresponding pseudo-type based equilibrium that coincides with it almost everywhere (constructed
as in the proof of Theorem 4.2). For details see
We conclude this section by pointing out the link between Theorem 4.2 and the main result
of Asker and Cantillon (2008, Theorem 1). Suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies, mapping their
possible types into vectors of scores, together with the allocation rule and the winning score rule imply
an equilibrium outcome function which maps suppliers’ possible types into outcomes (x(.), y(.)). From
Theorem 4.2 it readily follows that for every equilibrium in the scoring auction based on types, there
exists an equilibrium based on pseudo-types which induces the same equilibrium outcome function,
except possibly on a set of types with Lebesgue measure zero. (Again, this result is of course based on
the assumption that suppliers essentially do not employ allocation equivalent mixing.) This ﬁnding
is the direct combinatorial scoring auction extension of Asker and Cantillon’s (2008) main result
about the role of pseudo-types as suﬃcient statistics in single item scoring auctions (their Theorem
1). However, their result is stated in terms of equilibrium outcome functions rather than in terms of
the underlying equilibrium bidding strategies (like our Theorem 4.2).
Similar to Asker and Cantillon (2008) we use two main facts in order to establish Lemma 4.4
(stating that the set of types for which suppliers’ equilibrium strategies employ allocation mixing
has zero measure). First, we construct for every equilibrium in the scoring auction an auxiliary,
mixed strategy equilibrium (see Lemma 4.1). We do this in the same way as Asker and Cantillon
(2008). Suppliers’ bidding strategies in this auxiliary equilibrium are based on their pseudo-types.
This equilibrium is constructed in such a way that a supplier’s equilibrium bidding strategy speciﬁes
a mixed bid for each of his pseudo-types. Considering a speciﬁc pseudo-type ti, the support of such a
mixed bid consists of all the pure bids that the original equilibrium bidding function speciﬁes for the
types yielding ti as the pseudo-type. Second, we prove that for almost all pseudo-types this support
does not contain pure bids yielding diﬀerent expected allocations for the supplier (see Lemma 4.3).
In order to establish this result we use a diﬀerent method than Asker and Cantillon (2008). Our
method highlights the link to the monotonicity conditions used in the foregoing chapters (see (4.15)
for details).
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4.4 Technical Note Concerning the Buyer’s Utility
Let b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
be an equilibrium in the scoring auction. In Lemma 4.1 we have constructed
a new mixed strategy equilibrium b˜ which is outcome equivalent to b. That is, b˜ induces the same
distribution over scored bids as b. Hence, it also induces the same distribution over outcomes. As
pointed out before, it can be easily observed that suppliers are indiﬀerent between b and b˜ as their
expected utilities are the same in both. The same can be claimed for the buyer, however the argument
is not as straightforward as in the suppliers’ case. The reason is that for the buyer’s expected utility
not only the overall distribution of outcomes is of interest, but also the question which outcomes
are associated with which type-realizations of the suppliers. To illustrate this point we start by
considering a simpliﬁed setting where we only change the bidding strategy of one supplier.
Consider bˆ =
(
bˆ1, b2, . . . , bn
)
where bˆ1 is constructed based on b1 as described in the proof to
Lemma 4.1. By the logic described in this proof, bˆ is an outcome equivalent equilibrium to b. If
suppliers bid according to b, the expected utility of the buyer (given in (4.11)) can be decomposed
into two terms. Speciﬁcally,
U0(b) =
∫
θ∈Θ
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ∈Θ
[
n∑
i=2
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ (4.18)
+
∫
θ∈Θ
[
x˜1(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))
− φ
(
q∗1
(
θ1
)))
+ y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Now, let us consider the ﬁrst term in (4.18). Take some i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and look at
∫
θ∈Θ
[
x˜i(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))
+ yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θi∈Θi
[
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))] (
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− φ
(
q∗i
(
θi
)))]
γi
(
θi
)
dθi (4.19)
+
∫
θ∈Θ
[
yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Since by construction the distribution of suppliers’ bids under b is the same as under bˆ, the second
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term of (4.19) is not changing if we switch from equilibrium b to bˆ. That is,13
∫
θ∈Θ
[
yi(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Θ
[
yi(bˆ(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Similarly, since by construction bˆi = bi and the distribution of bids coming from the other suppliers
is the same under b and bˆ, we ﬁnd that for all θi ∈ Θi
E−i
[
x˜i
(
bi
(
θi
)
, b−i
(
θ−i
))]
= E−i
[
x˜i
(
bˆi
(
θi
)
, bˆ−i
(
θ−i
))]
.
Thus, the ﬁrst term of (4.19) is also not changing if we switch from b to bˆ.14 Hence, we ﬁnd that
overall the ﬁrst term in (4.18) is not changing if we switch from b to bˆ.
Now, let us consider supplier 1 and the second term in (4.18). Similar to (4.19) we have that
∫
θ∈Θ
[
x˜1(b(θ))
(
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))
− φ
(
q∗1
(
θ1
)))
+ y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ1∈Θ1
[
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))] (
v
(
q∗1
(
θ1
))
− φ
(
q∗1
(
θ1
)))]
γ1
(
θ1
)
dθ1
+
∫
θ∈Θ
[
y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ. (4.20)
Again, since the distribution of suppliers’ bids under b is by construction the same as under bˆ, the
second term of (4.20) is not changing if we switch from b to bˆ. That is
∫
θ∈Θ
[
y1(b(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Θ
[
y1(bˆ(θ))
]
γ(θ)dθ.
Also as before, the distribution of bids coming from the other suppliers (suppliers other than 1 that
is) is by construction the same under both b and bˆ. However, since bˆ1 is not necessarily equal to b1,
we cannot guarantee that for all θ1 ∈ Θ1
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))]
= E−1
[
x˜1
(
bˆ1
(
θ1
)
, bˆ−1
(
θ−1
))]
.15
13Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, yi(bˆ(.)) already incorporates the expectation over supplier 1’s
mixed strategies. The same applies to y1(bˆ(.)) later in this section.
14Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, E−i[.] denotes the expectation taken over all type proﬁles θ
−i
as well as the corresponding mixed strategies of supplier 1.
15Given that supplier 1 has mixed strategies under bˆ1, E−1[.] denotes the expectation taken over all type proﬁles
θ−1 as well as the corresponding mixed strategies of supplier 1.
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Nevertheless, from Lemma 4.3 it follows that the set of types θ1 ∈ Θ1 for which
E−1
[
x˜1
(
b1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))]

= E−1
[
x˜1
(
bˆ1
(
θ1
)
, b−1
(
θ−1
))]
has Lebesque measure zero. Thus, we can still guarantee that the ﬁrst term of (4.20) is not changing
if we switch from b to bˆ.
Based on the above analysis we ﬁnd that
U0(b)− U0(bˆ) = 0.
That is, the expected utility for the buyer in equilibrium b is the same as in bˆ. Furthermore, changing
the bidding strategies of the other suppliers (2, . . . , n) one by one and applying the above analysis
yields that also
U0(b)− U0(b˜) = 0.
That is, the expected utility for the buyer in equilibrium b is the same as in b˜.
4.5 Application
The main result of Section 4.3 is the multi-item extension of Asker and Cantillon’s (2008) result that
pseudo-types are a suﬃcient statistic in quasi-linear, single item scoring auctions. They use their
result to establish a link between single item scoring auctions and the well studied standard single
item IPV (independent private values) auctions. They demonstrate how knowledge about these IPV
auctions can be used for the equilibrium analysis in single item scoring auctions. Similar to them, we
can establish a link between combinatorial scoring auctions and the regular, price-only combinatorial
IPV auctions.
We observe that for every combinatorial scoring auction described in Section 4.2 there exists a
related combinatorial price-only auction allocating a items to n bidders. For this price-only auction
• the allocation rule is x,
• the payment rule is y =
(
y1, . . . , yn
)
(see (4.7) for deﬁnition),
• bidder i’s type is his pseudo-type and is distributed accordingly,
• bidder i’s utility function is speciﬁed according to (4.8), that is, given a true type ti his utility
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for a proﬁle of reports s =
(
s1, . . . , sn
)
is
ui
(
s | ti
)
= x˜i(s)ti − yi(s)
(see right above (4.6) for the deﬁnition of x˜i).
Note that a supplier’s bidding strategy in the above price-only auction is a mapping T i → Rd. Every
bidding strategy like this can be seen as a pseudo-type based bidding strategy Θi → Rd specifying
the same bid for all types yielding the same pseudo-type.
The above observation implies that, if allocation equivalent mixing is essentially absent, we can
use the existing literature on combinatorial price-only auctions to analyze the equilibria in the scor-
ing auction. In the following we illustrate this by constructing an eﬃcient scoring auction based
on probably the most famous combinatorial auction, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
(Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)). However, note that the classic combinatorial auction
literature has to oﬀer much more than just the standard VCG auction, see Cramton, Shoham and
Steinberg (2006) for an overview. A recent stream of literature for example is dealing with suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of equilibria. Chapters 2 and 3 are part of this stream. A more detailed
literature overview regarding this topic can be found in the corresponding introductory sections to
these chapters. Another interesting stream of literature is concerned with ways to reduce the commu-
nication complexity and the computational complexity of the allocation algorithm in combinatorial
auctions, see for example Holzman, Kﬁr-Dahav, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004), Nisan and Ronen
(2000), Bartal, Gonen and Nisan (2003) as well as Dobzinski, Nisan and Shapira (2006).
An additional example of the literature that can be used for the equilibrium analysis of com-
binatorial scoring auctions is the literature on bidder’s utility in direct revelation mechanisms with
multi-dimensional private information, see for example the revenue equivalence results in Chapter
3 as well as Krishna and Maenner (2001). Their results imply the following extension of Asker
and Cantillon’s (2008) “Expected Utility Equivalence”-Theorem for single item scoring auctions to
combinatorial scoring auctions. Note that in the following we consider pseudo-type based equilibria
where a supplier assigns the same scored bid to all types yielding the same pseudo-type. We are
going to denote a supplier’s bidding strategy as bi
(
ti
)
, that is directly as a mapping T i → Rd.
Corollary 4.1 Consider two scoring auctions (S1, . . . , Sd, x, w) and (S1, . . . , Sd, x
′, w′) as well as a
pair of corresponding pseudo-type based equilibria b and b′. Suppose that all pseudo-type spaces are
convex.
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1) x(b(t)) = x′(b′(t)), ∀t ∈ T and
2) U i
(
bi
(
t∗i
)
| t∗i
)
= U ′i
(
b′i
(
t∗i
)
| t∗i
)
for some ﬁxed t∗i ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ N ,
then the equilibria b and b′ of the two auctions generate the same expected utility for the buyer.
Condition 1 asserts that both allocation rules and equilibria yield the same allocation vectors for each
possible pseudo-type realization of the suppliers. Condition 2 states that both equilibria generate
the same expected utility for supplier i with ﬁxed pseudo-type t∗i. In order to see why Corollary 4.1
holds, it is useful to observe that the buyer’s expected utility (see also (4.11)) can be rewritten as
U0(b) =
∫
t∈T
[
n∑
i=1
x˜i(b(t))Eθi∈Θi
ti
[
v
(
q∗i
(
θi
))
− ci
(
q∗i
(
θi
)
, θi
)]]
π(t)dt (4.21)
−
n∑
i=1
∫
ti∈T i
U i
(
bi
(
ti
)
| ti
)
πi
(
ti
)
dti,
where πi denotes supplier i’s density on T i, π denotes the joint density on T and ci
(
q∗i
(
θi
)
, θi
)
=(
ci1
(
q∗i1
(
θi
)
, θi
)
, . . . , cid
(
q∗id
(
θi
)
, θi
))
. The optimal quality levels chosen by a supplier, qi∗, depend
only on his type and the scoring rules. It follows from Conditions 1 that the ﬁrst part of (4.21) is the
same for both equilibria. Remember (see also (4.10)) that supplier i’s expected utility U i
(
bi
(
ti
)
| ti
)
consists of his valuation for his expected allocation minus his expected payment. Given Condition
1, supplier i’s expected allocations are the same for both equilibria. Furthermore, the revenue
equivalence Theorem 3.5 in Chapter 3 asserts that supplier i’s expected payments for both equilibria
diﬀer only by an additive constant. By Condition 2 this constant is ﬁxed to equal zero. It follows
hat U i
(
bi
(
ti
)
| ti
)
is the same for both equilibria. Hence, the second part of (4.21) is the same for
both equilibria as well.
4.5.1 The VCG Scoring Auction
The VCG scoring auction is speciﬁed by the scoring rules (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
d), the allocation rule x
∗ and
the winning score rule w∗. In the following we deﬁne these rules. First of all, the scoring rules (see
(4.2)) reﬂect the buyer’s valuation. That is, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
S∗j (pj , qj) = vj (qj)− pj .
Note that in this case the jth element of a supplier’s pseudo-type is the maximum level of welfare that
this supplier can create by producing and subsequently selling the set of items j. Suppose suppliers
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have the pseudo-type proﬁle t. The welfare generated by a proﬁle of allocation vectors χ is
W (χ, t) =
n∑
i=1
χ˜iti,
where χ˜i denotes supplier i’s allocation vector χi without the element for the empty item set (see
also right above (4.6) for a deﬁnition).16
Based on a reported proﬁle of scores s, the allocation rule in the VCG scoring auction distributes
items over suppliers in such a way that welfare is maximized. This yields for every supplier one
set of items j∗ (possibly the empty set) that he is contracted to deliver. So, in his corresponding
allocation vector x∗i(s) we have that x∗ij∗(s) = 1 whereas x
∗i
j (s) = 0 for all j 
= j
∗. Furthermore,
x∗(s) maximizes W (., s). Denoting the maximal level of welfare achievable based on score proﬁle s
by Wmax(s), we have that
Wmax(s) =
n∑
i=1
x˜∗i(s)si.
The welfare generated by suppliers other than i is
W−imax(s) =
∑
h=i
x˜∗h(s)sh.
Similarly to the above we deﬁne Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
as the maximum level of welfare that can be achieved
by the others without supplier i being present.
The winning score rule w∗ is now deﬁned as follows. For the item set that he is winning (j∗),
every supplier is contracted a score reﬂecting the marginal impact that his presence has on the welfare
generated by all the others. For all other item sets the assigned score is zero. That is, given a report
proﬁle s,
w∗ij∗(s) = Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
−W−imax(s),
16To see this, note that if ∀j, φj(.) = vj(.) then the buyer utility in (4.9) reduces to
u
0 (s | θ) =
n∑
i=1
y
i(s).
Adding the suppliers’ utilities (given in 4.8) now yields
u
0 (s | θ) +
n∑
i=1
u
i
(
s | θi
)
=
n∑
i=1
x˜
i(s)ti
(
θ
i
)
.
So welfare depends only on the suppliers’ allocation vectors and pseudo-types.
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whereas w∗ij (s) = 0 for all j 
= j
∗. Using (4.7) this implies that
y∗i(s) = x∗i(s)w∗i(s)
= Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
−W−imax(s).
In the VCG scoring auction described above, it is a dominant strategy for suppliers to make a
scored bid that corresponds to their respective pseudo-type. That is, b =
(
b1, . . . , bn
)
with bi
(
θi
)
=
ti
(
θi
)
is a dominant strategy equilibrium in the VCG scoring auction. This result can be obtained
directly by observing that the combinatorial price-only auction that relates to the VCG scoring
auction above (as described in the beginning of Section 4.5) is the renowned VCG mechanism. This
mechanism eﬃciently allocates the items and charges bidder i with a payment yi that corresponds
to the impact that his presence in the auction has on the welfare generated by the others. It is a
well-known result (see for example Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)) that in the VCG mechanism it is
a dominant strategy for bidders to truthfully bid their type ti.
For completeness we state again the rationale for this result. Suppose that the other bidders have
a ﬁxed report proﬁle s−i. Then, the utility of bidder i with type ti for making a report si is
ui
(
s | ti
)
= x˜∗i(s)ti − y∗i(s)
= x˜∗i(s)ti +W−imax(s)− Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
≤ Wmax
(
ti, s−i
)
− Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
= x˜∗i
(
ti, s−i
)
ti +W−imax
(
ti, s−i
)
− Ŵmax
(
s−i
)
= x˜∗i
(
ti, s−i
)
ti − y∗i
(
ti, s−i
)
= ui
(
ti, s−i | ti
)
.
The ﬁrst and ﬁfth equality follow from (4.8). The second and fourth equality follow from the deﬁnition
of y∗i. The third equality follows from the deﬁnition of x∗. Thus, truthful reporting is indeed optimal.
However, note that the close link to the VCG mechanism does not only imply that the VCG
scoring auction shares the same merits, like for example the implementation in dominant strategies
(so a supplier does not need to know the types of the other bidders in order to play his dominant
strategy). It also implies that the VCG scoring auction exhibits the same weaknesses, like the
communication and computational complexity. A detailed discussion of the pros and cons of the
VCG mechanism can be found in Ausubel and Milgrom (2006).
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended the work of Asker and Cantillon (2008) about the analysis of single
item scoring auctions with one-dimensional pseudo-types to a framework featuring multiple items
and multi-dimensional pseudo-types. In doing this we face several technical diﬃculties and have to
make simplifying assumptions about the pseudo-type mapping in order to overcome these problems.
First of all, we assume that if a set of pseudo-types has Lebesgue measure zero then the set of
types yielding this set of pseudo-types also has Lebesgue measure zero. This property is not explicitly
mentioned in Asker and Cantillon (2008) because they state their results in terms of equilibrium
outcome functions rather than in terms of equilibrium bidding strategies as we do. In this case this
property is not needed. However, if Asker and Cantillon (2008) would state their results also in terms
of equilibrium bidding strategies, they would need this property of the pseudo-type mapping as well.
We consider the question whether this property follows from other properties of the setting also for
their framework as still open.
Second, we assume that the pseudo-type space T i is rich enough, so that for every ti ∈ T i there
exists a tˆi ∈ T i that is either component wise bigger or smaller than ti. Furthermore, we require
that any two ti, tˆi ∈ T i, where ti is componentwise smaller than tˆi, can be connected via a ﬁnite
sequence of pseudo-types that is stepwise increasing. We have to invoke these technical properties in
order to make the presented proof technique work. Though it is not nice that we have to make these
assumptions, it is the best we can do at this moment. As usual, if one switches from a one-dimensional
framework to a multi-dimensional framework, things become quickly very complicated.
Finally, we want to remark the following. In (4.15) we derive a monotonicity condition similar
to the ones presented in the two foregoing chapters. This monotonicity condition together with the
assumption of a “rich enough” pseudo-type space (see remarks above) is used to establish the result
in Lemma 4.2. Together with Lavricˇ’s (1993) Theorem 4.1 this Lemma is then used in the proof
of Lemma 4.3 to establish that the expected allocation mapping is continuous a.e.. It would be
interesting to see whether this can be shown to follow directly from the monotonicity condition in
(4.15). However, at this point we do not investigate this question and consider it a topic for further
research.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Iedere dag komen we in aanraking met strategische situaties waarvan de uitkomst afhangt van onze
interactie met andere mensen. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan alledaagse situaties zoals het stemmen met
collega’s over waar te gaan lunchen, het bieden op een zeldzame Ramones plaat op Ebay of het
spelen van een spelletje Risk met vrienden. Speltheorie probeert het gedrag van mensen in zulke
strategische situaties wiskundig te modelleren.
Het onderwerp van dit proefschrift valt onder een deelgebied van de speltheorie genaamd mecha-
nism design. Mechanism design is de tak van speltheorie die zich bezig houdt met het ontwerpen van
de regels van het spel. Een spel kan verschillende uitkomsten hebben. Iedere participerende agent
heeft een verzameling van mogelijke uitkomsten tot zijn beschikking waaruit hij kan kiezen. Hoe
precies, wordt bepaald door een mechanisme dat de regels van het spel deﬁnieert. Zo’n mechanisme
bestaat uit twee regels, een toewijzingsregel en een betalingsregel. De toewijzingsregel bepaalt de
uitkomst van het spel, gebaseerd op de acties van alle agenten. De betalingsregel bepaalt op eenzelfde
manier de uitbetaling die iedere agent moet doen of ontvangt.
Om het bovenstaande te illustreren bekijken we de veiling van een schilderij als voorbeeld. De
agenten in dit veilingspel zijn de deelnemende bieders. Een mogelijke uitkomst van de veiling is
bijvoorbeeld dat bieder A het schilderij wint. Een andere uitkomst zou zijn dat bieder B wint. De
actie die een bieder kan ondernemen om de uitkomst van de veiling te be¨ınvloeden is het bieden van
geld voor het schilderij. Gebaseerd op de biedingen van alle bieders bepaalt de toewijzingsregel wie
het schilderij krijgt en de betalingsregel bepaalt hoeveel iedereen moet betalen.
De voorkeuren van een agent voor bepaalde uitkomsten worden uitgedrukt door middel van zijn
waarderingsfunctie. Zijn type vertegenwoordigt de beschikbare informatie die belangrijk is voor zijn
waardering van de verschillende uitkomsten. In het voorbeeld van de veiling van het schilderij kan
het type van de agent bijvoorbeeld een weergave zijn van hoezeer hij het schilderij mooi vindt. In
129
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dit proefschrift richten we ons op direct revelation mechanisms, een speciale klasse van mechanismen.
In een direct revelation mechanism is het aankondigen van een type de enige actie die een agent kan
ondernemen. De strategie van een agent wordt dominant genoemd als het zijn nut maximaliseert
voor iedere mogelijke combinatie van acties die door de andere agenten ondernomen worden. Een
doel van de ontwerper van het mechanisme kan zijn om een direct revelation mechanism te ontwer-
pen dat dominant strategy incentive compatible is. Dit betekent het ontwikkelen van een mechanisme
zodanig dat het eerlijk aankondigen van zijn eigen type een dominante strategie is voor iedere agent.
In dit proefschrift bekijken we Bayes-Nash situaties. In deze situaties kennen agenten de types van
de anderen niet maar is de verdeling van mogelijke types voor iedere agent publiekelijk bekend. Meer
speciﬁek bekijken we Bayes-Nash incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms. Dit betekent
dat het waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren van zijn eigen type het verwachte nut van iedere agent maxi-
maliseert, gegeven dat alle andere agenten ook waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren.
In een recente stroming van de literatuur bekijken onderzoekers de karakterisering van domi-
nant strategy incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms in termen van alleen de allocatie.
Anders gezegd, ze willen precies die toewijzingsregels beschrijven waarvoor ze het bestaan van een
betalingsregel kunnen garanderen die het resulterende mechanisme dominant strategy incentive com-
patible maakt.
In Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 passen we dit idee toe op Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms.
In Hoofdstuk 2 bekijken we direct revelation mechanisms in situaties waar agenten onafhankelijk
verdeelde, eendimensionale types en quasi-lineaire nutsfuncties hebben. Agenten mogen afhankelijke
waarderingen hebben. We laten zien dat monotoniciteit, een voorwaarde op de toewijzingsregel, een
noodzakelijke voorwaarde is voor Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Deze voorwaarde stelt dat de
verwachte toename van waardering van een agent door het waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren van een
type t in plaats van het verkeerd rapporteren van een type s minimaal even groot moet zijn als de
verwachte toename door het verkeerd rapporteren van t in plaats van s.
Om vast te stellen dat monotoniciteit voldoende is voor Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility ge-
bruiken we een netwerk aanpak vergelijkbaar met die van Gui, Mu¨ller en Vohra (2004) en Saks
en Yu (2005) in hun werk over dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Aangezien de
beperkingen inherent in de deﬁnitie van Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility een natuurlijke netwerk
interpretatie hebben, bouwen we complete gerichte grafen voor de ruimte van de types van de agen-
ten. Om dit te doen associe¨ren we een knoop met ieder type en zetten we een gerichte zijde tussen
ieder geordend paar knopen. De lengte van de zijde die van de knoop geassocieerd met type s naar de
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knoop voor type t gaat is gedeﬁnieerd als de kosten van manipulatie. Dat wil zeggen, het verwachte
verschil in de waardering van een agent voor het waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren van s in plaats van
het verkeerd rapporteren van t. Monotoniciteit komt overeen met de afwezigheid van 2-cycli met
negatieve lengte in deze grafen.
We laten zien dat een toewijzingsregel Bayes-Nash incentive compatible is, dan en slechts dan
als de grafen boven beschreven geen cycli met negatieve lengte hebben. Dit resultaat is het Bayes-
Nash equivalent van een vondst van Rochet (1987) die laat zien dat dominant strategy incentive
compatibility beschreven kan worden in termen van de afwezigheid van cycli met negatieve lengte in
vergelijkbare grafen.
We laten zien dat we extra restricties moeten opleggen om te kunnen aantonen dat monotoniciteit
voldoende is voor Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Zulke condities zijn decomposition mono-
tonicity van de kosten van manipulatie of dat de waarderingsfuncties van de agenten voldoen aan
niet-afnemende verwachte verschillen. Voor deze restricties kunnen we aantonen dat monotoniciteit
voldoende is. Resultaten van Myerson (1981), Malakhov en Vohra (2004) en Feng (2008) voor Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible mechanisms volgen als speciale gevallen van onze resultaten. Hun setting
kan worden gevouwen in ons kader, dat een bredere klasse van ruimtes van types en alternatieve
vormen van afhankelijkheid tussen waarderingen van agenten toelaat.
Verder laten we zien hoe we bijbehorende betalingsregels voor Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
toewijzingsregels kunnen construeren door gebruik te maken van de lengte van het kortste pad in de
grafen van de agenten. Een toewijzingsregel voldoet aan revenue equivalence als alle betalingsregels
die het Bayes-Nash incentive compatible maken dezelfde verwachte uitbetaling opleveren tot aan een
additieve constante. We tonen aan dat revenue equivalence op gaat als de ruimtes van de types van
de agenten convex zijn en hun verwachte waarderingen convex zijn in hun eigen types. Daarmee
tonen we revenue equivalence aan onder dezelfde condities als Krishna en Maenner (2001).
In Hoofdstuk 3 breiden we de analyse van Hoofdstuk 2 uit naar situaties met multidimensionale
type ruimtes. We volgen dezelfde netwerk aanpak als voorheen en houden de structuur van het
hoofdstuk zo dicht mogelijk bij het vorige. In dit hoofdstuk moeten we de ruimtes van de types van
de agenten beperkten tot convex en hun verwachte waarderingsfuncties tot convex in hun eigen types.
We laten zien dat als de kosten van de manipulatie decomposition monotone zijn of de waarderings-
functies voldoen aan niet-afnemende verwachte verschillen, dan monotoniciteit in combinatie met een
integreerbaarheidsconditie zowel noodzakelijk als voldoende is voor Bayes-Nash incentive compatibil-
ity. Hoewel enkel monotoniciteit niet meer voldoende is, bereiken we nog steeds een karakterisering
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die puur gebaseerd is op de waarderingen en de toewijzingsregel. Karakteriseringsresultaten van
Jehiel, Moldovanu en Stacchetti (1999), Jehel en Moldovanu (2001) en Mu¨ller, Perea en Wolf (2007b)
volgens als speciale gevallen van onze resultaten. Wederom kunnen we revenue equivalence aantonen
onder dezelfde voorwaarden als Krishna en Maenner (2001).
In Hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we scoring veilingen. In het voorbeeld van de veiling van het schilderij
is er alleen competitie tussen de bieders via de prijs. In principe kondigt iedere bieder een prijs aan
die hij wil betalen en wie het hoogste bod doet krijgt het schilderij. Echter, soms is de prijs van
een voorwerp niet het enige dat van belang is en spelen niet-monetaire zaken ook een rol. Denk
bijvoorbeeld aan verscheidene bouwbedrijven die strijden om een overheidscontract om een snelweg
aan te leggen. Een belangrijk punt is natuurlijk de prijs. Een ander is bijvoorbeeld de tijd die nodig
is om het project te voltooien. Een bedrijf kan bieden om de snelweg aan te leggen voor 20 miljoen
binnen 6 maanden terwijl een ander bedrijf biedt om het te doen voor 15 miljoen maar binnen 9
maanden.
Een methode die veel gebruikt wordt voor de analyse van scoring veilingen is om de setting te
transformeren in een van een standaard, price-only veiling. Dan kunnen bekende resultaten voor
deze price-only veilingen toegepast worden. We doen dit voor een scoring veiling waarin verschil-
lende items met meervoudige attributen toegewezen moeten worden. We laten zien hoe deze setting
te transformeren tot een combinatorie¨le veiling die lijkt op de setting met lineaire waarderingen be-
sproken in Sectie 3.4.1 van het vorige hoofdstuk. Hiermee breiden we het werk van Asker en Cantillon
(2008) uit tot een kader met meervoudige items. Asker en Cantillon (2008) bekijken een scoring veil-
ing waarin een enkel item met meervoudige attributen moet worden toegewezen. Zij transformeren
dit tot een price-only veiling met een enkel item.
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